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ABSTRACT
AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANISM IN BLACK AND WHITE
SEPTEMBER 2016
MATTHEW C. MACWILLIAMS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by Professor Brian F. Schaffner
How can African Americans be described simultaneously by political scientists as one of
the most liberal and the most authoritarian groups in the United States? This conundrum frames
the puzzle at the core of this dissertation.
I argue that the political behavior of many African Americans is caught in a tug of war
between their racial identity and their predisposition to authoritarianism. When the issue at hand
engages African Americans’ authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism can trump racial
identity, produce attitudes that defy conventional wisdom, and dash the common theoretical
assumption that African American political behavior is homogeneous. Counter to some of the
accepted theories of political science, I demonstrate that African American authoritarians are less
likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their racial identity, African American political
behavior is not always more liberal than Whites, and African American worldviews and political
behaviors, when viewed through the lens of authoritarianism, are quite often heterogeneous and
differentiated.
Based on these findings, I contend that any theory of authoritarianism must include
African Americans in its analysis or at least present very persuasive arguments for their
exclusion. The fact is that 65 years after Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford’s
Authoritarian Personality was published, the study of authoritarianism finds itself once again at a
crossroads. Authoritarianism was originally conceived as a universal personality trait whose
scope recognized no cultural, racial, geographic, or political boundaries. But the central theories
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of authoritarian activation and polarization today are predicated on data that exclude the most
authoritarian racial group in America – African Americans – from analysis.
It is time for political science to revise the contemporary research on authoritarianism to
include African Americans. This is not an abstract exercise. It is a theoretical necessity. The result
will not only improve the study of authoritarianism; it will also advance the broader inquiry that
is political science as some of the discipline’s theoretical certainties become shibboleths, the
collateral damage of an empirical inquiry into American Authoritarianism in Black and White.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: AFRICAN AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANS
In an interview on Meet the Press (NBC News, 2015) he supported limiting the
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights of a minority group saying, “I would not advocate
that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation. I absolutely would not agree with that.” He
is “extremely pro-2nd Amendment” and against a woman’s right to choose. He believes
we must “end the war on God,” end Obamacare, use torture to fight terrorism, “covertly
spy on government workers to make them work harder,” and stop gay marriage (Carson,
2016, para 6).
His name is Ben Carson. He is a Republican candidate for President of the United
States. He is an African American and to many in the media he “is not a candidate but an
affront. A personal insult. After all, an educated Black man is supposed to think like,
well, Barack Obama.” (Lord, 2015, para. 24)
Ben Carson’s views are not an anomaly. Many African Americans share them.
For example, according to exit polls, 70% of African Americans voted to ban gay
marriage in 2008 in California (Cilliza & Sullivan, 2013). The so-called defection of
African American support for gay civil rights and liberties surprised political
commentators and scholars and angered liberal organizers and activists around the
country who assumed African Americans were monolithically and reflexively liberal
voters (Williams, 2011). It contributed to the electoral defeat of gay marriage in one of
the most liberal states in America. And it occurred on the same ballot in which 90% of
California African Americans voted for Barack Obama for President.
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The policies espoused by Ben Carson and the vote of African Americans against
civil rights in California reveal something quite important and all too often overlooked by
political science about Black Americans: The political behavior of many African
Americans is caught in a tug of war between their racial identity and the predisposition of
many Blacks to authoritarianism. When the issue at hand engages African Americans’
authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism can trump racial identity, produce attitudes
that defy conventional wisdom, and dash the common theoretical assumption that African
American political behavior is homogeneous.
African Americans: Liberal Authoritarians?
Race is one of the three symbolic predispositions identified by Sears and others
(McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1993; Sears & Kinder, 1971) and is a fundamental
organizing principle of American politics (Kinder & Winter, 2001). As such, race is
thought to structure and define the political behavior of African Americans. The fates of
African Americans are said to be linked. Their individual identity is subsumed by their
group racial identity (Dawson, 1995; Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Tate, 1994),
producing behavior that is in large part undifferentiated and a voting block that is
attitudinally homogeneous (Dawson, 1995; Haynie, 2001; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004;
Tate, 1994) and divided from Whites by their color (Kinder, 1996).1 African Americans
are a captive of the Democratic Party (Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) and
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Scholars and writers including Nteta (2012), Robinson (2011), Tate (2010), Waters (2009), and West
(1993) disagree with the conventional assumption that African American attitudes and political behavior
are monolithic, liberal, and governed primarily by the Black utility heuristic commonly referred to as linked
fate (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994). While recognizing the “strong identification of Black as a race” and the
liberal policy positions that can engender, Tate also acknowledged in From Protest to Politics that “on
certain issues, such as homosexuality and gender equality, Blacks are somewhat more conservative than
Whites” (Tate, 1994, p. 38).
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“are always more liberal than Whites, and the differences are substantial” (Kinder &
Winter, 2001, p. 441).2
Yet, African Americans are also purported to be “the most authoritarian racial
group in the United States, by far” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 141).
Authoritarianism is a “core political predisposition, on a par with party identification and
political ideology” (Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005). It is an important predictor of
political behavior (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et
al., 2005; Stenner, 2005), structuring preferences on a wide range of issues, driving
presidential and congressional voting behavior, and underlying the growing polarization
in contemporary American politics (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
By definition and behavior authoritarians are not liberals. Much of the extensive
scholarly literature concludes that authoritarianism and political conservatism are
inextricably linked (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer, 2006; Christie,
1954; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Kinder & Kam, 2009;
Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). Some social scientists consider authoritarianism the
psychological basis of conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) or even
a virulent variety of political conservatism (Lavine et al., 2005). But contemporary
scholar Karen Stenner (2005) makes a critical distinction between authoritarianism and
conservativism. She argues that while authoritarianism is “an aversion” to different

2

To be accurate, Kinder and Winter (2001) appear to be saying that African Americans are “always more
liberal than Whites” on issues with an overt or covert (but commonly assumed) racial dimension – for
example affirmative action or social welfare spending (p. 441). In a footnote, Kinder also explains that the
racial divide between Blacks and Whites predominates in racial and social welfare issues domains, but is
“less impressive” in other areas including social issues, immigration, and foreign policy (see #3, p. 441).
Theoretically, on issues where the racial divide is smaller or nonexistent (see Kinder, 1996; Schuman,
1997), African Americans have a lower probability of holding more liberal attitudes than Whites. Not
coincidentally, culture war social issues, immigration, and foreign policy are also the issue domains in
which the authoritarian predisposition is more likely to shape attitudes.
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“people and beliefs,” status quo conservatism “is an aversion to…change,” and laissezfaire conservatism is simply a commitment to free market principles (pp. 150-154).
Authoritarian scholars also have fundamental disagreements concerning the
provenance of authoritarianism. Most conclude that it is either a socially learned attitude,
a powerful, inherited personality trait, or a predisposition whose development is abetted
or constrained by social learning (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996,
2006; Duckitt, 1989; Duckitt, 1992; Feldman, 2003a; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009;
Lavine et al., 2005; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002; Merolla & Zechmeister,
2009; Oesterreich, 2005; Rickert, 1998; Stenner, 2005). Other scholars sidestep the
debate over the origins of authoritarianism entirely to focus on the study of its effects.
These scholars stipulate in their work that authoritarianism precedes the formation of
party identification and ideology, the inculcation of religious beliefs, and the learning and
socialization provided by formal education (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
While scholars differ on the specific origin of authoritarianism, threat has always
been thought to play an important role in the development of authoritarian behavior and
the expression of authoritarian attitudes. Today, some argue that authoritarianism is
activated by normative threat (Feldman, 2003a; Stenner, 2005). Others argue that
physical threats are also important triggers of authoritarian attitudes and behavior
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). In either case, the linkage between threat and
authoritarianism has remained a central tenet of authoritarian studies for more than seven
decades (Altemeyer, 1996).
Whether authoritarianism is conceptualized as an individual personality trait
forged in the crucible of childhood (Adorno et al., 1950), a socially-learned attitude
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(Altemeyer, 1981; 1988, 1996, 2006), or a predisposition (Stenner, 2005), authoritarians
are described as rigid thinkers who perceive the world in us-versus-them, Black-andWhite terms (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 1989;
Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Jost et al.,
2003; Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). Uniformity and order are authoritarian watch
words. Authoritarians obey. They seek order. They follow authoritarian leaders. They
eschew diversity.
While contemporary scholarship has revivified the study of authoritarianism,
expanding our understanding of its origins, activation, and effect on political behavior, it
has yet to reconcile the puzzle of African American authoritarians. How can African
Americans be described simultaneously as one of the most liberal and most authoritarian
groups in the United States?
This conundrum frames the question at the heart of this dissertation: Do African
Americans hold authoritarian beliefs and exhibit authoritarian behaviors? And it provokes
a cascade of other queries: How do African Americans compare to other racial groups
when it comes to authoritarianism? Are African American authoritarians’ worldviews and
attitudes similar to White authoritarians? Are African American authoritarians’
worldviews and attitudes dissimilar from their nonauthoritarian racial brethren? Does the
exclusion of African Americans from leading contemporary research on authoritarianism
raise questions about the universality of this research and its findings?
The exploration of these questions and their progeny lead to concerns not yet
considered by contemporary students of authoritarianism. It brings African Americans
back into the important study of authoritarianism. It adds to our understanding of
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authoritarianism in America. And like Kinder’s exploration of “both sides of the color
line” in public opinion (Kinder, 1996, p. 7), which illuminated not only the racial divide
between Blacks and Whites on overt and covert racial issues, but also the causal factors
behind observed attitudinal gaps (Kinder & Winter, 2001),3 this investigation is a
corrective that acknowledges the important scholarly work already completed on
authoritarianism and the importance of including African Americans in analyses to
deepen and refine our understanding.
Of course, bringing African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism
inevitably raises several concerns that go to the heart of authoritarian theory and the study
of political behavior. As I will show, the conventional wisdom ascribed to by many
scholars4 that African Americans are so constrained by racial group identification that
their political attitudes and behavior is monolithic (Dawson, 1995; Frymer, 1999; Haynie,
2001; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; McClain, Carew, Walton & Watts, 2009; Platt,
2008; Tate, 1994; Whitby, 2000) fractures when the opinions of Blacks are arrayed
across the authoritarian scale. The theory that authoritarianism is the causal agent behind
American political polarization (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) loses some of its
empirical support when African Americans are included in the analysis. The universality
of Stenner’s (2005) theory of the Authoritarian Dynamic, in which intolerance is the
outcome of an authoritarian predisposition activated by normative threat, comes into
question when we learn that the data on which the theory rests only includes White
3

Kinder and Winter’s (2001) finding of the important role differences between Blacks and Whites on the
principles of equality of opportunity and limited government play in creating the racial divide (and the
weaker or indifferent effects of social identity, meaning in-group identification and out-group resentment,
social class, and material interests) form a starting point for considering the importance of values and
worldview shared by Black and White authoritarians.
4
Especially, as Nteta, Rhodes, and Tarsi (2015) note, those scholars who fall into the trap of limiting their
definition of Black interests to issues of race, social welfare, and Black autonomy.
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Americans.5 And Hetherington and Weiler’s contention that it is nonauthoritarians – not
authoritarians – who become more authoritarian when confronting physical threats
forfeits claims to universality when it becomes apparent that the evidence offered in
support of their argument is estimated only for “males who are not Black or Hispanic”
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). Quite unfortunately, Blacks, Latinos, Asians, other
Americans who are not Caucasian, and women are all too often excluded when the
important topic of authoritarianism is under scholarly examination.
If authoritarianism was originally conceptualized as a personality that only affects
Whites (or to be more specific, White males), then the exclusion of African American,
Latinos, and other minorities from contemporary analyses of authoritarianism would be
completely defensible and not require explanation. But authoritarianism was originally
conceived as a universal personality trait whose scope recognized no cultural, racial,
geographic, or political boundaries. The authors of the first study to advance the concept
of authoritarianism – authoritarian patient zero – clearly stipulated that their research was
universally applicable (Adorno et al., 1950).6
At a minimum, contemporary scholars, whose works appear to make universal
claims about authoritarianism but whose methods focus on just one racial group, need to
either explicitly qualify their findings or provide compelling reasons for excluding what,
according to census projections, will soon represent a majority of the American public
from their analysis. Glossing over the exclusion of African Americans and Latinos from
what is ostensibly an inquiry into a universally extant trait is not sufficient. If a
5

In his review of The Authoritarian Dynamic, Kinder (2007) writes: “Stenner’s analysis is confined to
Whites. This is strange, since her aspirations are so general. She claims to be making an argument about a
universal predisposition, one that works the same way across time and culture” (p. 265).
6
They wrote: “when sections of the population not sampled in the present study are made the subjects of
the research,” the findings “will still hold” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 26)
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methodological choice is made to focus on one subgroup, that choice must be thoroughly
explained as the universality of the findings resulting from it are also disclaimed.
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) assert that “African Americans are the most
authoritarian racial group in the United States by far” (p. 141),7 a claim I verify
empirically in Chapter 2. Given the prevalence of authoritarianism among Blacks, I
contend that any theory of authoritarianism must include African Americans in its
analysis or, at least, present very persuasive arguments for their exclusion. That is why I
made the methodological choice in this dissertation to bring African Americans back into
the contemporary scholarly discussion of authoritarianism. But following this
methodological approach raises another fundamental question that begs an answer: Why
are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America?8
I suspect the answer to this question is rooted deeply in what we know about
authoritarians and threat; what we are learning today about the genetic transfer of stress
and anxiety from generation to generation; and what we bear witness to as Americans –
the African American experience in the United States that began with slavery and
remains battered today by social stigmatization and the institution of the New Jim Crow
(Alexander, 2012; West, 1993). Physical, social, psychological, and personal threat
courses through the history and everyday life of Black Americans.
Normative threat is said by Stenner (2005) to activate the authoritarian
predisposition. This is the Authoritarian Dynamic. Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
argue, as did Lipset (1959) and countless other students of authoritarianism, that threat
7

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) cite mean authoritarianism scores for Blacks and nonblacks from the
2004 ANES to support this claim (2009, p. 141). Nonblacks are defined as everyone in the sample who is
not an African American.
8
An ironic corollary to this question is: How can the target of so much authoritarian ire in America also be
the most authoritarian group in the country?
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and stress are drivers of authoritarian attitudes and behavior. To Hetherington and Weiler
(2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011), though, authoritarians are in a state of
constant hypervigilance and hold authoritarian attitudes even when physical or normative
threats are not extant. Thus, it is nonauthoritarians who become more authoritarian when
a physical threat appears because authoritarians are always activated and “have little
place to travel in terms of their opinions” (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 547).
Some scholars argue that authoritarianism is heritable with over 50 percent of the
variance in the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale9 attributable to genes (McCourt,
Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999). And recent epigenetic studies find that
changes to genes – caused by stress and threat – can be passed down from generation to
generation (Altemeyer, 2006; Fromm, 1941; Powell et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2010).
Thus, authoritarianism is activated and accentuated by threat. A predisposition to
authoritarianism is genetically heritable. And the transmission of a predisposition to
authoritarianism may be cumulative with threat and stress experienced over time building
an authoritarian body burden that is passed down and grows from generation to
generation.
Every day in America, African Americans confront more personal and physical
threats than Whites (West, 1993). Many African Americans live in a constant state of
hypervigilance to normative and physical threats because the society, culture, and
environment surrounding them are constantly and consistently threatening. The

9

A set of questions developed and refined by Altemeyer over several decades (1981, 1988, 1996, 2006)
whose objective is to measure authoritarianism. Critics contend that the RWA scale is tautological,
measuring authoritarian behavior instead of an individual’s predisposition to authoritarianism
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). The four child-rearing questions used by Hetherington,
Weiler, Suhay, Stenner, Feldman, and others to estimate authoritarianism are designed to avoid this
tautology.
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heightened levels of authoritarianism found among African Americans may simply be a
protective response to the withering series of threats many Blacks face each day
(Oesterreich, 2005; Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009).
Empirically, these threats are different than the dangers described by Stenner
(2005), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). The regular
threats faced by African Americans are both physical and normative. And they are not
episodic. Threat is simply a constant, palpable fixture in the lives of many African
Americans.
If threat plays an important role in activating authoritarianism, then African
Americans’ daily, asymmetric exposure to threat – from economic and educational
inequalities to police brutality, symbolic and not-so-symbolic racism, and stigmatization
– should differentially activate their authoritarian predisposition. The result, when survey
questions probe for authoritarianism, should be a higher percentage of African Americans
classified as authoritarians than Whites.
The differential exposure to threat that African Americans confront every day,
however, is just part of the theoretical back story behind Black authoritarianism. Here is
the rest of the tale.
Of all the racial and ethnic groups who have called America home over the last
400 years (with the exception of Native Americans), African Americans have confronted
the most pervasive and consistent threats personally and as a group. From slavery to
Emancipation, Plessy’s Separate But Equal pronouncement and Jim Crow to the War on
Drugs and the New Jim Crow (Alexander, 2012), generation after generation of African
Americans have experienced systematic, unrelenting stress and threat to their well-being
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and survival (West, 1993) – stress and threat that may be passed down epigenetically and
reverberate from generation to generation (Altemeyer, 2006; Fromm, 1941; Powell et al.,
2013; Wong et al., 2010). Thus, the constant exposure of African Americans to threat
over four centuries may have made some African Americans more predisposed to
authoritarianism than Whites. The result: because of their ancestors’ history of exposure
to threat, some African Americans, who regularly confront immediate and systemic
threats in America today, may also be more prone to an authoritarian reaction than other
Americans – especially White Americans.
Setting aside the possible epigenetic mechanism behind African American
authoritarianism for now,10 many African Americans current, daily asymmetric exposure
to threat and the stigma associated with their unequal and all-too-often separate social
status provides a compelling explanation by itself for the high percentage of Blacks who
are authoritarians. At face value, this simple explanation of the high percentage of
African American authoritarians makes the exclusion of Blacks from contemporary
studies of authoritarianism seem as unwise as it is unjustified.
Before treading too far onto this new scholarly shore, however, much evidence
must be assembled, analyzed, and presented. I start this process in the next few pages
with a brief review of 65 years of authoritarian study. This is a massive undertaking that
could fill hundreds of pages. Since other scholars have already thoroughly covered this
ground, I direct you to them (Martin, 2001; Meloen, 1993; M. B. Smith, 1997; R. M.
Smith, 1993) and present in what follows a brief sketch of the literature on
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A full analysis and discussion of this concept is far beyond the boundaries of this dissertation. A short
review of recently published literature on the generational transmission of threat, however, is presented in
Appendix D.
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authoritarianism that is pertinent to my questions.11 It is this literature that led me to the
conclusion that bringing African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism was a
methodologically necessary and important task.
This brief review is followed by a discussion of authoritarianism and its origins. I
define what I mean by authoritarianism and expand on conventional accounts of
authoritarianism’s roots in individuals. My account of authoritarianism’s origin goes
beyond the ongoing genetic inheritance and social learning debate to explore the
possibility that individuals’ daily, personal experiences with inequality – and the social
stigma that inevitably follows – may also activate and exacerbate authoritarianism.
Including these threats, along with the stigmatization born of systemic inequality, creates
the theoretical space in which the different rates of authoritarianism found between
Whites and African Americans may be parsimoniously explained.
With the authoritarian literature reviewed fleetingly and my meaning of
authoritarianism and description of its origin defined explicitly, I turn to a preview of the
seven chapters that follow: the research questions tackled in each chapter, a summary of
my findings, and the implications of these findings for the study of authoritarianism and
political behavior.
Sixty-Five Years of Authoritarian Study
The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) marks the beginning of the
scholarly exploration of authoritarianism. Its investigation into the individual,
psychological roots of the Fascist nightmare that descended on Europe from Nazi
11

An important part of this account, a review of the different scales used to measure authoritarianism, can
be found at the beginning of Chapter 2. This chapter also analyzes the recent claim that the child-rearing
scale used in surveys to measure authoritarianism is “cross-racially invalid” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014),
meaning it is an unreliable measure of authoritarianism among African Americans and, as we find tucked
away in a footnote in this paper (#23), Latinos as well. In Chapter 2, I find the claim invalid, not the scale.
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Germany launched two thousand studies and hundreds of academic careers.12 While its
methodology was quickly questioned (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hyman &
Sheatsley, 1954; Lipset, 1960; Meloen, 1993; Stenner, 2005), its core observation that
prejudice is a generalized attitude in those individuals who are intolerant – an “entire way
of thinking about those who are ‘different’” (Myers, 2010, p. 320) – is the foundation on
which the studies of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism that followed are based. 13
From the observation that anti-Semites were also predisposed toward intolerance
to others, Adorno et al. (1950) hypothesized that the systemic prejudice observed in some
individuals could be measured by a series of questions probing nine distinct, covarying
traits. Answers to these questions could be summed and then arrayed across a scale. This
measurement was called the F-scale14 (F for Fascism) and the psychological dimension it
estimated – The Authoritarian Personality.
The unfalsifiable, Freudian basis of The Authoritarian Personality, which argued
that the locus of authoritarian behavior is “child training as carried forward in a setting of
family life” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 6), the faulty design of F-scale questions that created
answer bias through acquiescent responses, and the multidimensional reality of the Fscale’s intended unidimensional output, led to withering criticism of Adorno’s
methodology (Christie, 1954; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Meloen, 1993). It also led to
new attempts at measuring authoritarianism, including the Dogmatism scale (Lipset,
1959), different Balanced F-scales (Rokeach, 1960), and the Wilson-Patterson
Conservatism scale (Ray, 1972).
12

Forty years after the publication of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) more than 2,000
papers and studies on authoritarianism had been written (Meloen, 1993).
13
Intolerant individuals’ propensity to prejudice across different outgroups has been found by numerous
scholars, including, for example, Allport (1935), Adorno et al. (1950), and Altemeyer (2006).
14
It is also called the California F-scale.
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Altemeyer (1981) introduced the Right-Wing Authoritarian scale (RWA) as a
solution to the measurement problems intrinsic to the F-scale. The RWA scale was
constructed on the tenets of Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1969; Wilson & Patterson,
1968). It added the influence of the environment in which children and young adults
develop to parental child-rearing practices as a factor in the development of an
authoritarian individual. It was a welcome step forward from the Freudian theoretical
basis of the F-scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006). To correct for the
multidimensionality of the F-scale, Altemeyer streamlined and focused the original, nine
dimensional description of the authoritarian personality type to three central, covarying
attitude clusters that theoretically produced a unidimensional measure. Altemeyer (1981)
posited that authoritarians submit to authority, prefer the conventional, and are aggressive
toward out groups (those who question authority as well as those who are deemed
unconventional) and designed a 34-item questionnaire to assess each individual’s
propensity to authoritarian attitudes. Empirically driven, rigorously tested, and
assiduously refined, RWA is an exceptional tool for measuring authoritarian attitudes.
But its inherent strength is also its fundamental weakness. Questions from which the
RWA scale is built are tautological with the authoritarianism in individuals the scale
seeks to estimate (Stenner, 2005).15 Following Stenner’s (2005) and Feldman’s (2003a)
critique of the scale, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) write that the reason the RWA scale
“is so predictive of prejudice and intolerance is that it is, itself, largely a measure of
15

Stenner (2005) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that the RWA scale is tautological because
many of the questions on which the scale is based are specific political or issue questions that measure
authoritarian behavior, not an individual’s predisposition to authoritarianism. The child-rearing scale
measures an individual’s predisposition to authoritarianism. Other criticisms of the RWA scale include that
it fails to make adequate distinctions between conservatism and authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005) and only
measures authoritarianism on the right side of the ideological spectrum (Ray, 1983; Shils, 1954). Altemeyer
addressed the obvious ideological bias in the RWA by attempting to develop a scale to estimate the
authoritarianism of individuals on the left side of the political spectrum.
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prejudice and intolerance” (p. 47). As such, the scale is hopeless as an estimator of the
underlying predisposition toward authoritarianism – the provenance of authoritarianism –
but an excellent measurement of authoritarian preferences (Stenner, 2005).16
A theoretically better device for measuring an individual’s predisposition to
authoritarianism was added by the National Election Study to its 1992 survey
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).17 This tool is a four-item set of child-rearing questions
that divorce the measurement of authoritarianism from the dependent variables
authoritarianism is supposed to explain. Starting with the introduction “Which one do
you think is more important for a child to have?” survey respondents are asked to choose
from a series of four pairs, including:





Independence or Respect for Elders?
Curiosity or Good Manners?
Obedience or Self-Reliance?
Considerate or Well Behaved?

Answers within each pair are rotated randomly. On some surveys, respondents are also
allowed to answer “both.”18
For each question, an authoritarian answer is scored 1.19 A nonauthoritarian
answer is scored 0. And in surveys where “Both” is an answer option, the value of both is
.5.
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Duckitt disagrees on this point arguing that the scale should be reconceptualized as “a set of three related
ideological dimensions” instead of “a unidimensional personality construct” (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, &
Heled, 2010, p. 685).
17
Child-rearing questions designed to measure authoritarianism first appeared on the General Social
Survey (GSS) in 1973. From 1973 to 1985, 13 child-trait questions were asked. Starting in 1986, this list
was paired down to five questions. The GSS questions do not perfectly match the questions used by NES
and other surveys used by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Stenner
(2005), and Feldman (1997, 2003a) and analyzed for this dissertation.
18
These surveys include the 2008 and 2012 ANES polls.
19
Authoritarian answers are Respect for Elders, Good Manners, Obedience, and Well Behaved.
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Respondent scores for all questions are then summed and divided by the number
of questions to arrive at an authoritarian scale that varies from 0 (representing the most
nonauthoritarian) to 1 (indicating the most authoritarian predisposition).20
These questions, or slight variations of them, have been used for more than two
decades by political scientists whose work has pushed authoritarianism back onto the
academic agenda (Adorno et al., 1950; Feldman, 2003a, 2003b; Hetherington & Suhay,
2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).21 Stenner’s succinct explanation of
the theoretical basis of the four questions elegantly sums up their unique utility: “Childrearing values… can effectively and unobtrusively reflect one’s fundamental orientations
toward authority/uniformity versus autonomy/difference,” the key dimension on which
authoritarianism is arrayed (Stenner, 2005, p. 24). The four-item child-rearing battery
“enables us to distinguish authoritarian predisposition from authoritarian ‘products’
(attitudes)… which are sometimes manifested but sometimes not, and whose specific
content may vary across time and space” (Stenner, 2005, p. 24).
Stenner’s (2005) words have profound implications for the measurement and
study of authoritarianism. First, if the specific content of authoritarian attitudes varies
across time and space, measurements of authoritarian attitudes – like the RWA –confront
not only temporal definitional hurdles, but also cultural ones. For a scale based primarily

20

Developing a 0-1 scale from the child-rearing questions is the approach used by Feldman and Stenner
(1997), Stenner (2005), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). I use this
approach throughout this dissertation instead of a factor analysis in order to more accurately compare my
findings to theirs.
21
The four child-rearing questions used to estimate authoritarianism asks respondents: “Which one do you
think is more important for a child to have?” Then, respondents are presented with four pairs of answers:
“1. Independence or Respect for Elders? 2. Curiosity or Good Manners? 3. Obedience or Self-Reliance?
and 4. Considerate or Well Behaved?” Answers in each pair are rotated randomly. In some surveys,
respondents are also allowed to answer “Both.” Authoritarian answers are Respect for Elders, Good
Manners, Obedience, and Well Behaved. Answers are aggregated and an authoritarian scale is constructed
that typically varies from 0 (not authoritarian at all) to 1 (most authoritarian).
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on what children learn from the environment in which they develop, this is an
exceptionally vexing problem. Second, if authoritarian attitudes are sometimes extant and
sometimes not, scales that use attitudes to identify authoritarians may or may not do an
accurate job, depending on whether one’s authoritarianism is activated when the scale
questions are asked. Third, the on again, off again nature of authoritarian activation
theorized by Stenner presents a difficult hurdle for a recent claim, advanced by Pérez and
Hetherington (2014).
Pérez and Hetherington (2014) argue that the four child-rearing questions used to
estimate authoritarianism are an unreliable measure of authoritarianism among African
Americans.22 One of the two arguments on which their claim rests is the theoretical
expectation that authoritarian attitudes are expressed consistently in survey research. 23
Since African Americans did not consistently demonstrate authoritarian attitudes on
policy questions from the two surveys examined by Pérez and Hetherington, they
conclude that the child-rearing scale is “cross-racially invalid.”24

22

While the focus of the paper was the “cross-racial invalidity” of the child-rearing scale as a measure of
authoritarianism among Blacks, Pérez and Hetherington also find the scale overstates the authoritarianism
of Latinos (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, pp. 13, footnote 23).
23
The second argument on which Pérez and Hetherington’s claim is based states that the questions that
comprise the scale are understood differently by members of different races. In other words, the
understanding of one or more questions that are part of the scale is variant (varies) between or among races.
If African Americans and Whites interpret the child-rearing questions differently (variantly), the latent,
unobserved variable (authoritarianism) estimated by the questions will have a different meaning for
members of each race.
24
The nomenclature here is tortured and easily confused. Here is what it means: Question invariance means
the latent variable is valid. Question variance indicates the latent variable is invalid. When the meaning of
questions is interpreted differently by different groups, the questions are variant. Variant questions produce
a latent variable that is invalid across groups. When the two groups interpreting the questions variantly are
defined in terms of race, the resulting scale is said to be, by Pérez and Hetherington, cross-racially
invariant. This means, quite simply, that the latent variable produced by the questions has a different
meaning for the different racial groups tested. See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of Pérez and
Hetherington’s two arguments in support of their claim that the child-rearing scale is cross-racially variant
and invalid.
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The inconsistent demonstration of authoritarian attitudes by African Americans
found by Pérez and Hetherington (2014), however, may be succinctly explained by
Stenner’s (2005) Authoritarian Dynamic theory. In other words, authoritarian attitudes
were not consistently displayed by African Americans on the policy questions from the
two surveys analyzed by Pérez and Hetherington because the authoritarianism of African
Americans was inactive when the survey questions were asked.
The second argument on which Pérez and Hetherington (2014) rest their claim
that the child-rearing scale is an inaccurate estimator of authoritarianism among African
Americans is a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis of scale question invariance
from the results of the 2008 ANES. While Pérez and Hetherington’s findings of scale
variance between Whites and African Americans on the 2008 ANES is absolutely
accurate, meaning the child-rearing questions on this may have been interpreted
differently by members of each race, a multi-group examinations of the child-rearing
questions on four other polls finds the answers invariant and, therefore, valid between
Whites and African Americans. As I will demonstrate later, the difference between valid
and invalid scale questions is simply the answer categories offered. Polls that allow
“both” as an answer to the four authoritarian question pairs produce scales that are invalid
between Whites and African Americans. Polls that do not offer “both” as an answer
option, forcing respondents to choose between answer pairs, produce estimations of
authoritarianism that are valid across race.
Sixty-five years after Adorno et al.’s (1950) Authoritarian Personality was
published, the study of authoritarianism is again at a cross roads. While authoritarianism
is a predisposition that theoretically knows no cultural, social, racial, or political
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boundaries,25 the central, contemporary theories of authoritarian activation and
polarization are predicated on data that excludes the most authoritarian racial group in
America – African Americans – from analysis. While the scientific rationale for
excluding African Americans from these studies of authoritarianism remains both unclear
and contested, much of Hetherington, Weiler, and Suhay’s work on authoritarianism is
based on data from which African Americans and, at times, Latinos are excluded
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Stenner’s work (Feldman
& Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005) also focuses exclusively on White, non-Hispanics.
Political scientists have learned a great deal about how the authoritarian
predisposition affects the behavior and attitudes of Whites. It is time to expand research
on authoritarianism to African Americas who, in the future with other minorities, will
soon comprise a majority of the population in the United States.
Exploring why African Americans are more authoritarian than Whites, and
understanding how, when, and under what conditions authoritarianism shapes African
American behavior is an important undertaking for anyone truly concerned about
securing the future of American democracy. The first step toward discovering answers to
these questions is clearly defining what authoritarianism is and identifying its theoretical
provenance.
Defining Authoritarianism, Identifying its Origins
There are many variations on the scholarly definition of authoritarianism. Given
the multiple ways in which authoritarianism has been conceptualized and described since

25

Adorno et al. (1950) studied “non-Jewish, White, native-born, middle-class Americans,” but asserted
their findings “will still hold” across “the population not sampled” (p. 26).
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The Authoritarian Personality was first published (Adorno et al., 1950), defining what it
is and specifying its origin is central to starting any inquiry on solid ground.
My definition of authoritarianism begins with Altemeyer’s three-part description
of what authoritarians do.26 Authoritarians submit to authority, prefer the conventional,
and may act aggressively to those out-groups who question authority, are deemed
unconventional, or both (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006). To Altemeyer’s
foundation, I add four other aspects that are components of different contemporary
definitions of authoritarians.
First, authoritarian submission to authority is deeply rooted and compelled.
Authoritarians follow authority because they seek order (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
Authoritarians’ need for order impels their submission to authority.
Second, authoritarians’ need for order compels them to act to defend it. When
usurpers – through their actions or simply their existence – question, challenge, or seek to
change accepted order and norms, authoritarians rise aggressively to defend them. On this
point, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that authoritarians, perpetually in a state of
hypervigilance, are always threatened and activated. Normative and physical threats do
not further agitate their authoritarian predisposition; they are already on alert. Instead, it
is nonauthoritarians, when confronting physical threats, who act more like authoritarians
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). By contrast, Stenner’s (2005) theory of The Authoritarian
Dynamic posits that the innate authoritarian predisposition in individuals is activated by

26

Altemeyer streamlined Adorno et al.’s (1950) original nine authoritarian personality traits to three to
arrive at what he argued is a unidimensional measure of authoritarianism – the Right-Wing Authoritarian
(RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 1981). As noted earlier, Duckitt (1989) contends the RWA scale should not be
operationalized as a unidimensional scale (Altemeyer, 1981).
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normative threat. This produces the intolerant attitudes and aggressive behavior that
makes authoritarianism such a potential menace to democracy and democratic thinking.
The contours of what constitutes a normative threat to authoritarians, however,
are not as simple as one might assume. In Stenner’s (2005) account, the authoritarian
predisposition seeks to balance “group authority and uniformity… and individual
autonomy and diversity” (p. 14). As such, authoritarians “want to be part of some
collective… some system” to which they and others conform to protect societal
uniformity (p. 18). Authoritarians’ search for uniformity, singularity, and unanimity of
purpose takes primacy over specific group identification and particular norms. Thus,
theories that put group identification and defense – driven by threats to groups,
competition among groups, or inequality between groups (Duckitt, 1989, 1992) – at the
center of authoritarianism and its activation do not fit well with Stenner’s definition.
Authoritarians will “abandon group authorities and norms when they no longer serve the
primary goal of enhancing uniformity and minimizing difference” (Stenner, 2005, p. 54).
Third, authoritarians’ sense of order is not necessarily or solely defined by
worldly powers. To authoritarians, there are higher powers that delineate right from
wrong and good from evil. There are transcendent ways of behaving and being that are
enduring, everlasting, and the root of balance and order (Feldman, 2003a). These
authorities are “morally and ontologically superior” to worldly authority (Wilson, 1973,
p. 858). For order to exist in the world, worldly authorities must submit to this higher
authority. That higher authority may be other worldly or a text (for example, the
Constitution) imbued with enlightened, transcendent power when its meaning is
interpreted originally.
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Finally, I stipulate, as other students of authoritarianism have, that
authoritarianism is universal and transcends society, culture, politics, and race.
Authoritarianism is not limited to Europeans or Whites. It does not discriminate. It is
found in every culture and among members of every race (Adorno et al., 1950;
Altemeyer, 2006; Christie, 1954; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler,
2009; Ray, 1983; Shils, 1954; Stenner, 2005). Studies of authoritarianism must treat it as
a universal constant or explain explicitly why it is not.
Given the continuing scholarly debate over the provenance of authoritarianism
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 35), defining its origins is another important
housekeeping task to complete before turning to the questions at the heart of this
dissertation. Four primary causal explanations of authoritarianism have been offered.
These include abusive, controlling parents – the Freudian explanation (Adorno et al.,
1950); social learning – Altemeyer’s attitudinal approach (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996,
2006); social dominance orientation – the need of certain individuals to identify with
powerful groups (Duckitt, 1989); and Stenner’s (2005) dispositionally rooted and
environmentally influenced hybrid.27 28
The Freudian account of authoritarianism’s origin was thoroughly kicked to the
curb within a decade of its introduction for two reasons.29 First, the F-scale developed by
Adorno et al. to measure authoritarianism suffered from acquiescent bias response and
included questions tapping behaviors other than authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981;

27

By himself and in collaboration with Stenner, Feldman’s work contributed greatly to the development of
Stenner’s thinking (Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997).
28
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) work skips over the origin debate to focus on the effects of
authoritarianism, stipulating that authoritarianism “is causally prior to the variables it affects” (2009, p. 36)
29
By the “1960s, The Authoritarian Personality was treated as the social-science version of the Edsel”
(Wolfe, 2005, p. B12).
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Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Stenner, 2005). Second, the Freudian
linkage of authoritarianism to childhood trauma was not considered scientifically
falsifiable (Altemeyer, 2006; Stenner, 2005). As such, the Freudian account of
authoritarianism is a poor candidate for revivification.30
The pervasiveness of authoritarians across cultures, societies, and racial and
ethnic groups, and the persistence of authoritarianism across time, makes the socially
learned theory of authoritarian development favored by Altemeyer empirically untenable
(Stenner, 2005). How can authoritarianism exist across so many different cultures and
societies (and throughout so many different historical periods) if, following Bandura’s
(1968) Social Learning Theory, it is only learned by children and young adults from their
parents and particular parts of the environment in which they develop? Certainly, a
theoretically stable, pervasive, and similar set of covarying traits cannot be solely the
outcome of a set of influences that varies so fundamentally across families, cultures, and
societies.
Altemeyer’s research also rules out Duckitt’s Social Dominance Orientation
(Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 1989) as a cause of authoritarianism. Altemeyer (1996)
concludes that the “need for group identification” is not a source of authoritarianism
(1996, p. 85).31

30

Milburn’s (2014) recent paper on authoritarianism and childhood experiences, however, offers an
intriguing examination of the relationship between political attitudes in adults and harsh childhood
punishments.
31
Both Altemeyer’s RWA scale, based on Social Learning Theory, and Duckitt’s Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO), an outgrowth of Social Dominance Theory, are excellent estimators of prejudicial
attitudes. Research indicates, however, that RWA and SDO capture “different motivational bases for…
prejudice that differentially interact with intergroup conditions to predict prejudice” (Altemeyer, 1981, p.
73).

23

My explanation of authoritarianism’s roots starts with the individual (not with ingroups and out-groups32) and sprouts from three conceptual seeds. First, authoritarianism
is in part an inherited predisposition. Second, it is in part a socially learned attitude. And
third, adding to the current debate over the origin of authoritarianism, I submit that it is
shaped by economic, educational, and societal inequality and the stigmatization of, and
threat and stress experienced by, individuals and groups who are deemed unequal. As
such, the environmental drivers of authoritarianism go well beyond the direct teaching
and imitation mechanisms described by Altemeyer. I contend that perceived and
individually experienced inequality – the stigmas that come with it, the constant threat it
poses, and the ceaseless anxiety and uncertainty it creates – must be part of any
explanation of the origins of authoritarianism. The genetic and socially learned theories
of authoritarianism’s provenance are well worn paths. The elevation of personal threat
and inequality as a root cause of authoritarianism is new territory.
Stenner (2005) stipulated that authoritarianism is neither a product of nature nor
socially learned nurture – seeds one and two in my account. Authoritarianism is an
outcome of the interplay of both. In other words, while authoritarianism starts as a
product of genetic inheritance (personality and innate cognitive ability), environmental
factors (primarily social learning as articulated by Altemeyer) play an important role in
its nurturing and expression.33

32

Thus, I reject Duckitt’s (1989) group identification theory as the root of authoritarianism. As Stenner
(2005, p. 54) contends “in-group identification is most appropriately considered a consequence” of “some
general desire…to transfer sovereignty to…some collective order rather than an identification with a
particular group.” Altemeyer (1996) concludes “authoritarianism does not appear to be basically caused by
a need for group identification” (p. 85).
33
Specifically, Stenner (2005) argues “a variety of factors may influence the development of authoritarian
predisposition…one may be inclined by personality to find difference exciting, or frightening; may be
cognitively able to deal with complexity, or unable to understand that different is not necessarily worse;
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Stenner’s (2005) account of authoritarianism’s origin is well supported. While the
genetic mechanism that transfers the authoritarian predisposition from one generation to
the next has not yet been identified by biologists, studies of authoritarianism in twins,
which used the RWA scale to estimate authoritarian attitudes, found that approximately
50% of phenotypic variance was genetic and 35% of the variance was environmental
(McCourt et al., 1999).34 35 The authoritarian genetic inheritance is expressed primarily
through one of the Big Five personality traits – openness to experience (Gerber, Huber,
Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; McAdams & Pals, 2006; McCrae,
1996; Stenner, 2005). Openness to experience and authoritarianism, again estimated
using Altemeyer’s RWA scale, are negatively correlated and the correlation is significant
(Butler, 2000; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Trapnell, 1994). In short, the more authoritarian a
person is, the less open he or she is to new experiences– a personality trait that is
primarily determined by genes (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006).36
Stenner’s (2005) articulation of authoritarianism as a genetically inherited
predisposition that is also environmentally shaped was a marked departure from scholarly
conventional wisdom. As Lavine et al. (2005) wrote in the same year that Stenner’s
Authoritarian Dynamic was published, most contemporary scholars at the time
considered authoritarianism “a set of ‘ideological beliefs’ or ‘social attitudes of a broad
may be socialized to believe that the individual is sovereign, or that individuals must submit to group
authority” (pp. 15-16)
34
The remaining fifteen percent was allocated to “common environment or assortative mating” (McCourt
et al., 1999). Assortative mating occurs when people with similar outlooks and background mate.
35
Altemeyer (1996) also extensively analyzed research on the possibility of the role of genes in shaping
authoritarianism. He concluded that the research does “not support the notion of fascism genes and instead
direct[s] our attention to environmental influences” (p. 75).
36
While the individual predisposition to a closed mind is passed on from generation to generation (Lipset,
1959), it is exacerbated by another individually inherited and environmentally conditioned capacity –
cognitive ability. Authoritarians are demonstrably less facile cognitively than nonauthoritarians (Stenner,
2005). Some aspects of an authoritarian’s cognitive limitations are innate. Other components of an
authoritarian’s cognitive impairments are environmentally shaped (Altemeyer, 1996).
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nature’ rather than… a basic dimension of personality” (Lavine et al., 2005, p. 220). The
primary mechanism for developing authoritarian attitudes was Bandura’s (1968) Social
Learning Model as interpreted by Altemeyer (1996). It represents the second seed in my
account of the origins of authoritarianism.
Offering a much needed replacement to the discredited psychodynamic
description of the origins of authoritarianism, Altemeyer applied Bandura’s (1977) Social
Learning Theory to the study of authoritarianism and hypothesized that authoritarian
attitudes “are shaped by the reinforcements and punishments administered by parents and
others as we grow up” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 78). As with Adorno et al.’s (1950) work,
Altemeyer contends that through “direct teachings” parents play an important role in
shaping authoritarianism in their offspring. But he adds that others play an important role
too, including “other determined socializers, such as day-care staff, older siblings,
grandparents, and Sunday school teachers… [who] can serve as models… [a] child might
imitate” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 79). Thus, social learning, through “direct teachings” and
“imitation,” is the crucible that shapes individual attitudes and each person’s proclivity
toward authoritarian behavior. According to Altemeyer, “we will learn as much or more
from observing others as we will from the personal blessings and batterings bestowed” on
us throughout life (1996, p. 78).
The effects of the blessings and batterings of everyday life on individuals –
overlooked and devalued as a factor in the development of authoritarianism in individuals
in the contemporary authoritarian literature – is the third and final seed in my account of
the roots of authoritarianism.37 I hypothesize that the threat, uncertainty, anxiety, and
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Except when life lessons are administered by parents or observed and imitated by children and
adolescents.
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feelings of vulnerability that inequality produces in individuals, and the social stigma that
comes with it, activate and feed authoritarianism not only in the present generation, but
also, possibly, across generations. As such, the everyday facts of life confronted by some
individuals, what could be called their individual environmental circumstances when
inequality and unequal opportunity are the principle reality, have as much of a role in
shaping authoritarianism as the direct teachings and imitation mechanisms that Altemeyer
(1981) extrapolated from Bandura’s (1968) Social Learning Theory.
From the extensive literature on threat, which began with Fromm (1941) and
continues today with Stenner’s (2005) theory of The Authoritarian Dynamic,
Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) recent article, and especially Henry’s (2008) and
Brandt and Henry’s (2012) work on inequality and the threat of stigmatization among
ethnic groups and women, we know that perceived and actual threats can trigger and
deepen authoritarian attitudes and behavior. I argue that the threat and anxiety produced
in individuals by their personal experiences with pervasive and persistent inequality – its
real, every day consequences as well as the long-term personal malaise it can manifest –
is another important factor at the root of authoritarianism.
When discussing the origins of authoritarianism, Stenner (2005) notes in passing
that “difficult life conditions may dispose those less privileged individuals to
authoritarian and intolerant stances via some basic ‘frustration aggression’ (Berkowitz,
1998) mechanism” (p. 148). I contend that the feelings of vulnerability, anxiety, danger,
and threat caused by unrelenting economic, environmental, and educational inequality,38
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From insufficient prenatal care to poor nutrition during childhood, exposure to lead paint and arsenic, and
attendance at chronically underperforming schools, educational, economic, and environmental inequality
creates conditions that can lead to emotional and cognitive impairments and may also exacerbate an
individual’s predisposition to authoritarianism.
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as well as the stigma that inequality is known to create, should not be a footnote in a
review of the lynchpins of authoritarian behavior. It must be a central consideration. If
threat plays a key role in shaping authoritarian behavior, then the personal, group, and
institutional threat felt by those who are treated unequally in society cannot be ignored
when accounting for the origins of authoritarianism.
When we account for these asymmetrically experienced threats, the high
percentage of African American authoritarians no longer seems a statistical anomaly and
the exclusion of African Americans from contemporary analyses of authoritarianism
seems unwarranted. In what follows, I bring African Americans back into the discussion
of authoritarianism while leaving it to others to examine the role of threat in the
development of African American authoritarians.
Data and Models
Before turning to an outline of the chapters that follow, a short word about the
data used throughout this dissertation and the independent variables included in each
model is in order. Twelve national surveys form the foundation for my hypotheses and
observations. These surveys represent all of the publicly available or privately accessible
national surveys (that I am aware of) in which authoritarianism is estimated using the
child-rearing battery of questions. The child-rearing item approach for estimating
authoritarianism is my tool of choice because of its methodological superiority. A brief
description of the surveys that asked these questions and were used in this dissertation is
included in Appendix B.
In addition to authoritarianism, six other independent variables were used in the
models that form the empirical backbone of my work. These variables are gender, age,
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education, church attendance, party identification, and race. My parsimonious use of
independent variables is based in theory and geared to avoid the prevalent and “highly
dysfunctional habit” of “kitchen sink models that ignore the effects of collinearity”
(Schrodt, 2014, p. 2).
Following Hetherington, Weiler, Suhay, and Stenner (Hetherington & Weiler,
2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005), I stipulate theoretically that
authoritarianism is a predisposition that may be a partially inherited trait and arises
causally prior to the political attitudes and behavior that it affects. As such, it occurs
before ideology, partisanship, other “isms,” and independent variables like income that
clog the linear models of so much political science.
Authoritarian theory also specifies that it predicts a broad range of behaviors and
attitudes that cut across ideological, income, education, race, and partisan lines. From
attitudes about good and evil, presidential power, the place of “inferior groups” in
society, linked fate, the central tenets of Madisonian democracy, fear of “the other,”
aggressive behavior, and racial resentment to perceptions about immigrants and
immigration, support for strong leaders, and the importance of obedience,
authoritarianism, as I will demonstrate in later chapters, predicts behavior while other
“usual suspects” independent variables just tag along. Thus, authoritarianism is the causal
prior from which, for example, ideology and income are highly correlated outgrowths.
I include gender and age in each model because they are basic demographics.
Race is added because the difference between White and African Americans’
authoritarianism is fundamental to my thesis. Even though I am already one step beyond
Achen’s (2002) rule of three independent variables, Stenner’s (2005) finding that
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education, primarily, and church attendance, secondarily, are major learned sources of
authoritarianism led me to include both in all models.
Finally, I reluctantly added partisan identification because all of the behaviors I
am studying are linked to politics. All other possible independent variables, including
ideology and income, are excluded from my analysis because the garbage in, garbage out
logic of garbage can models detracts from rather than adds to understanding.
The Chapters that Follow
The chapters that follow this introduction seek to shed light on the questions at the
core of this dissertation and the conundrum at its heart: How can African Americans be
authoritarian, liberal, and attitudinally homogeneous simultaneously?
The exploration begins in Chapter 2 with a brief discussion of the different scales
that have been used to measure authoritarianism since the 1950s. After reviewing the
methodological problems presented by successive attempts to measure authoritarianism, I
focus on the recent criticism levied against the four-question child-rearing scale.
The child-rearing scale is used exclusively in this dissertation to estimate
authoritarianism. It is the measurement of choice for many contemporary authoritarian
scholars. One of those scholars now argues that African Americans and Whites
understand the questions that comprise the scale differently (Pérez & Hetherington,
2014). As such, the scale is said to be cross-racially invalid, meaning the high incidence
of authoritarianism found by the scale among African Americans is inaccurate.39
Using a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis of data from six surveys, I
demonstrate that the variance problem identified by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) in one
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Later in the article (see #23) it is also argued that the scale is invariant between Latinos and Whites,
leaving a scale that appears to only measure authoritarianism among Whites.
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survey is a result of the wording of question answers and not different understandings of
the questions. I conclude that the child-rearing questions are indeed a good estimator of
an individual’s latent predisposition to authoritarianism, and predictor of authoritarian
behavior irrespective of race, when question answers are limited to paired responses that
omit “both” as a response.
With the issue of scale validity settled, I turn in Chapter 3 to describing African
American authoritarians demographically. Using data from the University of
Massachusetts’s module on the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I make
an intriguing discovery. African American authoritarians are less likely to believe their
individual fate is linked to their racial group and more likely to be racially resentful of
other African Americans than nonauthoritarians who are Black. Additionally, I find that
standard demographics, including income, ideology, educational attainment, gender, and
partisan identification are not associated with authoritarianism among African
Americans. Regular church attendance, however, is associated with authoritarianism in
African Americans as it is in Whites.
African American authoritarians’ rejection of linked fate and the negative racial
stereotype of Blacks in America lead to the observation that African American
authoritarians may choose a different or additional group with which to identify. This
group celebrates the mainstream norms of American individualism and selfdetermination, is traditionally moral, obeys authority, and eschews diversity. This is the
group known as American authoritarians.
The push and pull of authoritarianism and race on African Americans’
perceptions and attitudes, identified in this chapter, underlies and underscores the

31

discussion in every chapter that follows. It also debunks the widely held assumptions that
African American opinion is homogeneous and African Americans have no choice but to
embrace their identity as a member of a racially-stereotyped underclass. Some African
Americans, in this case Black authoritarians, choose identities that do not fit the
stereotype assigned to them by society.
Chapter 4 takes a quick detour from the discussion of authoritarianism and race to
examine in more detail a threshold question that must be answered before exploring
when, where, and how authoritarianism will affect the behavior of African Americans. I
ask: Why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America? I
contend that heightened authoritarian attitudes and behavior found in African Americans
are the logical outcomes of the unrelenting stresses many African Americans experience
daily.
Chapter 5 details the striking similarities between African American and White
authoritarians’ fundamental beliefs and values (or worldview) and the stark differences
between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans on this same dimension.
Worldview, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) define it, is “a distinct way of
understanding political reality” that “shap[es] political behavior and identity” (2009, p.
64). A person’s worldview is not produced out of the ether, nor does it exist in a vacuum.
It is “tethered to an underlying predisposition” (2009, p. 64). In this case, that
predisposition is authoritarianism.
The four components of the authoritarian worldview examined in this chapter
flow from my definition of authoritarianism. They include authoritarians’:


demand for established and accepted norms and desire for order that maintains
them,
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rigid, black-and-white view of the world and willing submissiveness to authority
that works to insure the order they desire,



belief in higher powers that supersede worldly authority – especially when that
authority does not support enduring and ageless conventions, and



aggression toward those who flaunt norms and conventions or question the
worldly or transcendent authority that defends them.
I demonstrate that authoritarianism not only replaces some African Americans’

allegiance to their racial identity, but also shapes their worldview. Thus, while African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differ in both group identification and
worldview, the core beliefs and values of White and African American authoritarians are,
at times, remarkably similar.
The effects of African American and White authoritarians’ similar worldviews on
issues and policies that theoretically engage the authoritarian predisposition
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005) are examined in Chapter 6. I demonstrate
that authoritarianism is a powerful force that structures not only many African
Americans’ values and beliefs, but also their political and policy preferences.
A review of two decades of opinion research reveals that African American and
White authoritarians hold similar attitudes on many of the wedge issues that Hetherington
and Weiler (2009) argue are at the core of the worldview evolution that is restructuring
politics and driving political polarization among White Americans today. From gay rights
to the effects of terrorism on civil rights, immigration, feelings toward political figures
and out-groups, the role of the CIA, and even the legalization of marijuana, African
American and White authoritarians are often on the same attitudinal page while
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nonauthoritarian and authoritarian African Americans appear to be reading from quite
different books.
Chapters 3, 5, and 6 demonstrate unequivocally that racial identity does not
insulate some African Americans from the siren demands of their authoritarian
predisposition. The worldviews, issue preferences, and racial identification of African
Americans authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differ in ways that are measurable and
meaningful. Contemporary scholarship that contends African Americans are politically
monolithic and move en masse must be reassessed to account for this reality.
Next, Chapter 7 examines Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) important theory that
political polarization in America is an outcome of the worldview evolution caused by
authoritarianism. Their theory is based on an analysis of data from which African
Americans are deleted. Thus, the most authoritarian segment of the American electorate,
which is attitudinally similar to other authoritarians on issues that are part of the
hypothesized worldview evolution, is excluded from the analysis of authoritarianism’s
effect on partisanship. I find that when African Americans are included in this analysis
and the time period studied is extended to 2012, some of the polarizing effects found by
Hetherington and Weiler are muted. The core thesis that authoritarianism plays a role in
partisan polarization remains intact, but the magnitude of the effect is less than what
Hetherington and Weiler initially found.
Given the intransigence of partisan identification, it may simply take longer for
authoritarians to change identification than Hetherington and Weiler expected or, quite
possibly, the right event may not yet have come along to catalyze the sorting more
completely. The candidacy of Donald Trump may be the precipitating event or inflection
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point that spurs a partisan realignment driven by authoritarianism. In either case, the 2016
election year provides an important laboratory and impetus for further study of
authoritarianism in American politics.
My final chapter returns briefly to the core questions raised at the beginning of
this dissertation. I ask: What has been learned from this investigation of authoritarianism
and, most importantly, what may this learning mean to the study of political science?
Authoritarianism has been described as the taproot of intolerance and a predisposition or
attitude that is antithetical to democracy. If it is, then clearly defining it, understanding its
origins, and measuring its prevalence as well as identifying what may provoke or assuage
it is an important task on the political science agenda.
The threats and danger found in the unequal enclaves of urban and rural America
and the deep-seated feelings of insecurity that inevitably accompany them harken back
hauntingly to the “increasing isolation and powerlessness of the individual” identified by
Fromm (1941, p. 241) as the breeding ground of authoritarianism. As the threats
confronting the world – from climate change and terrorism to economic inequality – go
global, understanding the authoritarian reaction and its causes may be an important step
to securing a civil future in America and around the globe.
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CHAPTER 2
MEASURING AUTHORITARIANISM
The child-rearing questions used since 199240 and throughout this dissertation to
estimate authoritarianism have recently been called “cross-racially invalid” (Pérez &
Hetherington, 2014, p. 1). The cross-racial validity of the child-rearing questions was
examined by Pérez and Hetherington using Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(MGCFA). MGCFA allows for the testing of variance between different groups’
understanding of questions that comprise a latent variable. In the case of authoritarianism,
the child-rearing questions are the observed items tested for variance and
authoritarianism is the latent, unobserved variable produced from the factoring or scaling
of questions. If different groups of people have markedly different understandings of the
child-rearing questions, their answers to the questions are “variant” and invalid between
groups. On the other hand, invariance in question understanding between groups equals
valid questions and a valid scale.
Put simply, cross-racially invalid means that African Americans and Whites
interpret the child-rearing questions differently. This alleged difference in question
interpretation means that while African Americans and Whites appear to be answering
the same questions, their answers are based on different understandings of what the
questions ask. The result, according to Pérez and Hetherington (2014), is that the
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The four-question child-rearing battery used throughout this dissertation to estimate authoritarianism first
appeared on the 1992 American National Election Study. Different batteries of child-rearing questions have
been employed to measure authoritarianism since 1973. From 1973 to 1985, 13 child-trait questions were
asked on the General Social Survey (GSS). In 1986, this list was paired down to five questions. The GSS
questions do not perfectly match the four questions used by ANES, CCES, and other surveys analyzed by
leading, contemporary political scientists studying authoritarianism.
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authoritarian scale generated by the child-rearing questions is measuring different
attitudes for Whites than it is measuring for African Americans.41
Of course, if the child-rearing scale is not cross-racially valid, then studies that
include White and African American authoritarians in their analysis may underestimate
(Kam & Kinder, 2007) or, depending on the attitudes under analysis, overrate the effect
of authoritarianism on behavior. Moreover, studies that have included African Americans
in their authoritarian analysis may be in error (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009) while those
that have excluded African Americans and others, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009),
Hetherington and Suhay (2011), and Stenner (2005) have done, may confront valid
questions about the universality of their claims concerning the effect of authoritarianism
on behavior (Kinder, 2007).
The cross-racial validity of the child-rearing scale is a very important question for
authoritarian scholars. In this chapter, I confront it by asking this simple, pointed
question: Is the child-rearing scale on which most of the contemporary research on
authoritarianism is based a variant and inaccurate means of estimating authoritarianism
among African Americans?
The argument for scale variance is based on theory and supported by evidence.
The suggested steadfast, monolithic allegiance of African Americans to their racial group
identity, as measured by linked fate questions (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) is the alleged,
root cause of variant Black interpretations of the child-rearing questions (Pérez &
Hetherington, 2014). The different attitudes expressed by African American and White
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If the theoretical argument behind the cross-racial invalidity of the authoritarian scale, which I will
explain later, is followed to its logical conclusion, it is possible to contend that the scale is valid only for
White males. In fact, a footnote in Pérez and Hetherington’s article (2014, p. 13, footnote 23) reports that
the child-rearing questions are also an invalid estimator of authoritarianism among Latinos.
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authoritarians on issues from two polls (the 2008 ANES and the 2010 YGP) that should
theoretically engage their authoritarian predisposition adds evidentiary weight to the
hypothesis. The actual finding of variance between African and White Americans’
understanding of child-rearing questions on the 2008 ANES further bolsters the theory.
And the persistent and unsettling prevalence of authoritarianism among African
Americans is elegantly explained if the child-rearing scale is, in fact, rife with
measurement error. Thus, if African American and White authoritarians express different
attitudes on issues that should engage their authoritarianism similarly and their
understandings of the child-rearing questions are statistically variant, quod erat
demonstrandum, the child-rearing scale must be cross-racially invalid.
But is it? A broader exploration of authoritarianism among African Americans
(offered in the chapters that follow) and testing of child-rearing questions for variance
from polls beyond the one examined by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) lead to a quite
different conclusion. This exploration begins with the finding that African Americans’
identification with their racial group is not monolithic. In fact, according to the data
presented in Chapter 3, there are statistically significant and substantive differences
between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians’ perceptions of linked
fate. African American authoritarians even express racial resentment toward other
Blacks, essentially saying I am not like them. I am not one of them. The mainstream
stereotype of African Americans is not my identity.
Data presented from over 20 years of polling in Chapters 5 and 6 also demonstrate
that African and White American authoritarians’ overall worldview and attitudes on
numerous issues are often quite similar. And, as discussed in Chapter 4, the prevalence of
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authoritarianism among African Americans is the predictable and observed outcome of
their persistent, asymmetric exposure to threat.
These three observations, which are analyzed in detail in subsequent chapters,
lead to the following hypotheses concerning the reliability of child-rearing questions as
estimators of latent authoritarianism among African Americans as well as Whites. I
expect (H1) most variations in observations of authoritarian behavior and attitudes
between African American and White authoritarians are not a product of scale variance
and can be explained more simply by whether:
1. The issue in question is based on principles that include an overt or covert
racial dimension.
2. The question activates latent authoritarianism.
3. The threat posed by the issue in question causes nonauthoritarians to
behave more like authoritarians.
4. The question poses an asymmetric or symmetric threat to African
Americans and Whites.
While this hypothesis may explain the observed differences in behavior and attitudes
documented by Pérez and Hetherington (2014), it does not address the variance found by
their Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the child-rearing questions on the
ANES 2008 survey.
To explore the issue of scale invariance in more detail, I tested the child-rearing
questions from five national polls in addition to the ANES 2008. I found authoritarian
question variance between Whites and African Americans in one additional survey and
invariance on the other four. The two surveys in which authoritarian questions were
variant included “both” as an answer in addition to the paired child-rearing responses.
The four surveys in which the authoritarian questions were invariant and, therefore, valid
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did not offer “both” as a response. Stated theoretically, I hypothesize (H2) that the
authoritarian scale will be invariant and valid for Whites and African Americans when
responses to the child-rearing questions are limited to paired attributes and survey
respondents are not offered the option of choosing “both” as an answer.
Complications with the measures used to estimate authoritarianism is not a new
problem. Measurement problems have bedeviled the study of authoritarianism since its
inception. I begin this chapter with a brief review of those different measuring problems.
This is followed by a summary of the claim (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014) that the present
tool used to estimate authoritarianism – the child-rearing battery of questions – is valid
for White Americans and errant when applied to African Americans. Next, I present a
Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis of child-rearing questions from six recent
polls and data from more than 20 years of surveys that questions the accuracy and
universality of the claim that the authoritarian scale is variant between Whites and
African Americans. I close with a brief discussion of how existing theories can be
employed to explain the variations in authoritarian behaviors accurately noted by Pérez
and Hetherington. These theories include Kinder’s observations in his works on the racial
issue divide (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001), Stenner’s theory of the
Authoritarian Dynamic (Stenner, 2005), and Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and
Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction theory, which argues that
nonauthoritarians behave more like authoritarians when confronting threats that are
personalized.42
Counter to Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) conclusion, I find that while the
authoritarian scale derived from child-rearing questions is not a flawless predictor of
42

The limits of this theory are examined in Appendix D.
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authoritarian behavior in every instance, it is still a very good estimator of the
predisposition to authoritarianism.
Scale variance is a product of question wording. Scales based on child- rearing
questions that do not include “both” as a response will produce invariant estimates of
authoritarianism among African Americans and Whites. Certainly, there will be instances
when the expected authoritarian behavior by authoritarians is not observed among both
Whites and Blacks. In these cases, authoritarianism may be dormant and inactivated,
blunted by race, not primed and therefore not expressed, asymmetrically activated, or
simply obscured by nonauthoritarians reacting in an authoritarian manner. More often
than not, however, the child-rearing questions do an excellent job of estimating latent
authoritarianism in African Americans and Whites as well as predicting their political
behavior.
Measurement Approaches and Problems
Measurement problems have plagued the study of authoritarianism since its
inception (Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993). The design and statistical validity of the
first attempt to estimate individuals’ innate predisposition to authoritarianism, the F-scale
(Adorno et al., 1950) was questioned just four years after its introduction (Christie, 1954;
Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954). By the 1960s, many scholars considered the F-scale an
“Edsel, a case study in how to do everything wrong” (Wolfe, 2005).43
New measurement schemes, including the so-called balanced F-scales – designed
to correct the acquiescent response bias intrinsic in the item wording of the original
Fascism scale (Lee & Warr, 1969; Rokeach, 1960), the Dogmatism scale (Rokeach,
43

An excellent review of the genesis of the study of authoritarianism, the development of the F-scale, and
the status of authoritarian theory and measurement is Strengths and Weakness: The Authoritarian
Personality Today (Stone et al., 1993).
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1960) and the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale (Ray, 1972) – fell short of the
measurement mark for a bevy of different reasons. The Conservatism scale conflates
authoritarianism with conservatism (Stenner, 2005). The foundation of balanced F-scales
remains Freudian psychodynamic theory, which is inherently unfalsifiable (Altemeyer,
2006; Duckitt, 1992; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). And while the
Dogmatism scale avoids the conservative bias of both the F and Conservatism scales
(Rokeach, 1960), the questions which comprise it are worded (like the F-Scale) in one
direction and subject to acquiescent response bias (Ray, 1970).
In an effort to resolve the ongoing authoritarian measurement problem, Altemeyer
introduced the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale in 1981 (Altemeyer, 1981) and
has regularly updated it to reflect societal changes (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996, 2006) . The
RWA scale is recognized as an excellent tool for estimating authoritarian attitudes
(Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). Its
fundamental strength is, however, its Achilles Heel. Many of the questions on which the
scale is based measure political attitudes. As such, the scale is an excellent tool for
measuring the expression of authoritarianism, but not for identifying individuals’
underlying predisposition to it (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).44 This
presents a particular theoretical problem for Stenner, who argues that authoritarianism is
latent until activated by a normative threat. Since the RWA scale only measures an
individual’s expression of authoritarianism, it is liable to miss those authoritarians who
are not activated at a particular point in time. To Stenner, Hetherington, and Weiler the
RWA scale is simply tautological – an excellent measurement of authoritarian prejudicial
44

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that the RWA scale “is so predictive of prejudice and
intolerance… [because it is] largely a measure of prejudice and intolerance” and not authoritarianism (p.
47).

42

preferences but an inaccurate estimator of a predisposition to authoritarianism
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).
The thicket of measurement problems presented by the different scales designed
to estimate authoritarianism consigned authoritarian studies to the “scholarly hinterlands”
of political science (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 36) until the introduction of a new
measure, based on four child-rearing questions, appeared on the ANES 1992 survey.
Questions about child-rearing values had been used on the General Social Survey (GSS)
since 1973 as a tool for estimating authoritarianism (Wronski, 2015). The inclusion of
four similar questions on the ANES 1992 survey led to a revival of the study of
authoritarianism by political scientists that was initiated by Feldman and Stenner
(Feldman & Stenner, 1997).
The child-rearing questions appeared to resolve the vexing measurement
problems that had bedeviled authoritarian scholarship for decades. As Stenner (2005)
succinctly explains, the four child-rearing questions “enable us to distinguish
authoritarian predisposition for authoritarian ‘products’ (attitudes)…which are sometimes
manifested but sometimes not, and whose specific content may vary across time and
space” (Stenner, 2005, p. 24). Armed with a new tool for identifying authoritarians,
political scientists pushed the study of authoritarianism back onto the scholarly agenda
(Feldman, 2003a; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner,
2005), starting with an analysis of data from the 1992 ANES studying the interaction of
perceived threat and authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 1997).
Since the inclusion of the child-rearing battery on the 1992 ANES, estimates of
authoritarianism using these questions have consistently found that the percentage of
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African Americans who are authoritarians in the United States is much greater than the
percentage of Whites. The difference between African American and White
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authoritarianism is summarized in the boxplot below (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Mean authoritarian scores.
(with 95% confidence intervals)
The significant difference between African American and White authoritarianism
displayed in this figure, and found in every poll when authoritarianism is estimated using
child-rearing questions, was overlooked for almost two decades by scholars leading the
renaissance in the study of authoritarianism. Hetherington and Weiler’s original work on
authoritarianism and partisan polarization toggled African Americans in and out of the
analysis (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Their work on authoritarianism and threat
focused predicted probability analyses exclusively on Whites (Hetherington & Suhay,
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2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Stenner’s research analyzed only non-Hispanic
Whites (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005).
As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, concerns about the cross-racial validity
of the four child-rearing items used to estimate authoritarianism were recently raised by
Pérez and Hetherington (2014). They contend that the gap in the prevalence of
authoritarianism between African Americans and Whites, produced by these questions
and summarized in Figure 1, is “largely a measurement artifact” (Pérez & Hetherington,
2014, p. 2).
If their concerns are correct and the child-rearing questions form an accurate
predictor of authoritarianism among Whites but not among African Americans, then
decades of studies and theoretical claims based on the scale confront new and important
challenges to their accuracy, validity, and universality. Understanding Pérez and
Hetherington’s concerns about the scales’ validity and evaluating the efficacy of their
argument goes to the very heart of contemporary and future studies of authoritarianism.
Hypothesis: The Authoritarian Scale Produced by Child-rearing Questions is
“Cross-Racially Invalid”
Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) argument that the authoritarian scale derived
from child-rearing questions is an inaccurate estimator of authoritarianism among African
Americans begins with theory. They argue the four child-rearing questions that comprise
the authoritarian scale are rooted in a metaphor that equates “hierarchical thinking at
home (as parents) with hierarchical thinking in society” (2014, p. 1). This metaphor,
according to Pérez and Hetherington, is apt with Whites who are racially dominant in
America, but falls apart with African Americans who are not. Thus “for White
respondents, individual dominance within a family hierarchy meshes with group
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dominance within America’s racial order” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, p. 2).45 The
practical implication is that Whites and African Americans’ understand and interpret the
child-rearing questions differently with the result that the authoritarian scale generated by
child-rearing questions is valid for Whites and invalid for Blacks because the metaphor
on which it is based does not apply to African Americans. African Americans are simply
not a dominant group in America’s racial order.
Pérez and Hetherington (2014) assert that “two observable implications” follow if
their theoretical “reasoning is correct” (2014, p. 4) that the family hierarchy metaphor is
apt with Whites and inapt with African Americans and the authoritarian scale derived
from child-rearing questions based on the metaphor is racially invalid. The first
observable consequence will be variance between African Americans’ and Whites’
understandings of the questions used to approximate authoritarianism as estimated
through Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis. If African Americans’ and Whites’
understanding of the four child-rearing questions, which when factored together produce
the unobserved latent variable called authoritarianism, vary in a way that is statistically
significant, then it is possible the two racial groups interpret and answer scale questions
differently.
The second discernible result will be statistically and substantively discrepant
responses between African American and White authoritarians to survey questions on
issues that are theorized to activate authoritarian responses. In other words, African
American and White authoritarians will express statistically different attitudes on
worldview and issue questions that go to heart of the authoritarian predisposition to obey,
seek order, defend norms, act aggressively toward “the other,” and eschew diversity.
45

See also Kim (2003), Omi and Winant (1994), Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pkatto (1997).
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Pérez and Hetherington (2014) present data from one survey (the ANES 2008) to
test for the first observable implication of their theory – variance in understanding
between African Americans and Whites of the child-rearing questions. They chose the
2008 ANES because its oversampling of Blacks yielded a robust N for analysis. Using
Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis to test for invariance, Pérez and Hetherington
find that African Americans and Whites may indeed have variant interpretations of the
child-rearing questions used to build the authoritarian scale, concluding that their
statistical analysis “indicates” the child-rearing questions “are not invariant across race”
(p. 6).46 In other words, there are indications that meanings of the child-rearing questions
may be different for African and White Americans.
Presenting a bivariate analysis of selected questions from two polls (2008 ANES
and 2010 YGP)47 to test for evidence of what they describe as the second observable
consequence of variance,48 Pérez and Hetherington (2014) find what they characterize as
discrepant correlations between White and African American authoritarian responses on
some issues49 that for African Americans and Whites “ought to be robustly correlated
with authoritarianism” (p. 9). Yet, “the correlations between authoritarianism and these
variables” among African Americans observed “are often zero” while they are “almost
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The two other data sets analyzed by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) – the 2008 and 2010
YouGovPolimetrix (YGP) surveys that were administered online – yielded similar results (2014, p. 6).
47
The 2010 YouGovPolimetrix poll is an online survey. It uses “opt-in design with matching methology”
(p.4) to produce a sample of 1,000 Whites and 1,000 Blacks.
48
The ANES 2008 survey and the 2010 YouGovPolimetrix survey.
49
The issues, opinions, and predispositions tested included: moral traditionalism, racial resentment,
egalitarianism, feminism, partisanship, ideology, gay marriage, gay adoption, and immigration as well as
feelings toward Muslims, atheists, Hindus, African Americans, and Whites, and identification with
America, and concerns about threats to cultural norms.
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always robust and reliable” among Whites (p. 9).50 This leads Pérez and Hetherington to
conclude that “this general pattern” of correlational differences between Whites and
African Americans on issues that should engage authoritarianism “underscores the childrearing scale’s lack of measurement invariance across race” (p. 9).
Finally, in a coda to their paper, Pérez and Hetherington (2014) append results
from an immigration experiment on the 2008 YGP to provide additional support for their
hypothesis that the child-rearing scale is variant. These results assess “the effects of
authoritarianism on opposition to illegal immigration” by illegal Mexicans and illegal
Canadians among Whites and African Americans (p. 11). The results find that both
illegal Mexicans and illegal Canadian immigrants concern White authoritarians while
only illegal Canadians concern African American authoritarians. From this data Pérez
and Hetherington conclude that “the expected theoretical pattern is discernibly weaker
among Blacks” (p. 10). While they note that differences in Whites’ and African
Americans’ perception of threat may be behind the different authoritarian perceptions of
illegal Mexicans, no explanation is given why anyone – authoritarian or not – would be
concerned about illegal Canadian immigrants posing a threat to America.51
Based on their theory, the findings of discrepant correlations, the indications of
variance produced by the Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis, and the
experimental results examining reactions to illegal Mexican and illegal Canadian
immigrants, Pérez and Hetherington (2014) conclude the child-rearing scale is “crossracially invalid” (p. 1).
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Pérez and Hetherington (2014) present correlation differences in their paper “because they are intuitive
and simple to present…a more rigorous comparison of regression coefficients…affirm the results”
presented (p. 7).
51
As designed, the experiment seems a bit too unreal and other worldly, and the results too speculative, to
be offered or accepted as evidence of variance among child-rearing questions.
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A Broader Inquiry of the Hypothesis that the Authoritarian Scale is
Cross-Racially Invalid
While Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) theory is bold, their conclusion that the
authoritarian scale produced by the child-rearing questions is “cross-racially invalid”
seems intemperate. The evidence in support of their hypothesis comes from just two
surveys. The theory on which their hypothesis rests is, in light of the data presented in
Chapters 3 and 4, demonstrably inapplicable to African American authoritarians. And the
way in which African Americans were oversampled in the 2008 ANES, the only survey
on which Pérez and Hetherington’s statistical claims of variance between Whites and
African Americans rest, may have affected their findings.
A reexamination of Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) claim begins, as it should,
with the theory on which it is based and a broader analysis of two decades of
authoritarian survey data to determine if the two observable consequences their theory
predicts stand the test of a broader inquiry.
Theoretical Underpinnings
Pérez and Hetherington (2014) contend that the metaphor which makes the childrearing questions accurate estimators of authoritarianism works for Whites but not for
African Americans. They argue the metaphor is based on hierarchy. Whites are at the top
of the racial group hierarchy in America. Blacks are decidedly not. Thus, the metaphor is
applicable to Whites, but not African Americans.52

52

Of course, Whites’ racial hegemony over African Americans is not the only dominant group relationship
extant in American society. Whites have also dominated Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians in
America. Male dominance over women also has a long, checkered history that all too often persists. A
logical extension of Pérez and Hetherington’s metaphor theory leads to the possibility that the authoritarian
scale produced by child-rearing value questions may be valid only among White males. In fact, Pérez and
Hetherington open the door to this possibility in a footnote in their article stating “measurement invariance
also emerges if we analyze Latino responses on the child-rearing scale” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, p.
13, footnote 23). Thus, if Pérez and Hetherington’s theory is right, while authoritarianism is a universal
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This theory assumes, of course, that African Americans are a monolithic racial
group whose members perceive their fates are linked and all readily identify themselves,
or have no choice but to identify themselves, as members of a Black underclass. This
presumption that African Americans monolithically identify with the mainstream
stereotype of Black inferiority is empirically flawed.53
As Robinson (2011) has argued, there are at least four attitudinal subsets of
Blacks in America today – Mainstream, Abandoned, Emergent (divided into two
subcategories), and Transcendents. “These four Black Americas are increasingly distinct,
separated by demography, geography, and psychology. [And] they have different
profiles, different mind-sets, different hopes, fears, and dreams” (Robinson, 2011, p. 5).
One subset of Emergent African Americans has recently immigrated to this country.
They now total almost 10 percent of all African Americans. Many of them are highly
educated. And “half or more of the Black students entering elite universities” today “are
the sons and daughters” of these Emergents (Robinson, 2011, p. 9). The threats posed by
slavery and Jim Crow have little historic resonance with these Emergents. They
immigrated to this country because of the opportunity it offers and, for some, the safe
haven it represents.
Certainly, the historic dominance of Whites in America means little to Emergents.
It follows then that the theoretical unsuitability of the parental metaphor on which the
cross-racial variance theory rests is also inapplicable to them. Members of the
Transcendent, Emergent, and middle-class Mainstream subsets of African Americans are
predisposition the scale contemporary scholar’s use to measure it, and on which they base all of their
hypotheses and work, may only be valid among White males.
53

Robinson (2011) argues that the scholarly assumption of a monolithic Black community was never
accurate. “Black America was never monolithic, but at certain rare moments it ha[s] recognized a single
leader” ( p. 58).

50

also less likely to accept the proposition of White dominance within America’s racial
order. As such, the parental metaphor captured by the child-rearing questions may also be
a reliable barometer of their authoritarian predisposition.
The evidence that Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) theoretical assumption is
inaccurate, however, goes well beyond Robinson’s descriptive analysis. African
American authoritarians are statistically much less likely than their nonauthoritarian
brethren to agree their individual fate is linked (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) to their racial
group identity, and much more likely to say their fate is not linked at all (Figures 2 and
3).
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Figure 2: Linked fate.
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Figure 3: African Americans’ linked fate.
African American authoritarians are also statistically more likely to agree with the
symbolically racist (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay & Hough,
1976; Sears, 1993; Sears, 1988; Sears & Kinder, 1971) negative stereotypes of members
of their own race still broadcast by much of mainstream America and measured by racial
resentment questions (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Racial resentment among African Americans of African Americans.
(0 is not resentful at all and 1 is the most resentful with 95% confidence intervals)
And they react to questions about “the other” just as White authoritarians do, agreeing
that there are inferior groups in society who must be kept in their place (see Chapter 5).
And most importantly, while African American authoritarians are hostile to what they
deem to be other inferior groups, they identify closely with the particular group with
which they identify and aspire to belong – conventional, norm-espousing and -defending
Americans who, for now, are at the top of the mainstream hierarchical social order.
African American authoritarians are prouder to be American than
nonauthoritarians (see Chapter 5, Figure 36). They are much more likely than
nonauthoritarians of either race to revere the Horatio Alger mythos, which sits at the core
of the American Dream and whose veneration defines those who espouse and defend it as
true or aspirational Americans (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Strongly agree: Horatio Alger—if you work hard, you can succeed.
In short, African American authoritarians differentiate and distance themselves
from the mainstream stereotypes of Black Americans that define and reinforce the racial
group hierarchy at the core of Pérez and Hetherington’s theory. African American
authoritarians’ answers to linked fate, racial resentment, fear of “the other,” American
pride, and Horatio Alger questions demonstrate unequivocally their self-identification as
American and not, or not only, Black. They choose not to identify themselves as the
mainstream stereotype of Black Americans. They are not them. They do not hold those
values. They work hard. They refuse to be burdened by the downward mobility of being
perceived as only Black in America (Waters, 2009, p. 65). American is one of their
reference groups and a chosen identity. They are Americans who are also Black. And as
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authoritarians, they will defend their chosen group identity against all others because the
very act of defending defines who they are, and who they are not.
Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) theory of the cross-racial invalidity of the
authoritarian scale rests fully on the assumption that African Americans have no choice
when it comes to their identity. African Americans are consigned – without recourse – to
inferior, under-class status in the hierarchical racial order of America.
Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) assumption, however, is incorrect. For African
Americans who are also authoritarians, race is simply not the only factor that shapes their
choice of identity, worldview, or political behavior. As I have demonstrated, African
American attitudes are neither monolithic, predictably liberal, driven by a jointly held
conception of linked racial fate, nor constrained, solely, by racial group identity. African
American authoritarians choose and, in many cases, strive to identify with the Americans
at the top of the hierarchy. As such, the metaphor at the core of the child-rearing
questions resonates with them just as well as it does with White authoritarians.
Observable Consequences:
Question Variance and Attitudinally Discrepant Behavior
Pérez and Hetherington (2014) contend that two observable consequences follow
from their theory and marshal data from two surveys to find evidence of these
consequences. The first consequence predicted by their theory is variant understanding of
child-rearing questions among African and White Americans. Taking responses to the
child-rearing questions from the 2008 ANES, Pérez and Hetherington estimate a model
using “robust weighted least squares with polychoric correlations as inputs” (2014, p. 6).
First, they approximate an unrestricted model in which “factor loadings and item
thresholds are freely estimated within each racial group.” If a strong model fit, as
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measured by through the comparative fit index (CFI) and root mean squared error of
approximation (RMSEA) is found, 54 Pérez and Hetherington then estimate “a restricted
model that fixes the item loadings and thresholds to equality” between Whites and
African Americans, which “implies that race does not affect individual responses to the
child-rearing items” (p. 6). To test for invariance “the difference in chi-square (X2)
between the unrestricted and restricted models” is estimated (p. 6). A statistically
significant difference between the models’ chi square (X2) means Whites and Blacks
have a variant understanding of the child-rearing questions and the latent variable
produced by scaling or factoring the questions – authoritarianism – is likely to be invalid
between races. This racial invalidity is likely because the statistically significant
difference in the models’ chi square (X2) indicates that “restricting the item loadings and
thresholds to equality across groups deteriorates the model’s fit” (p. 6).
I use the exact same approach employed by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) to test
for variant understandings of the child-rearing questions between Whites and African
Americans on six different polls, including the 2008, 2011, and 2012 ANES surveys, the
2008 LAPOP poll, the 2014 UMASS CCES module, and a 2015 national poll I fielded in
December. However, the inclusion of binary, categorical variables in my analysis
necessitates the use of a different model estimator than the one used by Pérez and
Hetherington. The estimator of choice for binary as well as categorical variables, and the
one I employed, is weighted least squares with mean and variance adjustment (Muthén &
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The recommended values for each measure of fit are: .950 or greater for CFI and .08 or less for RMSEA
(Acock, 2013) or .900 or greater for CFI and .05 or less for RMSEA (Brown, 2006). CFI approximates how
much better the estimated model fits the data than a null model. For example, a CFI of .950 means the
estimated model performs 95% better than a null model “in which we assume the items are all unrelated to
each other” (Acock, 2013, p. 23). RMSEA evaluates “how much error there is for each degree of freedom”
penalizing a model “for unnecessary added complexity” (p. 24).
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Muthén, 2005). As Brown (2006) notes, “WLSMV is a robust estimator…and provides
the best option for modeling categorical and ordered data” (p. 24). Given the
demonstrated difference between the authoritarian means between Whites and African
Americans and following Pérez and Hetherington’s approach as well as Muthén and
Muthén’s recommendation, I fixed group means in the unrestricted model to zero so that
the invariance test was “unaffected by possible differences in group means” (p. 6).
Following Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) lead, I first estimate unrestricted and
restricted models for the child-rearing questions of the 2008 ANES using the WLSMV
estimator. My results mirror their findings, producing a significant chi square change
between the models (X2= 39.815) that is also statistically significant (p < .0001). This
indicates the “observed scores on the child-rearing items are not strictly a function of
people’s underlying level of authoritarianism. Race also affects the reporting of
authoritarianism” (p. 6). When the same statistical approach is applied to child-rearing
items from the 2012 ANES, which like the 2008 ANES includes “both” as an question
response, variance between Whites and African Americans understandings of the
questions (X2=35.83 with a p<.0001) is found once again (Table 1).
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Table 1
Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: Authoritarian scale variant
Latent Variable -- Authoritarianism
Observed Variables -- Four Child Rearing Questions (Paired Child Attribute Responses plus "Both")
Compared Groups -- Whites and African Americans

Survey

Chi Square

Chi Square

CFI

RMSEA

Difference Test

ANES 2008 (N=1621, 1093 White. 528 Black)
Unrestricted Model

32.681 (p<.0001)

Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model

39.815 p<.001

0.974

0.094

0.945

0.087

0.975

0.088

0.963

0.068

ANES 2012 (N=4214, 3260 White, 954 Black)
Unrestricted Model

69.787 (p<.0001)

Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model

35.823 (p<.0001)

Note: All estimates using Weighted Least Squares w ith Mean and Variance adjustments

Statistical testing of the cross-racial validity of child-rearing questions on the 2008
LAPOP, 2011 ANES, 2014 UMASS CCES module, and the 2015 national survey I
conducted in December, however, all find the questions to be invariant (Table 2). In other
words, the authoritarian scale produced from these questions in these four polls is crossracially valid. Whites and African Americans have the same understanding of the
questions and the authoritarian scale estimates their unobserved but essential
predisposition to authoritarianism accurately.
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Table 2
Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: Authoritarian scale invariant
Latent Variable -- Authoritarianism
Observed Variables -- Four Child Rearing Questions (Paired Child Attribute Responses Only)
Compared Groups -- Whites and African Americans

Survey

Chi Square

Chi Square

CFI

RMSEA

Difference Test

LAPOP 2008 (N=1248, 1095 White, 153 Black)
Unrestricted Model

7.800 (p=.0992)

Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model

1.478 (p=.4776)

0.994

0.039

0.992

0.028

0.975

0.076

0.977

0.060

0.988

0.069

0.99

0.050

0.978

0.078

0.98

0.061

ANES 2011 (N=1075, 956 White, 119 Black)
Unrestricted Model

16.370 (p=.0026)

Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model

2.534 (p=.2817)

UMASS-CCES 2014 (N=1865, 1620 White, 245 Black)
Unrestricted Model

16.370 (p=.0026)

Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model

2.534 (p=.2817)

UMASS 2015 (N=1470, 1219 White, 251 Black)
Unrestricted Model

21.768 (p=.0002)

Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model

2.162 (p=.3393)

Note: All estimates using Weighted Least Squares w ith Mean and Variance adjustments

There is a difference, however, between the two polls in which the child-rearing
questions are variant and the four surveys where the questions are invariant. The four
surveys where invariance is found include child-rearing questions on which respondents’
answers are limited to paired choices of desirable attributes. The two surveys where
variance is found between African Americans and Whites ask questions in which “both”
is added as a response option. This finding leads me to the hypothesis stated earlier: that
the authoritarian scale will be invariant and valid for Whites and African Americans
when responses to the child-rearing questions are limited to paired attributes and variant
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when “both” is offered as a third choice. While I have not yet tested this hypothesis in a
survey experiment, Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) claim of variance between African
American and Whites’ understanding of child-rearing question can no longer be
considered a universally applicable finding. Counter to Pérez and Hetherington’s
conclusion, the scales derived from the questions on four of the six surveys analyzed here
are cross-racially valid. In these surveys, African American and Whites have similar
understandings of the child-rearing questions and the authoritarian scale built from these
questions is not affected in a statistically or substantively meaningful way by racial
differences.
The second consequence predicted by Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) theory is
that on issues that are theoretically of import to authoritarians White and African
American authoritarian attitudes will be discrepant. Relying on questions from two
surveys, 55 Pérez and Hetherington do find discrepant correlations between White and
African American authoritarian responses on some issues that are theoretically of import
to authoritarians.
Several of the questions tested by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) in support of
their cross-racial thesis, however, are puzzling. For example, the differing correlations
between African American and White authoritarians on racial resentment questions,
feelings toward Atheists and Hindus, and partisan identification found on the ANES 2008
survey seem to prove little. First, nowhere in the current scholarly literature on
authoritarianism are Atheists and Hindus identified as groups that present a threat to
American authoritarians. Second, the racial resentment battery of questions is designed to
measure the resentment of Whites and others toward African Americans. Thus, African
55

The 2008 ANES survey and the 2010 YouGovPolimetrix survey.
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Americans authoritarians are unlikely to exhibit as much racial resentment to members of
their own race as authoritarian Whites express toward Blacks. Finally, on the other seven
issues or issue areas cited as examples of correlational differences between White and
African American authoritarians, the correlation between White authoritarians and the
issue cited is low, never surpassing .28 or falling to less than -.29. Within this small
range, the correlational differences between Whites and African Americans on these
issues are at most an insignificant .15 points.
The bivariate results from these two surveys, which were also subjected to a
multivariate analysis by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) that appears in the appendix of
their article, must also be weighed against the data from 12 national surveys taken over
the last two decades and presented in Chapters 3, 5, and 6. This data demonstrates time
and again the similarity between the attitudes of African American and White
authoritarians on a broad array of values and issues.
The attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians
on fundamental principles that comprise the authoritarian worldview and a wide range of
salient issues that are theorized to engage the authoritarian predisposition present another
significant problem for Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) thesis. Certainly, African
American and White authoritarians do not always exhibit the same attitudes. But more
often than not, their worldview, attitudes on issues that should engage their
authoritarianism, and even their perception of what should pose a symmetrical threat are
strikingly similar.
For example, a sampling of the worldview principles presented in Chapter 5,
ranging from the necessity of choosing between good and evil, suppressing the rights of
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dissenters, the threat posed by “the other,” the belief that inferior groups should stay in
their place, and the Horatio Alger mythos, reveals the statistical similarity of the opinions
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of African American and White authoritarians (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Statistical similarities between African American and White authoritarian
attitudes on worldview principles.

Just as importantly, the opinions of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, no matter their
race, are also statistically different. For example, African American and White
nonauthoritarians are statistically less likely to strongly agree that we must choose
between good and evil than authoritarians (worldview #1). They are also statistically
more likely to strongly disagree that inferior groups should stay in their place (worldview
#2) than authoritarians (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Difference between African American and White nonauthoritarians and
authoritarians predicted attitudes on two worldview principles.

The empirical evidence of statistical similarity between African American and White
authoritarians and dissimilarity between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on
principles that are intrinsic to the authoritarian worldview abounds in the 12 surveys
analyzed for this dissertation.
When the views of African American and White authoritarians are statistically
different, the perceptions of authoritarians are still, often, statistically dissimilar from all
nonauthoritarians. For example, on the 2012 ANES survey, White and African American
authoritarians hold statistically different views on moral traditionalism, but both White
and African American authoritarians are more morally traditional than nonauthoritarians
(Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Difference between African American and White authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians predicted attitudes on moral traditionalism.

The documented statistical similarities between the worldviews of African
American and White authoritarians on principles are repeated when it comes to their
preferences on issues that theoretically should engage authoritarianism and are part of the
worldview evolution (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). For example, from gay marriage
and adoption to suppressing the free press, views of new immigrants, Muslims, and
Clarence Thomas, the legalization of marijuana, and CIA torture, African American and
White authoritarians again hold statistically identical views (Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Statistical similarity between African American and White authoritarians’
attitudes of worldview evolution issues.

Once again, the attitudes of nonauthoritarians and authoritarians, whether they are
African American or White, are often statistically different on these issues. For example,
nonauthoritarians are statistically less likely to oppose gay marriage and legalizing
marijuana than authoritarians. They are also less likely to strongly agree that new
immigrants are a burden on the country (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Statistical differences between nonauthoritarian and authoritarian African
Americans and Whites on worldview evolution issues.

Finally, according to the theories explored in Chapter 4, a symmetrically
perceived threat, like the physical threat posed by terrorism, should find authoritarianism
a statistically and substantively significant independent variable for both African
Americans and Whites. In other words, authoritarianism should be predictive of
perceptions of threat irrespective of race; and the more authoritarian one’s predisposition,
the more likely they will be to fear physical harm from terrorism. As I will demonstrate
in Chapter 4, this is exactly the behavior found. The authoritarianism of African
Americans and Whites is predictive of their perceptions of symmetric threat.
From fundamental principles to authoritarian issues and perceptions of symmetric
threats, African American and White authoritarians express statistically similar attitudes
on questions from surveys spanning more than two decades. As such, the second
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consequence predicted by Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) theory – statistically
discrepant attitudes between White and African American authoritarians on issues that
are theoretically of import to authoritarians – does not withstand a broader analysis of
available polling data. African American and White authoritarians will not always hold
statistically similar attitudes, but quite often they do.
A Competing Hypothesis Concerning the Racial Validity of the
Child-rearing Scale
Undoubtedly, there will be differences between the attitudes of African American
and White authoritarians. However, as I have shown in the previous discussion of theory
and consequences, these differences simply do not warrant the wholesale dismissal of
child-rearing questions as estimators of authoritarianism in African Americans (or
Latinos, Asian Americans, women, Muslims, and any other group that does not sit at the
top of the hierarchical order in America). Variations that do exist between African and
White American authoritarian attitudes, when they are statistically significant, can be
explained by existing theories concerning race, authoritarianism, and threat without
limiting the scope of the child-rearing scale’s universality and utility so categorically that
the scale and the theories based on it are virtually useless. Thus, my competing
hypothesis (H1) asserts that child-rearing questions are a good estimator of the latent
authoritarian predisposition among African Americans and Whites. Any variations in
observations of authoritarian behavior and attitudes can be explained more
parsimoniously by existing theories concerning race, authoritarianism, and threat.
This theoretical approach separates the authoritarian predisposition from its
expression, recognizing, as we should, that predisposition and expression are different
(Stenner, 2005). It acknowledges that while the authoritarian scale measures
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predisposition, the expression of the predisposition can be attenuated by four different
conditions. These conditions are not newly discovered or the progeny of radical theories.
Three of them represent important scholarly contributions already made to the
understanding of race, political behavior, and authoritarianism, including Kinder’s work
on the racial divide (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001), Stenner’s (2005) theory of
authoritarian activation (Stenner, 2005), and Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and
Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction thesis. The fourth theory,
concerning the symmetrical or asymmetrical nature of threat, is new and is advanced next
in this dissertation. The ways in which these conditions can mediate the expression of the
authoritarian predisposition are discussed next.
Differential Principles and Overt and Covert Racial Issues
Kinder’s exploration of the racial divide between Black and White Americans on
race and social welfare issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001) produced an unexpected finding
with important theoretical ramifications. Kinder finds that race – both in terms of ingroup identification (linked fate) and out-group resentment (racial resentment) – is not at
the core of the identified divide between African American and White opinions. In other
words, race had “no effect” or is a “weak predictor of opinion” in the two issue areas
where Kinder and Winter (2001) finds a wide gap in the attitudes of African Americans
and Whites (2001, p. 447).56 While this finding obviously presents another challenge to
the theoretical underpinnings of Pérez and Hetherington’s hypothesis concerning the
validity of the authoritarian scale, it also forms the basis of the first explanation for
variance and similarity among the attitudes of African Americans and White
authoritarians.
56

Kinder and Winter (2001) note, “This is true except on the issue of affirmative action” ( p. 447).
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The key to the divide in opinion between African and White Americans on race
(overt racial issues like affirmative action) and social welfare issues (what Kinder and
Winter [2001] consider covert racial issues) is the divergent views of African Americans
and Whites on two principles – equal opportunity and limited government. As Kinder and
Winter note “principles turn out to account for a sizable share of the racial divide in
opinion (p. 447).57 Kinder and Winter’s finding about the role principles play in attitude
formation echoes Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) contention that worldview “serve[s]
as a determinant of public opinion and political behavior” (p. 36).
As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, many of the principles on which the authoritarian
worldview rests are shared by both African American and White authoritarians. Since
there is congruence between African Americans and White authoritarians on a broad
range of principles, and, according to Kinder and Winter’s (2001) work, principles drive
attitudes more than race and class interest, the opinions of African American and White
authoritarians should be similar across a wide range of contested issue in American
politics that theoretically engage or provoke the authoritarian predisposition, including
many of the salient concerns at the core of the worldview evolution posited by
Hetherington and Weiler (2009).58 On the other hand, when African and White
Americans views on principles diverge, as Kinder and Winter found they do on equal
opportunity and limited government, African Americans’ racial identity will compete
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Differences in “social class” (also labeled as “material interests”) had no effect on the racial gap on race
issues but were “part of the story” on social welfare issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, pp. 446-449).
58
The racial divide is “much less impressive on other social issues, immigration, and foreign policy”
(Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 441). Not coincidentally, culture war social issues, immigration, and foreign
policy are the issue domains in which the authoritarian predisposition and resulting worldview is more
likely to shape attitudes (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
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with their authoritarianism and American identity, producing variations between the
attitudes of African and White American authoritarians.
Authoritarian Activation
Stenner (2005) theorizes that normative threat activates authoritarianism in those
Americans who are already predisposed to authoritarianism. To Stenner authoritarianism
is not always on. Authoritarian behavior is activated “when needed” (p. 14) in reaction to
a particular threat. As such, “authoritarianism does not consistently predict behavior
across different situations” (p. 13).
Thus, when White and African American authoritarians both perceive a threat
they will both react to it. When they perceive a threat differentially, they will react to it
differently. (For example, the personal threat posed by local and state police which I
document in Chapter 4.) And when neither White or African American authoritarians
perceive a threat, their authoritarian predisposition –according to Stenner’s theory – will
remain dormant and, in large part, unexpressed.
Following Stenner’s (2005) logic, observed variance between attitudes expressed
by African American and White authoritarians is not necessarily an outcome of
differences in their authoritarian predisposition. It may simply be a product of differential
activation in the presence of threat or the lack of activation entirely.
Nonauthoritarian Activation and Asymmetric Threats
Unlike Stenner (2005), according to Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and
Hetherington and Suhay (2011), authoritarians live in a perpetual state of hypervigilance.
Perceiving threats whether they exist or not, their authoritarianism is always on
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). As such, these scholars contend that increases in
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perceived threats (threats to personal safety) cause nonauthoritarians to behave more like
authoritarians. In their work, they demonstrate how the personal threat from terrorism can
powerfully reshape attitudes of nonauthoritarians transforming them – under certain
conditions – into authoritarian look-a-likes (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).59
This time, following Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and
Suhay’s (2011) logic, two conditions could produce observable variances in attitudes
expressed by African American and White authoritarians. First, if a personal threat is
implied and increasing, but the threat is covertly or overtly racial as defined by Kinder
and Winter (2011), White nonauthoritarians may react like authoritarians while the
response of African American nonauthoritarians would be muted by their race.
Conversely, if an asymmetric personal threat is extant, meaning in this case that it is
perceived by African American nonauthoritarians but not Whites, African American
nonauthoritarians may act more like authoritarians, employing authoritarianism as a
shield to protect themselves from the perceived threat while White nonauthoritarians may
not be activated at all. Again, variance between African American and White behaviors
and attitudes in both of these circumstances are not an outcome of changes in latent
authoritarian predisposition, they are reactions to varying perceptions of threat.
Authoritarian Activation and Asymmetric Threat
The threat posed by police and discussed in Chapter 4 is an excellent example of
how an asymmetrically perceived threat can trigger African American nonauthoritarians
to act more authoritarian and also engage African American authoritarians while having
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This is Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction thesis,
which is discussed in detail in Appendix A. Please note, the predicted probabilities used to illustrate the
thesis in the article that appeared in the American Journal of Political Science are only estimated for “males
who are not Black or Hispanic” (p. 553).
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little effect on the attitudes of White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. Observed
differences in responses to threat by African American and White authoritarians,
therefore, can be the result of racial differences in the perception of threats by
authoritarians and not racial differences in their authoritarian predisposition. In other
words, different perceptions of threat among authoritarians may restructure their opinions
on certain issues along racial lines and produce statistically differing attitudes among
authoritarians without changing their underlying predisposition toward authoritarianism.
This is not an outcome of variance within the authoritarian predisposition measured by
scale questions. Instead, it is a result of the variant authoritarian activation of members of
different races because of their differential reactions to particular threats.
Chapter Summary
Until the four child-rearing items were included on the ANES survey in 1992, an
accurate measurement of individuals’ predisposition to authoritarianism had eluded
political scientists for more than 40 years. The scale derived from the child-rearing
questions led to a renaissance in the important study of authoritarianism, the risks it may
pose to democracy (Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Merolla & Zechmeister,
2009), the role of threat in the activation of authoritarian behaviors among authoritarians
as well as nonauthoritarians (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005), and the role
authoritarianism may have played in recent political polarization (Hetherington & Weiler,
2009).
If the scale is variant and African Americans and Whites interpret the questions
on which it is based differentially, then the numerous universal theoretical claims that
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have been made by contemporary authoritarian scholarship based on it must be carefully
reconsider and qualified.
Evidence of the scale’s variance, however, is at best ephemeral and inconclusive.
In no less than four recent surveys examined in this chapter, the scale was invariant.
These findings should put an end to any blanket scholarly claims that the authoritarian
scale derived for child-rearing questions is cross-racially invalid. Moreover, the
preponderance of data presented in Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that African American and
White authoritarians are attitudinally quite similar on a wide range of values that
structure worldview and issue preferences.60 When threat is perceived differentially by
African and White Americans, however, dissimilarities in the behavior of authoritarians
may be observed. This is a result of variations in authoritarian and nonauthoritarian
activation, not variance in predisposition.
The puzzle that led Pérez and Hetherington (2014) to test child-rearing questions
for invariance, the marked prevalence of authoritarianism among African Americans, is
more parsimoniously explained by the recognition that the asymmetric threats African
Americans confront every day (and their forebears confronted throughout American
history) predispose them to authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a response to their
environment, a protective shield from the dangers confronting them daily.
Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) finding of variant attitudes between African and
White American authoritarians, when they do indeed exist, is more simply explained by
the four conditions that I hypothesize mediate the expression of authoritarianism as well

60

Perceptions of the personal threat posed by terrorism, the threat variable used by Hetherington and
Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) to investigate their negative interaction thesis, also
varies by authoritarianism without statistically significant or substantive differences between African and
White Americans.
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as the actual variation in the wording of answers to child-rearing questions. Moreover,
the theory on which Pérez and Hetherington (2014) base their claims is founded on a
caricature of African Americans that is inaccurate. African Americans are not the
monolithic, homogeneous group of political science theory.61 They never have been. A
more nuanced approach to understanding African American attitudes is required not just
in studies of American authoritarianism, but across the discipline of political science.

61

Robinson (2011) argues that the scholarly assumption of a monolithic Black community was never
accurate. “Black America was never monolithic, but at certain rare moments it ha[s] recognized a single
leader” (p. 58).

74

CHAPTER 3
AFRICAN AMERICANS: LIBERAL AUTHORITARIANS?
The exploration of African American authoritarians begins, as it should, with two
threshold questions. The first question requires an empirical analysis of the claim made
by Hetherington and Weiler that “African Americans are the most authoritarian racial
group in the United States by far” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 141). This statement
instigated the chain of questions that led to this dissertation and the puzzle at its core:
How can African Americans be the most authoritarian and the most liberal group in
America if their attitudes are homogeneous?
The simple answer is that African Americans cannot be authoritarian, liberal, and
homogeneous simultaneously. Authoritarians are not liberal by any stretch of the
imagination. If some African Americans are authoritarians and others are liberals, then
African American attitudes are not monolithic. If African American attitudes are not
monolithic, then the Black utility heuristic and theory of linked racial fate (Davis, 1995;
Tate, 1994) is not a universal predictor of African American behavior. If linked fate only
predicts how some African Americans behave, what, if anything, structures the opinions
of other African Americans? Is it authoritarianism?
This question leads inevitably back to the initial empirical query: How prevalent
is authoritarianism among African Americans? And its corollary: Are African Americans
more authoritarian than Whites?
My hypothesis is simple. Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) statement, which they
substantiated with data from one survey (the 2004 ANES), that African Americans are
the most authoritarian racial group in America and always more authoritarian than Whites
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is accurate. Stated simply, when authoritarianism is measured using the child-rearing
battery of questions, a higher percentage of African Americans will be classified
authoritarian than Whites (H1).
The second question wrestled with in this chapter is an obvious, yet important,
follow-up to this hypothesis: Who are African American authoritarians, and how do they
differ from African American nonauthoritarians? The latter part of this question, as well
as the attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians, is the
subject of Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The first part of this question, which assumes there will
be demographic differences between African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians, is the focus of this chapter. Stated hypothetically, I contend there will
be distinct, observable demographic differences between African American authoritarians
and nonauthoritarians (H2).
Examining data from seven national surveys taken from 1992 through 2014, this
chapter explores both hypotheses. First, I find that authoritarianism is always more
prevalent among African Americans than Whites. Then, using data from the University of
Massachusetts module on the CCES 2014 election surveys to explore whether
demographic differences exist between African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians, I find that differences between African Americans perceptions of
linked fate and reported church attendance are associated with authoritarianism. African
Americans, who are less likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their group racial
identity and more likely to attend church each week, are more likely to be authoritarian.
The finding that African Americans authoritarians are less likely to perceive their
individual fate is linked to their racial identity leads to an interesting possibility and the
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final hypothesis examined in this chapter that authoritarianism may be a more important
force structuring the worldview and attitudes of some African Americans than their race
(H3).
The implications of this hypothesis for the theorized homogeneity and liberal
leanings of African Americans’ opinions are significant. Contrary to the scholarly
conventional wisdom, African American attitudes are neither necessarily homogeneous
nor pathologically liberal. They may vary based on an African American’s predisposition
to authoritarianism, personal perception of linked fate and, as we will see later, whether
the issue or behavior in question engages authoritarianism, demands racial solidarity, or
both.
The possibility that authoritarianism structures the behavior of some African
Americans more than their identification with their racial group leads to the final section
of this chapter – a coda that starts with an analysis of several linked fate questions asked
on recent surveys that include robust samples of African Americans. The goal of this
exploration is to determine if African American authoritarians are consistently less likely
to agree that their individual fate is linked to the fate of their racial group.
The question of the relative roles of authoritarianism and group identification in
the structuring of African American behavior leads farther afield to the investigation of
possible differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians
answers to racial resentment questions.
Racial resentment questions and the scale derived from them were developed to
measure the continuing antipathy of Whites toward Blacks as “biological racism”
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declined (Kinder, 1996, p. 97).62 Racial resentment “powerfully predicts derogatory racial
stereotypes” (Kinder, 1996, p. 109) by measuring “animosity toward Blacks …in the
language of American individualism” (p. 124). Stated simply, the racial resentment scale
estimates the symbolic racism of White Americans toward Blacks.63
In most surveys, African Americans have been asked the same questions probing
racial resentment toward Blacks. This data has been mostly ignored by scholars. In the
last part of this chapter, I analyze African Americans’ answers to these questions to see if
African American authoritarians are more likely to agree with the negative, mainstream
stereotypes of their race than nonauthoritarians who are African Americans. If they do,
African American authoritarians’ rejection of linked fate may be part of a pattern in
which African Americans authoritarians not only reject the proposition that their
individual fate is tied to their racial group identity, but also differentiate themselves from
other African Americans, rejecting the negative stereotype of Blacks in America,
asserting that stereotypes does not define them, and choosing a different or additional
identity and group to which to belong. A group that celebrates the mainstream norms of
American individualism and self-determination, is traditionally moral, obeys authority,
and eschews diversity to the exclusion of all else – in other words, American
authoritarians.
Admittedly, the coda to this chapter is a departure that takes me far ahead to
hypotheses and concepts that will be explored in detail in later chapters. I include it here
because the push and pull of authoritarianism and race on African Americans underlies
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As Kinder (1996) points out “the decline of biological racism must not be equated with the decline of
racism generally” ( p. 97).
63
Kinder (1996) notes that the term “symbolic racism” was an “unfortunate choice,” and “we intend racial
resentment to take on the characteristics normally attributed to symbolic racism” ( p. 293).
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and underscores everything that follows. Outlining the existence and contours of the
tension between authoritarianism and race helps set the scene for what is yet to come in
later chapters.
In this chapter, I find that African Americans authoritarians do indeed think their
fate is not as linked to their racial group as nonauthoritarian African Americans. And,
intriguingly, they are also more likely to express racial resentment toward members of
their own race.
With the overview complete, let’s turn to the first hypothesis offered and the
evidence that authoritarianism is more prevalent among African Americans than Whites.
Prevalence of African American Authoritarians
A simple frequency distribution of the authoritarian scales derived from answers
to the child-rearing questions asked on seven polls conducted between 1992 and 2014
was estimated to determine the incidence of those with the most authoritarian
predisposition (those who score 1 on the scale) among African Americans and Whites.
The results of this analysis consistently find that the percentage of African Americans
who are the most authoritarian in the United States is greater than the percentage of
Whites (Appendix C – Table 20).
Next, authoritarian scale data was pooled from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and
2012 ANES surveys to assess the distribution of authoritarians for Americans who
identify as White or African Americans. The skew among the racially combined
population towards authoritarianism is obvious (Figure 11).
In this figure, following the approach used by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) as
well as others, I also classified those who score .75 or above on the scale as high
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authoritarians (labeled “authoritarians”), and those who score .25 on the scale as low
authoritarians (labeled “nonauthoritarians”). Except where explicitly noted, this
classification scheme is used throughout this dissertation to divide respondents into
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Figure 11: Distribution of Blacks and Whites on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.

A look at this same data divided by race reveals, once again, that African Americans
(Figure 12) are more disposed to authoritarianism than Whites (Figure 13).
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Figure 12: Distribution of Blacks on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.
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Figure 13: Distribution of Whites on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.

Finally, a difference of means test was used to determine if the mean authoritarian
scores of African Americans are not only greater than, but also statistically different from
Whites. The results of these bivariate tests reveal that the mean authoritarian scores of
Whites are less than and statistically different from African Americans at a p-value of
less than .05 on each of the seven polls (Figure 14 and Appendix C – Table 21).
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Figure 14: Mean authoritarian scores.
(with 95% confidence intervals)
Added to Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) finding from the 2004 ANES survey,
the results from these seven polls conducted over the last two decades confirm the
hypothesis that the prevalence of authoritarianism, as estimated by the four-item childrearing questions, is indeed greater among African Americans than Whites. As such, any
theory of authoritarianism based on the child-rearing scale should include African
Americans in its analysis or, at least, present very persuasive arguments for excluding
them.
Demographics of African American Authoritarians
Data from the University of Massachusetts’s module on the 2014 CCES election
survey was used to explore the second hypothesis offered in this chapter that there are
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observable demographic differences between African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians.
First, a Wilcoxon-Mann bivariate test of independent samples was employed to
determine if African American authoritarians are statistically different than
nonauthoritarians across a series of common demographic variables including age,
ideology, income, education, and party identification as well as three other variables.
These three variables are linked fate, church attendance, and citizenship status. Theory is
behind the inclusion of these three variables in my analysis. First, I hypothesized that
African American authoritarians are less likely to think their fate is linked to their race
than Black nonauthoritarians because they are more likely to identify themselves with
other American authoritarians. Second, church attendance was included because of the
correlation between religiosity and authoritarianism found among Whites and Stenner’s
(2005) contention that “religious upbringing does add a very small additional increment”
to one’s authoritarianism (p. 156). Finally, because of the hypothetical link between
generational exposure to threat and anxiety and authoritarianism, I added citizenship
status to ascertain if African Americans whose families had a longer history in the United
States were more likely to be authoritarians than those who were new to this country.
Linked fate is an ordinal variable with four possible answers that range from “a
lot” to “not at all.” Church attendance is also an ordinal variable with five possible
answers ranging from “once a week” to “never.”64 Finally, citizenship status included
five possible answers. The first two answers are “citizen immigrant” and “non-citizen
immigrant.” These were combined to form an immigrant answer which is followed
64

Originally, there were seven answer options for the church attendance question. In this analysis, answers
“more than once a week” and weekly were combined. The answers “never” and “don’t know” were also
combined.
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ordinally by “first generation,” “second generation,” and “third generation and more”
answers.
The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann test find a statistically significant difference
between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians only on linked fate (pvalue < .001) and church attendance (p-value = .0001). Thus, this bivariate test indicates
that African American authoritarians are more likely to attend church at least weekly and
less likely to think their individual fate is linked to their racial group than
nonauthoritarian Blacks. None of the other variables examined reach a statistically
significant threshold (Table 3).
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Table 3
Statistical significance of difference between African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians on selected variables
(0 = nonauthoritarian and 1 = authoritarian)
Where 0 is Nonauthoritarian and 1 is Authoritarian

Linked Fate
Church Attendance
Education
Ideology
Age
Citizenship Status
Income
Party Identification

p-value

z score

N

0.0009
0.0001
0.0651
0.0815
0.2941
0.3587
0.4851
0.9670

-3.332
3.809
1.845
-1.742
1.049
0.918
0.698
-0.041

190
191
191
177
191
191
174
187

Source: UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.
Note: Estimates produced using a Wilcoxon-Mann test.

All these variables, except party identification,65 were then placed in an ordinal
logit regression model to which gender and a binary variable for Catholicism was
added.66 With Black authoritarianism as the dependent variable and nine independent
variables included in the model only weekly church attendance and linked fate achieved
statistical significance.67
I find that differences between African Americans perceptions of linked fate and
reported church attendance are predictive of their authoritarianism. African Americans
who are less likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their group racial identity and
65

Ideology, which registered a p-value of .0815 on the Wilcoxon-Mann test, was included instead of party
identification which had the least statistically significant p-value of .967.
66
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) inclusion of Catholicism as a binary independent variable in several of
his regression analyses led to its testing here.
67
Following Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) lead, I employ a one-tailed test of statistical significance on
this question for linked fate because of the “clear directional claim” (p. 554) I made about linked fate and
African American authoritarians. The two-tailed p-value of linked fate among African Americans in Table
4 is .069. The two-tailed p-value of linked fate among African Americans in Table 5 is .065.
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more likely to attend church each week are more likely to be authoritarian. While
Catholicism skirts the edge of statistical significance (p-value =.056), other standard
demographics, including income, education, gender, ideology, and age have no
statistically significant bearing on African Americans’ authoritarianism.

Table 4
Demographic indicators of African American authoritarianism

African Americans
0.275 **

Linked Fate
Std. Err .

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Education

0.286

-0.035
Std. Err.

Ideology

0.107

0.627
Std. Err.

Age

0.496

-0.174
Std. Err.

Length of Citizenship
Std. Err.

Income
Std. Err.

Religion: Catholic

0.117

-0.122
0.156
-0.524
0.420

-1.158 *
Std. Err.

0.607

Std. Err.

-0.352
0.287

Gender
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

0.152

0.743 ***

1
2
3
4

-3.967
-2.440
-1.300
0.470

Count R2

0.410

Adjusted Count R2

0.042

N

195

Source: UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.
Note: Estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis. Follow ing
Hetherington's methodology (2011, p.554), a one-tailed test of statistical
significance is used for linked fate because of the clearly stated priors
of the relationship betw een authoritarianism and linked fate.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Are there other variables beyond linked fate and church attendance that have
statistical and substantive bearing on the observed authoritarianism of African
Americans? Once again using data from the University of Massachusetts’s module on the
2014 CCES election survey, I looked at whether employment status, region of the
country, mobility over time, or type of community made a difference to African
Americans’ disposition to authoritarianism. I tested these variables in addition to other
variables – such as income and citizenship status and family history in the United States –
that were tested in the model reported in Table 4. I found that southerners and those who
still lived in the community or state where they spent most of their childhood were also
more likely to be authoritarians (Table 5). Thus, linked fate, church attendance, living in
the South, and lack of mobility throughout life (operationalized as staying close to where
you grew up) were all predictive of authoritarianism among African Americans.
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Table 5
Additional demographic indicators of African American authoritarianism

African Americans
0.280 **

Linked Fate
Std. Err .

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Education

0.292

-0.052
Std. Err.

Ideology

0.108

0.681
Std. Err.

Age

0.496

-0.147
Std. Err.

Length of Citizenship
Std. Err.

Income
Std. Err.

Religion: Catholic

0.119

-0.158
0.158
-0.287
0.442

-1.156 *
Std. Err.

Gender
Std. Err.

Region: South
Std. Err.

Mobility

0.605

-0.269
0.295
0.542 **
0.278

-0.610 **
Std. Err.

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

0.152

0.601 **

1
2
3
4

0.292
-3.988
-2.444
-1.307
0.521

Count R2

0.397

Adjusted Count R2

0.017

N

194

Source: UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.
Note: Estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis. Follow ing
Hetherington's methodology (2011, p.554), a one-tailed test of statistical
significance is used for linked fate because of the clearly stated priors
of the relationship betw een authoritarianism and linked fate.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

Linked fate is described as an observable expression of African Americans’ racial
solidarity. It is identified as the mechanism and “utility heuristic” (Dawson, 1995; Tate,
1994) behind the theorized homogeneity of African American behavior as well as the
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allegedly liberal bent of African American attitudes. The inverse relationship between
African Americans agreement that their fate is linked to their race and authoritarianism,
demonstrated in both a bivariate and multivariate analysis of data from the UMASS
module of the 2014 CCES, calls for a deeper examination of the interrelationship
between racial identity and authoritarianism and the intriguing possibility that
authoritarianism may be a more important factor structuring the worldview and attitudes
of African Americans than race.
Authoritarianism and African Americans’ Perception of Racial Identity
African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians’ attitudes toward their
shared racial identity can be found in two baseline questions that have been used
extensively by scholars over the last two decades to explore how race affects political
behavior. These standard questions include a battery used to measure racial resentment
towards African Americans and linked fate – a question that explores whether African
American respondents believe what happens in their life is tied to the fate of their race.
These baseline questions provide the grist for an examination of whether African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians perceive their shared racial identity
differently and an exploration of the third hypothesis considered in this chapter that the
difference between African American authoritarians’ and nonauthoritarians’ worldviews
and attitudes are neither erased nor bridged by their shared racial identity. If this is the
case, authoritarianism may vie with race to structure the behavior of African Americans
who are also authoritarians.
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Authoritarianism and Racial Identity: Racial Resentment
The racial resentment battery of questions was designed (Kinder, 1996) as a
measure symbolic racism. The questions first appeared on the survey fielded by ANES in
1988 and have been used extensively since. The genesis of the questions can be traced
back to McConahay and Hough’s (1976) and Kinder and Sear’s (1981) argument that
symbolic racism was replacing a more overt form of racism in America – racism based
on the supposed biological inferiority of African Americans. In short, some Whites’
overt, racist assertions of African American biological inferiority were being replaced by
coded accusations that Blacks are lazy and do not work as hard as other Americans and
ethnic groups who had immigrated to America.
Four racial resentment questions were designed to measure the level of symbolic
racism Whites and others hold toward African Americans. On these questions,
respondents are asked to answer, using a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree to
strongly disagree, whether “over the past few years Blacks have gotten less than they
deserve,” if “Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites,”
whether since “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and
worked their way up, Blacks should do the same without any special favors,” and if
“generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult
for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Typically, answers to these
questions are aggregated and used to produce a racial resentment scale that varies from 0
to 1 with 1 representing the most racially resentful point on the scale.
In survey after survey, African Americans have also been asked to answer these
questions. And as expected, African Americans score quite low on the racial resentment
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scale. Looked at monolithically, African Americans strongly disagree that members of
their race do not work as hard as Whites and other immigrant groups. However, the moral
traditionalism of African American authoritarians and their belief in the Horatio Alger
mythos, which are both documented in Chapter 5, lead to an obvious question: Do
African American authoritarians’ view their race’s commitment to the American norm of
hard work differently than nonauthoritarians as measured by the racial resentment scale?
The short answer to this question is as simple as it is interesting: Yes, they do.
A bivariate, difference of means test of African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians68 placement on the racial resentment scale, conducted using data from
the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys69 as well as the 2011 WISER poll,
reveals statistically significant differences in racial resentment (p-value .05 or less) 70 in
five of the six years studied (Table 6). In these five surveys, African American
authoritarians are statistically more likely to score higher on the racial resentment scale
than nonauthoritarian African Americans. In other words, African American
authoritarians demonstrate a higher level of racial resentment toward members of their
own race than nonauthoritarian African Americans. (Racial resentment values for White
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are also statistically significant with both groups
posting, as expected, higher racial resentment scores than African Americans – Appendix
C – Tables 22 & 23)

68

In four of the six polls, African Americans scoring .75 and above on the authoritarian scale were
categorized as authoritarians, and those scoring .25 and below were categorized as nonauthoritarians.
Because of the small sample of African Americans surveyed by the 2000 ANES poll and the small number
of African Americans giving nonauthoritarian answers on the 2008 ANES poll, African Americans scoring
.875 or above in these two polls were categorized as authoritarians and the nonauthoritarian category
included those African Americans scoring .5 or less.
69
The four child-rearing questions were not asked on the 1996 ANES.
70
The p-value on the 2004 ANES is 0.0538.
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Table 6
African Americans’ mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale
(0 = least racially resentful. 1 = most racially resentful)
1992 ANES

2000 ANES

2004 ANES

2008 ANES

2011 WISER

2012 ANES

Mean Score
0.2453
0.3842

Mean Score
0.3689
0.4615

Mean Score
0.3077
0.4312

Mean Score
0.4614
0.4940

Mean Score
0.2726
0.3832

Mean Score
0.3506
0.4151

0.1389

0.0926

0.1235

0.0326

0.1106

0.0644

P-value, one tailed

0.0008

0.0079

0.0269

0.0883

0.0115

0.0157

P-value, two tailed

0.0016

0.0157

0.0538

0.1766

0.0230

0.0314

N

209

106

122

346

717

719

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality, 2011.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

A multivariate analysis of the same polls and questions, with racial resentment as
the dependent variable and authoritarianism, party identification, gender, age, church
attendance, and education the independent variables, finds authoritarianism achieving
statistical significance in three of the six surveys studied, including the 2011 WISER and
2012 ANES surveys, which included larger samples of African Americans (Appendix C
– Table 24).
In the 2011 WISER survey, the predicted value of an African American
authoritarian score on the racial resentment scale was .397, compared to a
nonauthoritarian score of .241. In other words, African American authoritarians were 15
percentage points more resentful of members of their own race than nonauthoritarian
African Americans.
In the 2012 ANES survey, the predicted value of an African American
authoritarian score on the racial resentment scale was .439, compared to a
nonauthoritarian score of .349. Thus, African American authoritarians were 9 percentage
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points more resentful of members of their own race than nonauthoritarian African
Americans.
Graphs of the predicted racial resentment values of African and White Americans
across the authoritarian scale demonstrate the substantive differences between African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians as well as White Americans (Figure 15).
Thus, there is bivariate and multivariate statistical evidence that African
American authoritarians do indeed view their race’s commitment to the American norm
of hard work, as measured by the racial resentment scale, differently than

.5
0

.25

Predicted Values

.75

nonauthoritarian African Americans.

0

.25

.5

.75

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans

White Americans
WISER 2011

Figure 15: Racial resentment.
(1 = most racial resentment)
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Authoritarianism and Racial Identity: Linked Fate
Linked fate is the “acute sense of awareness (or recognition) that what happens to
the group will also affect the individual member” (Simien, 2005). In terms of African
Americans, it is the theorized recognition by individual African Americans that their
futures are tethered inexorably to their racial identity (Dawson, 1995; Jaynes & Williams,
1989; Tate, 1994).
In survey research, linked fate, among African Americans and other groups, is
measured by a standard question that asks: “Do you think that what happens generally to
(racial group of respondents) will have something to do with what happens in your life.”
Answers to this question include: “A lot,” “Some,” “Not Much,” or “Not at All.”
Results of African American answers to linked fate questions have been used to
support the scholarly contention that African Americans sublimate their individual
identity to their racial identity. These results have also been cited, along with historical
explanations (Dawson, 1995; Gurin, Hatchett, & Jackson, 1989; Herring, Jankowski, &
Brown, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Tate, 1991, 1994),
as the primary factors behind African Americans’ monolithic political behavior.
However, as was found when analyzing African American responses to racial resentment
questions, important differences exist between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African
Americans’ attitudes toward their racial identity.
The 2011 WISER poll asks African Americans a one-step linked fate question.71
A multivariate analysis of the question -- with linked fate as the dependent variable and

71

The standard linked fate question on contemporary ANES surveys is a two-step question. In this format,
respondents are first asked to respond – yes or no – if they believe their fate is linked to the group to which
they belong. The follow-up question sorts “yes” respondents into “a lot,” “some,” and “not much.” This
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authoritarianism, party identification, age, gender, church attendance, and education
serving as independent variables – clearly demonstrates the statistically significant and
substantive differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians’
perceptions of linkage to their racial group (Appendix C – Table 25 for Figure 16).
`

African American authoritarians are much less likely to agree “a lot” that their

fate is linked to their racial identity than nonauthoritarian African Americans. In the 2011
WISER survey, the predicted value of African American nonauthoritarians saying their
fate is linked “a lot” to their racial group is .627 compared to African American
authoritarians predicted score of .275. Moving across the authoritarian scale from
nonauthoritarian to authoritarian, therefore, generates a 35 percentage point drop in those
African Americans who agree “a lot” that their fate is linked to their racial identity. Thus,
African American authoritarians are more likely to express resentment towards other
African Americans and less likely to agree that their individual fate is linked to their
racial group.
The significant differences between African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians on whether their fate is linked to their racial identity are displayed
visually in Figure 16. By comparison and as expected, White Americans show little
difference of opinion on linked fate across the authoritarian scale (Figure 17).

question format produces somewhat different results than the one-step approach used in the WISER study
in which respondents are presented with all four-answer options at once.
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Figure 16: Linked fate among African Americans.
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.75
.5
0

Predicted Values

.25

0

.25

.5

.75

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans

White Americans
WISER 2011

Figure 17: Linked fate.
(“My fate is linked “A lot” to the fate of my racial group”)

As I noted in Chapter 3, a multivariate analysis of another linked fate question (on the
2012 ANES), which uses a different answer format than the 2011 WISER survey to
measure African Americans’ perception of whether their fate is linked to their racial
identity, finds again that the views of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African
Americans on linked fate are markedly different (Appendix C – Figure 66 and Table 26).
With linked fate the dependent variable, and authoritarianism, party identification,
gender, age, education, and church attendance the independent variables, the predicted
values of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans attitudes on linked fate
are mirror images.
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On the key question of linked fate, which has been used to bolster the scholarly
argument that African Americans are politically monolithic and reliably liberal because
their individual concerns are subsumed by the racial identity, the opinions of African
American authoritarians, according to the 2011 WISER and the 2012 ANES survey
results, are statistically different than the opinions of nonauthoritarian Blacks. African
American authoritarians are much less likely to see their individual fate linked to their
racial group than nonauthoritarians.
Chapter Summary
African Americans are more authoritarian than Whites. African American
authoritarians are more likely to attend church regularly and much less likely than their
nonauthoritarian brethren to believe their individual fate is linked (Dawson, 1995; Tate,
1994) to their racial group identity. As measured by questions geared to estimate racial
resentment (Kinder, 1996), they are also statistically more likely to agree with the
symbolically racist (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay & Hough,
1976; Sears, 1993; Sears, 1988; Sears & Kinder, 1971) negative stereotypes of
members of their own race still broadcast by much of mainstream America.
The contest between African American’s authoritarianism and their racial identity
affects not only how these authoritarians view other African Americans, but also the ties
that bind them to their race. They see themselves as different than the mainstream
stereotypes of Black Americans. They are not them. They do not hold those values. They
do not want to be burdened by the downward mobility of being perceived as only Black
(Waters, 2009, p. 65). American is one of their reference groups. They are Americans

99

who are also Black and, as authoritarians, they will defend their chosen groups against all
others.
For African Americans, who are also authoritarians, race is simply not the only
factor that shapes their choices of identity (Waters, 2009), view of the world, or attitudes
on salient issues. As I will show in the chapters that follow, when issues or circumstances
activate their authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism will trump their racial identity
within many value and issue domains. The result is African American political behaviors
that are neither monolithic, predictably liberal, nor driven by a jointly held conception of
linked racial fate. Instead, the political behavior of African American authoritarians is, at
times, structured by their authoritarian predisposition and quite different than the
behavior of their nonauthoritarian brethren.
Theory argues that authoritarianism is a powerful predisposition and predictor of
behavior. Its incidence and effect knows no boundaries. It is a universal condition that
reaches indiscriminately across race, ethnic, and national boundaries. There is no
theoretical reason to assume that the siren call of the authoritarian predisposition affects
African Americans less than Whites in America. That is why I made the methodological
choice in this dissertation to bring African Americans back into the contemporary
scholarly discussion of authoritarianism. But following this methodological approach
leads to another fundamental question that begs an answer: Why do more African
Americans answer authoritarianism call than Whites? Why are African Americans the
most authoritarian racial group in America?
That question, of course, is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
AUTHORITARIANISM AND THREAT
In all of its different manifestations and guises, threat is at the root of
authoritarianism. It determines where an individual is likely to be located “on the
continuum between authoritarian and democratic belief” (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p.
189) and it is “one of the strongest predictors of intolerance” (p. 332). In this chapter, I
argue that threat is the logical and overlooked explanation for the high levels of
authoritarianism found in African Americans today. Authoritarianism is not an anomaly
among African Americans. It is the predictable outcome of the unrelenting and
asymmetric threat, stress, and stigmatization African Americans experience personally
each day and have experienced historically.
The link between African Americans’ high rate of authoritarianism and their
asymmetric exposure to personal threat was not explored by Hetherington and Weiler
(2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), or Stenner (2005) – some of the leading,
contemporary theorists on authoritarianism and threat. It cannot be plumbed in depth in
this chapter. But its exploration can begin by first reviewing the extensive literature
linking authoritarianism and threat. This scholarship on the relationship between the
perception of personal threat and the incidence of authoritarianism is clear. If African
Americans perceive personal threats more intensely and pervasively than Whites, they are
more likely to exhibit authoritarian attitudes and behaviors.
Next, I add stigma and inequality to the list of threats that can engender
authoritarianism. The relationship between stigma and authoritarianism is the subject of
recent studies. These studies find that authoritarianism is partially a response to
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stigmatization (Brandt & Henry, 2012; Cohen et al., 2008). As such, authoritarianism
shields minorities from the psychological threat of stigma. This new theory, what I call
the Authoritarian Shield, may prove as useful a concept as Stenner’s (2005)
Authoritarian Dynamic when African American and other minorities are added back into
analyses of authoritarianism.
Then, I examine the first hypothesis offered in this chapter. I argue (H1) that some
personal threats are experienced much more by African Americans than Whites in
America. The racial basis and structuring of these threats and the pervasive, asymmetric
exposure to them by African Americans makes Blacks more fearful of these personal
threats than Whites and transcends authoritarian differences among African Americans.
For the sake of clarity, I call this the asymmetric threat proposition.
I present empirical evidence that demonstrates African Americans experience or
fear certain racially-based material, psychological, and physical personal threats more
than Whites in America. These threats are asymmetrically experienced by African
Americans, meaning they are a common part of the daily experience of African
Americans but a less common or uncommon experience for Whites. And the asymmetry
of the threats is racially-based or structured.72
I follow the presentation of the empirical evidence of asymmetrically experienced
threat with a discussion of a simple but important corollary to the theory that increasing
threat increases authoritarianism. I hypothesize (H2) that threats, which are not racebased but pose a danger that is theorized to engage authoritarianism and endangers
72

The empirical evidence of asymmetrically experienced material, psychological, and physical threats is
summarized in three questions asked on the LAPOP 2008 survey. This survey includes the child-rearing
battery used to estimate authoritarianism.
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African and White Americans equally, will be perceived by African Americans
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differentially and African American and White
authoritarians similarly. I call this the symmetric threat proposition.
If every day, personal threat, experienced asymmetrically by Blacks leads to
higher levels of authoritarianism in African Americans than Whites, then the African
Americans who are authoritarians should also be more reactive to, and evince more fear
of, generalized threats that are theorized to engage all authoritarians. Thus, African
American and White authoritarians will fear a generalized threat (a threat that is not race
specific) similarly while authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, no matter what their race,
will fear it differentially.
I conclude by discussing how the twin notions of the Authoritarian Shield and
asymmetrically experienced threats connect with the two leading, contemporary accounts
of authoritarianism and threat, add to them, and provide a robust and theoretically
consistent explanation of the prevalence of authoritarianism among African Americans.
The Effect of Threat on Authoritarianism
Fromm (1941) attributed Fascism’s rise to threat. Isolated, powerless, and
insecure people escaped from freedom by submitting to Nazi authoritarianism. Adorno et
al.’s (1950) Freudian explanation of authoritarianism proposed that a threatening
childhood environment created authoritarian adults. Rokeach (1960) argued that “adverse
experiences, temporary or enduring” threaten individuals, create anxiety, and cause
dogmatism and intolerance (p. 69). As such, over time, threat, uncertainty, and fear breed
authoritarianism ( Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006; Fillenbaum & Jackman, 1961;
Lipset, 1959, 1960; Sanford, 1966; Wilson, 1973).
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A variety of threats have been theoretically implicated in authoritarianism and
“point to threat as a primary, or perhaps as the primary, determinant of heightened
authoritarianism” (Sales & Friend, 1973, p. 163). Among them are personal threat
(Fillenbaum & Jackman, 1961; Lipset, 1960; Sanford, 1966), the threat of personal
failure (Sales & Friend, 1973), threat aggregated and estimated across society (Sales,
1973), socially learned and experienced threats (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006),
external and internal fear and anxiety (Ray, 1972; Wilson, 1973), intensely identified and
conforming in-groups threatened by unconventional out-groups (Duckitt, 1989),
individual and collective threats (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991), threats perceived to be
more personal (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011), personal insecurity caused by the threat of
terrorism (Hofstadter, 1964), and differentially perceived economic threats (Lipset, 1959;
McFarland, Ageyev, & Hinton, 1995).
Nearly a half century after The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950)
was first published, however, the statistical evidence linking threat to authoritarianism
remained sparse (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) work bridged
this empirical gap. Using child-rearing questions included on the ANES 1992 survey for
the first time to estimate authoritarianism, they found that “authoritarianism and
perceptions of environmental stress (threat) interact in creating intolerance” (Dalton &
Klingemann, 2007, p. 332). Threat did not make individuals more authoritarian. Instead,
according to Feldman and Stenner’s hypothesis, it activated intolerant authoritarian
behaviors in individuals already predisposed to authoritarianism.
Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) findings did not contradict the widely held
assumption that long-term exposure to threat breeds authoritarianism. They did challenge,
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however, the notion that personal threats play an important role in authoritarianism.
Feldman and Stenner contended that “authoritarianism is activated when there is a
perception that the political or social order is threatened” (pp. 765-766). Based on their
analysis of 1992 ANES data, threats to social norms and order from ideologically distant
political parties or candidates, negatively perceived presidential candidates, or a
deteriorating national economy interact with authoritarianism, while personal threats to
individuals (for example, unemployment) did not (p. 765).73
“In the absence of threat” the lack of a connection “between authoritarian
predispositions and the dependent variables” (p. 765) studied by Feldman and Stenner
also raised serious questions about both Adorno et al.’s (1950) and Altemeyer’s (1981)
theoretical accounts of the origins of authoritarianism. To answer these questions,
Feldman proposed a new explanation for authoritarianism that allows for the empirically
observed interactive effects of threat and authoritarianism. He posited that “authoritarian
predispositions originate in the conflict between the values of social conformity and
personal autonomy” (Feldman, 2003a, p. 41). When social conformity is threatened,
authoritarian predispositions are activated and intolerant behavior is produced (Feldman,
2003a, p. 51). Building on this work, Stenner (2005) proposed the Authoritarian
Dynamic, a “process in which an enduring individual predisposition interacts with
changing environmental conditions – specifically, conditions of ‘normative threat’ – to
produce manifest expressions of intolerance” (p. 13).
There are three vitally important components of Stenner’s (2005) theory. First,
authoritarianism is conceptualized as an enduring predisposition that is partially
73

This is the first example of analysis of authoritarianism using child-rearing questions that exclude all but
Whites from the data.
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inherited. Second, authoritarianism is not always on. Authoritarian behavior is activated
“when needed” (p. 14). As such, “authoritarianism does not consistently predict behavior
across different situations” (p. 13). Finally, not all threats are created equal. Only threats
to norms and order, when they are perceived by an individual with an authoritarian
predisposition, have the capacity to elicit an intolerant reaction.
There is also one glaring omission in the data on which Stenner rests her theory of
authoritarian activation. Beginning with Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) first account of
authoritarian activation and continuing with her book, The Authoritarian Dynamic
(Stenner, 2005), only the behaviors of White, non-Hispanic Americans are evaluated.74
While Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) account of the interaction between threats to
moral order and authoritarianism is compelling and well documented, it was certainly not
the last word. Other scholars found that threats to morality and mortality can activate
authoritarian behavior in individuals with a predisposition to authoritarianism. Using a
balanced F-scale to measure authoritarianism, Rickert (1998) discovered that
authoritarians who were economically threatened were six times more likely “to favor
restricting benefits to powerless groups” than authoritarians and nonauthoritarians who
were not threatened (1998, p. 707). Experimenting with situationally induced threats,
Lavine et al. (2002) concluded that threats to cultural values as well as personal threats
activate authoritarian behaviors in those predisposed to authoritarianism. Moreover, the
experimental results implied “that authoritarians think and act as they do in order to

74

In his review of The Authoritarian Dynamic, Kinder (2007) underscores this as a shortcoming of
Stenner’s work (2005).
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reduce an apparently acute sensitivity to threat” (p. 359)75 – an observation that is a halfstep away from conceptualizing authoritarianism as a shield from threat.
“Threats to social order and cohesion, social identity, economic security, and
mortality” have all been associated with authoritarian activation (Lavine, Milton Lodge,
& Kate Freitas, 2005, p. 227). And while some scholars have found sociotropic threat is a
more important trigger of intolerant, antidemocratic behavior than personal threat
(Gibson, 1998; Marcus, 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993), Davis and Silver
(2004) contend that “when threat is personalized the response may become
overwhelmingly intolerant toward perceived outgroups or threatening groups” (1957, p.
30).76 Thus, the list of scholars who find threats beyond normative challenges to order
important to authoritarianism is indeed lengthy and includes Adorno, Altemeyer, Davis,
Duckitt, Hetherington, Weiler, Suhay, Lavine, Lodge, Merolla, Oesterrich, Rickert, and
Zechmeister.
Who is activated by threat is as contested a question as what type of threat
activates them. As already discussed, some scholars contend that authoritarians are
activated and respond aggressively when confronted by threat (Feldman, 2003a; Feldman
& Stenner, 1997; Lavine et al., 2005; Lavine et al., 2002; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009;
Rickert, 1998; Stenner, 2005). Others argue that authoritarian behavior is not turned on
and off by the presence or absence of threat. Instead, the aggression that forms the
bedrock of authoritarian behavior is chronically salient and not only influences how
authoritarians act, but also how they perceive the world around them (Adorno et al.,

75

Greenberg et al. (1990) also contend authoritarians are more sensitive to threats to mortality than
nonauthoritarians.
76
This quote summarizes some of the findings of Davis’s (1995) paper on Black political intolerance.
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1950; Altemeyer, 1981,1988, 1996, 2006; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington &
Weiler, 2009; Meloen, Van der Linden, & De Witte, 1996).
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011), leading
authoritarian scholars who argue that the authoritarian predisposition is constantly
engaged irrespective of threat, add that nonauthoritarians will be more affected than
authoritarians by rising threats to morality and mortality. They contend that “as people in
the middle and lower tiers of authoritarianism come to perceive threat, they adopt policy
orientations that are more like an authoritarian’s” (p. 113). Thus, Hetherington and
Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) contend that a negative interaction
exists between threat and authoritarianism. Nonauthoritarians become more aggressive in
the presence of physical and normative threat, while authoritarians, already chronically
near the apex of aggressive behavior, have much less room for their aggression to grow.77
In other words, in the presence of mortal, physical threat or moral, normative danger
nonauthoritarians become more aggressive and behave more like authoritarians.78 Or, as
the cartoon character Pogo remarked, and Hetherington and Suhay (p. 558) conclude: We
have met the enemy, and he is us.
Implicit in Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s
theory of threat and authoritarian behavior or, at least, their approach to testing it, is the
77

In Appendix A I explore if Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011)
theory that a negative interaction exists between threat and authoritarianism is universal or threat specific.
This theory is a very important concern for all who care about preserving democracy in what seems like an
increasingly threatening world. It raises numerous concerns about the ability of states and societies to
maintain democratic institutions and protect liberties when confronted by external and internal threats.
Examining this theory through the lens of asymmetric and symmetric threats discussed in Chapter 4, I find
that certain threats do not cause a more authoritarian reaction in nonauthoritarians than authoritarians.
Thus, the negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism is threat specific and not universal.
78
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) make an important distinction
between sociotropic physical threat and personal physical threat. They argue that personal physical threat
makes nonauthoritarians behave more like authoritarians. Sociotropic physical threat or, as Hetherington
and Suhay (2011) operationalized it in their study, perceiving “that the country is in danger” from terrorism
(p. 556) does not.
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assumption that authoritarianism alone structures perceptions of mortal and moral threat.
Racially-based differences in perceptions of threat between authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians are not considered. Irrespective of race, authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians will not only be moved by threat differentially, they will also always
perceive threat differently. Stuck in a perpetual state of hypervigilance, authoritarians
will always be more likely to perceive the world as a dangerous place and feel threatened,
anxious, and insecure (Adorno et al., 1950; Alexander, 2010; Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt,
2001; Greenberg et al., 1990; Lavine et al., 2005; Lavine et al., 2002; Oesterreich, 2005).
On the other hand, nonauthoritarians will be less likely than authoritarians to perceive
threats. But when nonauthoritarians do perceive a clear and present personal danger, they
will be more likely to react with authoritarian aggression (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).
In testing this theory, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and
Suhay (2011) operationalize threat in two ways. Normative threat is estimated through
questions from the standard, ANES moral traditionalist battery that they argue get to the
root of threats to norms (Davison, 1991; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Layman, 2001).
The two questions used to scale perceptions of what they call the moral threat posed by
“Newer Lifestyles”79 are:


“The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior
to those changes.”



and “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their
own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.”

Next, physical danger is estimated using a question that personalizes threat and links it to
a prevalent and pervasive concern. The question asks: “How worried are you that you

79

The other two questions that comprise the ANES moral traditionalist battery, which focus on the rights of
gays and lesbians, were not included in Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) “Newer Lifestyles” scale.
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personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?”80 This is labeled in Hetherington
and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) data tables as “Perceived
Threat from Terrorism.” Both normative and physical threats are combined with
authoritarianism to produce independent variables that account statistically for the
interaction between authoritarianism and normative threat or authoritarianism and
physical threat.
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) use gay rights questions as dependent variables
to test their threat theory in the moral domain. Along with Suhay, they employ questions
on civil liberties and use of American force to test his hypothesis in the mortal domain
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). In regression analyses,
they employ a binary independent variable (with 0 representing nonblacks and 1 equal to
African Americans) to estimate the effect of race on gay rights, civil liberties, and use of
American force. In each predicted probability graph used to display the effect of
authoritarianism, perceived threat, and the interaction of these variables on gay rights,
civil liberties, and use of force, African Americans, however, are excluded from the
analysis.81

80

Wording from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.
Do African Americans perceive the two threats operationalized by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and
Hetherington and Suhay (2011) in their work the same as Whites? Hetherington and Weiler found,
authoritarians are statistically more likely to agree that “Newer Lifestyles” are an anathema to our society.
Thus, White and African American authoritarians are more likely to perceive “Newer Lifestyles” as a threat
to normative order while White and African American nonauthoritarians are not. Importantly, there are no
statistically significant differences between White and African Americans, White and African Americans
authoritarians, and White and African Americans nonauthoritarians’ opinions on this question.
Hetherington, Weiler, and Suhay also find that authoritarians are statistically more likely to be worried
about the personal threat posed by terrorism than nonauthoritarians. In this analysis, authoritarians are
defined as those who score .75 on the 0-1 scale and higher. Nonauthoritarians score .25 and lower on the
scale. Comparing attitudinal differences between “high” and “low” authoritarians is a standard approach
used by many scholars.
81
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The two leading, contemporary accounts of threat and authoritarianism, advanced
by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2009), and Stenner (2005)
are constrained by similar analytical shortcomings – the list of threats considered is
limited and the role threat plays in authoritarian behavior is examined after the most
authoritarian racial group in America has been excluded. Their approaches, which the
discussion of stigma that follows underscores, suffer from these constraints.
Stigma and Authoritarianism
Threat can take many forms. One such form, neglected so far in this discussion of
the role of threat in authoritarianism, is the psychological threat posed by stigmatization.
Stigmatized individuals are those who are marginalized in a society. They are threatened
by prejudice and discrimination that stems from the social devaluation of them as
individuals and of the group to which society says they belong. They are rejected in
whole or part by society.
Two recent studies on the relationship between stigma and authoritarianism have
found “higher mean levels of authoritarianism compared to Whites” among stigmatized
ethnic minorities in the United States (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 19) and higher levels of
authoritarianism in women in the 54 societies studied across the globe where gender
inequalities were high (Brandt & Henry, 2012).
The root cause of the elevated levels of authoritarianism in both groups studied –
women and ethnic minorities – was stigma. As such “authoritarianism is, in part, a
response to [societal] rejection, a psychological threat associated with stigma” (Brandt &
Henry, 2012, p. 1301).
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The notion that some expressions of authoritarianism are a response to the
intolerance that is a product of Stenner’s (2005) Authoritarian Dynamic is a revelation. It
is also a concept unlikely to be articulated or explored by contemporary studies of
authoritarianism that exclude African Americans and other minorities from the analysis.
The theory, however, is not new. In 1957, using the contested but not yet
discredited F-scale to measure authoritarianism, two researchers analyzed “Ethnic
Differences in the Authoritarian Personality” (C. U. Smith & Prothro) among a sample of
196 students from a Southern state’s separate White and Black universities. In this study,
African American authoritarian scores were substantively higher than the scores of
Whites, and African Americans “scored considerably higher than most of [the groups
measured by] Adorno” (1957, p. 336). The statistical difference between the scores of
White and African American authoritarians was significant at a p-value of <.05.
Child-rearing practices, the Freudian explanation offered by Adorno et al., (1950)
for authoritarianism, was rejected by C. U. Smith and Prothro (1957) as the mechanism
driving the difference they observed. Instead,
The writers are inclined to believe that the pattern of race relations, typified by
segregation and discrimination, in the South is of primary importance in
contributing to the relatively high degree of susceptibility to authoritarian values
demonstrated by the Negro subgroup… Negroes possess a higher authoritarian
potential than Whites [because of] the biracial social system prevalent in the
South. (p. 338).
The separate and unequal Jim Crow system stigmatized Blacks. That
stigmatization produced higher levels of authoritarianism among Blacks than Whites
“since Whites in the South are not faced with similar experiences (as Blacks), they are far
less likely to develop such (authoritarian) personality characteristics” (C. U. Smith &
Prothro, 1957, p. 338).
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The irony of intolerance, which is an outcome of the interaction of a
predisposition to authoritarianism interacting with threat, producing increased levels of
authoritarianism in the individuals and groups subjected to the prejudicial stigmatization
is a puzzle in need of an explanation. Why might stigmatized groups become more
authoritarian when confronted by intolerance and discrimination?
One possible answer is deeply rooted in the study of authoritarianism. From the
beginning, authoritarianism and intolerance have been explained as a reaction to, or a
way to escape from, psychological and physical threats (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport,
1935; Altemeyer, 1996). Recently, authoritarianism has been conceptualized as an
“emancipatory strategy to protect Blacks from groups who directly threaten their physical
and psychological security” (Davis, 1995, p. 1), a means for finding “safety and security”
(Oesterreich, 2005, p. 275) or collective security (Jugert & Duckitt, 2009), and an
effective buffer for mentally distressing threats (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) that is “good for
you” (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009, p. 33).
No matter whether you are a member of a majority or minority racial, ethnic, or
social group, when threat is afoot, authoritarianism is a protective solution – an
Authoritarian Shield from exigent physical or psychological peril. And the more threat
you or the group you belong to has experienced, including the threats emanating from
stigma, the more likely you will exhibit authoritarian attitudes and behaviors that shield
you from danger.
There is no better example of individual and group stigmatization in America than
African Americans.
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Asymmetric Material, Psychological, and Physical Threats and
African American Authoritarianism
Today, “Black people in the United States differ from all other modern people
owing to the unprecedented levels of unregulated and unrestrained violence directed at
them” (West, 2001, p. XIII). This violence and threat of violence is asymmetrically
experienced by African Americans. And while it is a common part of African Americans’
daily experience, White Americans are largely untouched by it.
Empirical evidence of the difference between African and White Americans’
experience with material, psychological, and physical threats is present in numerous
national surveys conducted over the last several decades. Surveys in which these threats
were studied and authoritarian child-rearing questions were asked, however, are not
common.
In this chapter, three questions asked on the LAPOP 2008 survey are analyzed to
begin to examine whether African Americans report higher levels of material, personal,
and psychological threat than Whites. Since this survey also includes the standard battery
of authoritarian child-rearing question, the similarities and differences of perceptions of
threat among African American and White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, which
are central to the argument made in this chapter, can also be measured. This measurement
is necessary to test the asymmetric threat hypothesis (H1) that some personal threats are
experienced much more by African Americans than Whites in America.
The empirical ramifications of this proposition are clear. African Americans
should express greater fear than Whites of racially-based or structured threats they
experience asymmetrically and, importantly, their fears will transcend their authoritarian
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differences. In other words, authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans will
react similarly to these threats.
The first threat analyzed to test this theory is job loss. When it comes to job loss, a
fear of material loss and a threat to personal security, a bivariate analysis of LAPOP 2008
questions shows that African Americans fear the threat of job loss statistically more than
Whites. Moreover, as predicted, there is no statistical difference between African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians fear of losing a job (Table 7). Given the
continuing socio-economic disparities between African and White Americans and the
historical and contemporary differences in job opportunities available to them, African
Americans asymmetric fear of job loss, which transcends their authoritarianism, comports
with theoretical expectations.
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Table 7
Fear of losing a job
(0 = Not at all worried. 1 = Very worried) (Whites and African Americans only)

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians

All

All

Authoritarians

Nonauthoritarians

African
Americans

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

0.5215
0.5071

0.6204
0.6333

Whites
African Americans
Difference of Means

0.0144

0.5049
0.6057

0.4795
0.6333

0.5160
0.6204

-0.1008

-0.1539

-0.1044

-0.0130

P-value

0.5646

0.0013

0.0001

0.2376

0.8845

N

925

1246

584

341

123

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Next, African Americans are also more likely than Whites to say the neighborhood where
they live is unsafe at a p-value of < .001. Once again, the physical threat to personal
safety felt by African Americans because of where they live transcends their
authoritarianism (Table 8). Thus, when it comes to asymmetrically experienced material
and physical personal threats, race matters to African Americans while differences in
their level of authoritarianism do not.
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Table 8
Safety of neighborhood
(0 = Safe 1 = Unsafe) (Whites and African Americans only)

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians

All

All

Authoritarians

Nonauthoritarians

African
Americans

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

0.2057
0.2503

0.3333
0.3079

Whites
African Americans
Difference of Means

-0.0446

0.2208
0.2963

0.2377
0.3079

0.1986
0.3333

-0.0755

-0.0702

-0.1348

0.0254

P-value

0.0078

0.0003

0.0088

0.0202

0.6981

N

928

1249

586

342

123

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Finally, on the question of trusting police, which is reconceptualized as both a
physical and psychological measure of fear of police,82 African American and White
perceptions differ dramatically. Not surprisingly, African Americans are statistically
more likely to fear and distrust the police than Whites. Once again there is no statistical
difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians fear of the
police. The wide gap between African American and White perceptions of the police is
underscored by the finding that, when race is factored out of the equation, authoritarians
are more statistically more likely to trust the police, than nonauthoritarians at a p-value of
.0287 (Table 9).

82

Those who answer that they do not trust police are assumed to be saying, in effect, that they fear police.
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Table 9
Distrust of police
(0 = Trust 1 = Distrust) (Whites and African Americans only)

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians

All

All

Authoritarians

Nonauthoritarians

African
Americans

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

0.4371
0.3942

0.5648
0.5429

Whites
African Americans
Difference of Means

0.0429

0.3843
0.5381

0.3617
0.5429

0.4300
0.5648

-0.1539

-0.1811

-0.1348

0.0220

P-value

0.0213

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0347

0.7530

N

928

1249

586

342

123

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Evidence of the asymmetric nature of material, physical, and psychological
personal threats African Americans experience every day also abound in survey research
that does not include authoritarian question batteries. For example, 70% of African
Americans say that police treat them less fairly than Whites (Anderson, 2014). Ninetyone percent agree that police forces across the United States do a poor or only a fair job
of treating racial and ethnic groups fairly, and 87% of Blacks think the police do a poor
or only a fair job of using the right amount of force in each situation (Pew Research
Center, 2014).
African Americans also question the fairness of the court system. Sixty-eight
percent say Blacks are treated less fairly by the courts than Whites (Anderson, 2014).
Anderson also reported that close to one out of every two African Americans agrees they
are treated less fairly on the job (54%), in local public schools (51%), when voting
(48%), in getting health care (47%) and in stores and restaurants (44%) than Whites.
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Eighty-eight percent of African Americans say there is a lot or some
discrimination against them today in America and 35% think they have been
discriminated against or been treated unfairly because of their race in the past twelve
months (Doherty, 2013). Even news coverage of African Americans is perceived by
Blacks as being too negative. Fifty-eight percent of African Americans say news
coverage of them is too negative, compared to just one percent who say it is too positive.
African Americans perceptions of discrimination, measured through surveys,
square with the reality of the asymmetric sleights, challenges, unequal treatment and
opportunity, and real threats and dangers they confront regularly. “African Americans are
incarcerated at grossly disproportionate rates” in the United States (Alexander, 2012, p.
97) with African Americans and Latinos representing “ninety percent of those admitted to
prison for drug offenses in many states” (p. 57). The mass incarceration of African
Americans since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the beginning of the
War on Drugs has created a “new racial caste system” in the United States that has
replaced the old Jim Crow with “The New Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2012).
Poverty among African Americans is “the highest of any racial or ethnic group”
in the United States with 27.2% of Blacks, according to census data, living at or below
the poverty line (Krogstad, 2015). While a Black middle class has emerged in America
during the last five decades, “roughly one-quarter of Black Americans… remain in
poverty” forming a group of racially and economically segregated Americans who live in
urban cores and rural backwaters and have been labelled “the Abandoned” (Robinson,
2011, p. 7). These African Americans in particular, as well as other African Americans
who are doing better economically, experience threats – individually and as a group –
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from stigmatization, inequality, and discrimination that know no equal among Whites. As
journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015) commented, while discussing his new book Between
the World and Me to an audience in West Baltimore just months after the Freddie Gray
riots: “Fear is one of the dominant emotions in the African American community”
(Coates, 2015).
There are biological consequences to African Americans chronic exposure to
threat, stress, and anxiety. These costs include the “increased risk of disease, and…
increases in the expression of proinflammatory genes” (Powell et al., 2013, p. 16574).83
While all men and women are created equally, the threats, anxieties, and stress they
experience in life are not. Survey research, social statistics, census data, and scholarly
and journalistic accounts document the very different threat environments in which
Whites and African Americans live every day.
The material, physical, and psychological threats African Americans experience
personally and asymmetrically every day contribute to the elevated levels of
authoritarianism, estimated using the child-rearing questions, found among Black
Americans in survey after survey conducted since 1992. African Americans are “the most
authoritarian racial group in the United States by far” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p.
141) because they are members of the most socially stigmatized and personally
threatened racial group in America. The scholarship could not be clearer: Increased threat
and social stigmatization increases authoritarianism.

83

A brief review of the epigenetic literature on the biologic consequences of prolonged exposure to threat
is included in Appendix D.
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Symmetric Threats and Authoritarianism
A simple but important corollary to the proposition that increasing threat
increases authoritarianism is the second hypothesis considered in this chapter. The
symmetric threat proposition (H2) argues that threats, which are not race-based but pose a
danger that is theorized to engage authoritarianism and endangers African and White
Americans equally, will be perceived by African Americans authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians differentially and African American and White authoritarians similarly.
Stated simply, African American and White authoritarians will fear a symmetric threat
similarly and react to it equally. African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians
will fear the same symmetric threat differentially and react to it unequally.
Another question on the LAPOP 2008 survey provides a test of this hypothesis
and an excellent point of comparison with the three asymmetric threats – job loss,
neighborhood safety, and fear of police – discussed earlier. The question asks “How
worried are you or someone in your family will become a victim of a terrorist attack?”
This question was used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011) in their article on
authoritarianism, threat, and the war on terror to estimate a physical threat variable that
theoretically activates an authoritarian response.84 There is no racial component to the
threat in the question and the question was selected specifically to estimate the interactive
effect of threat and authoritarianism on selected dependent variables that were postulated
as likely authoritarian responses to personalized, physical threats from terrorism.
84

In their article, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) used terrorism questions from two surveys to estimate
this threat for eight dependent variables (p. 554). The wording of the terrorism questions on the two surveys
and the answer scales is somewhat different. This difference is not noted by Hetherington and Suhay. The
LAPOP 2008 terrorism question used by Hetherington and Suhay has a seven-point answer that ranges
from “a lot” to “not at all.” The question wording is quoted above. The CCES 2006 terrorism question is
“How worried are you that you personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack.” It has a four-point
answer scale that ranges from “not at all worried” to “very worried.”
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A bivariate analysis of the fear of threat from terrorism question, which replicates
the approach used to examine responses to asymmetric threats, demonstrates that, when
confronted by a symmetric threat, African American and White authoritarians react
similarly while authoritarians and nonauthoritarians react differentially. As predicted, the
reaction to symmetric threat is the opposite of what was found when the three asymmetric
threats were examined earlier.

Table 10
Bivariate analysis: Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism
(0 = Not at all 1 = A lot) (White and African Americans only)

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians

All

All

Authoritarians

Nonauthoritarians

African
Americans

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

0.2022
0.3245

0.2222
0.3429

Whites
African Americans
Difference of Means

-0.1223

0.2785
0.3083

0.3205
0.3429

0.2011
0.2222

-0.0297

-0.0224

-0.0211

-0.1206

P-value

<.0001

0.2175

0.4662

0.7243

.0619*

N

927

1248

585

342

123

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test. The p-value reported for African Americans is one-tailed based on the
clearly stated theoretical expectation that African American authoritarians w ill be more threatened by this question than nonauthoritarians

African American and White authoritarians are more worried about the threat
posed by terrorism than nonauthoritarians, and the difference between the scores of
authoritarians is small and not statistically significant (p-value = .4662). The difference
between the mean scores of African American and White nonauthoritarians on terrorism
is also small and statistically insignificant (p-value = .7243). On the other hand, the
difference of means score between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on terrorism
concern is statistically significant at a p-value of <.0001, while the one-tailed difference

122

of means between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is just slightly
above statistical significance (p-value = .0619) with the small sample size, in all
likelihood, leading to this finding.
Thus, as predicted, African American and White authoritarians perceive this
symmetric threat similarly and authoritarians and nonauthoritarians perceive it
differentially. The expected difference in perception of the threat by African Americans
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, however, is just outside the boundary of statistical
significance.
Theoretically, according to the hypothesis, a multivariate analysis of a
symmetrically perceived threat, like the physical threat posed by terrorism, should find
authoritarianism a statistically and substantively significant independent variable for both
African Americans and Whites. In other words, authoritarianism should be predictive of
perceptions of threat irrespective of race. Thus, the more authoritarian one’s
predisposition, the more likely they will be to fear physical harm from terrorism. An OLS
model with physical threat from terrorism as the dependent variable and authoritarianism,
gender, age, party identification, education, and church attendance specified as the
independent variables was estimated for African Americans and Whites. The results
clearly demonstrate that the authoritarianism of African Americans and Whites is
predictive of perceptions of this type of symmetric threat (Figure 18). Authoritarianism is
statistically significant at a p-value <.05 for African Americans and Whites and is
substantively the largest coefficient in both regression analyses (Appendix C – Table 27).
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Figure 18: Fear of personal physical threat from terrorism.

As predicted, since they perceive the threat from terrorism symmetrically, the more
authoritarian an African or White American is, the more fearful they are of the physical
threat posed to them or their family by terrorism. On the other hand, nonauthoritarians,
no matter what their race, will simply not be as concerned about terrorist threats.
The acid test of this hypothesis is to interact authoritarianism with race in a
regression model. If the resulting interaction term is statistically insignificant and the
coefficient is small, the hypothesis that threats which are not race based, in other words
threats that are symmetric, will be reacted to similarly by authoritarians no matter what
their race and differentially by authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is supported. The
results reported in Table 11 support the hypothesis.

124

Table 11
Multivariate analysis: Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism
(0 = Not worried at all 1 = Worried a lot)

Whites & African Americans
Authoritarianism

0.850 ****
Std. Err .

Race (Whites and African Americans)
Std. Err.

Authoritarianism*Race

0.439

0.496
Std. Err.

Gender

0.598

0.358
Std. Err.

Age

0.107

0.133
Std. Err.

Party Identification

0.059

0.068
Std. Err.

Education

0.026

-0.054
Std. Err.

Church Attendance

0.036

0.243
Std. Err.

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

0.189

-0.242

1
2
3
4
5
6

0.122
0.063
1.128
1.820
2.703
3.519
4.234

Count R2

0.312

Adjusted Count R2

-0.009

N

1191

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using Ordinal Logistic regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

Chapter Summary:
The Prevalence of Black Authoritarians and the Protective Authoritarian Shield
The regular asymmetric exposure of African Americans to material, physical, and
psychological personal threats work in two ways to make Blacks, when measured in
surveys using the child-rearing scale, more authoritarian than Whites. These two
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pathways are not new inventions. Instead, they represent the two competing,
contemporary accounts of the interaction of threat and authoritarianism posited by
leading scholars of authoritarianism.
First, as Stenner (2005) predicts, threat activates authoritarianism in those African
Americans who are already predisposed to it. Second, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
predict, threat causes nonauthoritarian African Americans to behave more like
authoritarians. The fusion of these two different authoritarian pathways leads to
heightened levels of authoritarianism among African Americans that are an observable,
and regularly observed, statistical fact.
There are important differences, however, between Stenner’s (2005) and
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011)
conceptualization of threat and the threats confronting African Americans detailed in this
chapter. Stenner’s threat is normative, and it is not constant. When it appears, the
authoritarianism latent in people is activated. On the other hand, Hetherington and
Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) authoritarians live in a
hypervigilant state. Perceiving threats whether they exist or not, their authoritarianism is
always on.
The asymmetric threats analyzed in this chapter and experienced by African
Americans – those who are predisposed to authoritarianism and those who are not – are
neither episodic, normative, nor imagined. They are a constant, palpable fact of life every
day for African Americans. The clear and present dangers asymmetrically confronting
most African Americans make them more authoritarian. African Americans construct a
protective shield to shelter them and their families from these pervasive, corrosive
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threats. That shield is authoritarianism, and more African Americans build an
Authoritarian Shield than Whites simply because they confront more threats than Whites
do.
Why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America and
statistically so much more likely to be authoritarian than Whites? The disproportionately
high rate of authoritarianism consistently found among African Americans – detected
when using tools as disparate as the F-scale and the contemporary battery of childrearing
questions – can be explained by the predictable reaction of African Americans to their
greater, asymmetric exposure to threat. This includes the personal material, physical, and
psychological threats and stresses experienced daily by African Americans, along with
threats to their racial group that are an outcome of stigma and inequality, and shape the
cultural and social environment in which they live and grow up today.
The prevalence of authoritarianism found consistently in surveys over the last two
years among African Americans is not a statistical anomaly. It is an outcome of the daily,
asymmetric exposure of African Americans to personal threat. In America, the Black
experience with threat is pervasive and, at times, life threatening. More than 50 years
after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, threat, stress, and stigmatization continue to permeate
the social and economic reality confronting most African Americans. A higher
percentage of African Americans are authoritarians than Whites because more African
Americans experience more threats, stress, and stigmatization as part of their lives every
day than Whites do.
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CHAPTER 5
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AUTHORITARIAN WORLDVIEW
If authoritarianism is as powerful a predisposition with African Americans as it is
reputed to be among White Americans – and there is no reason postulated by Stenner
(2005), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2009), or other
authoritarian scholars to expect otherwise – then authoritarianism should fundamentally
structure and shape the political behavior of African American authoritarians. Thus,
African American authoritarians may identify as Democrats. They may also claim to be
ideologically liberal or moderate. But if authoritarian theory is universal, the worldview
of African American authoritarians (examined in this chapter) and attitudes on issues
shaped by their worldview (examined in the next chapter) must be demonstrably different
than African Americans who are not authoritarian. Even more, the worldview and
attitudes of African American authoritarians will be similar to authoritarians who are also
White.
The implications of worldview and attitudinal similarities between African
American and White authoritarians and dissimilarities with other Black Americans for
orthodox political science are clear. African Americans’ political behavior may not be as
monolithic or as reflexively liberal as scholarly conventional wisdom asserts because, for
many African Americans, their political behavior is structured by authoritarianism as well
as race.
When I write that authoritarianism shapes some African Americans’ worldview, I
am employing Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) definition of authoritarianism and mean
“a distinct way of understanding political reality” that “shap[es] political behavior and
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identity” (2009, p. 64). A person’s worldview is not produced out of the ether, nor does it
exist in a vacuum. It is “tethered to an underlying predisposition” (2009, p. 64). In this
chapter, I argue that predisposition is authoritarianism, and it shapes some African
Americans’ worldview more than their racial identity does.
With African Americans excluded from much of the contemporary analyses of the
effect of authoritarianism on political behavior, cleavages between the political behavior
of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, the effects of African
American authoritarian political behavior on theories of authoritarianism, and similarities
between African and White American authoritarians’ preferences and opinions are often
overlooked and unexamined. 85
In this chapter, I continue to bring African Americans back into the analysis of
authoritarianism in America by exploring whether the worldview of some African
Americans is in fact shaped by authoritarianism. To that end, I examine three questions:
Do African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians have different worldviews? Is
the worldview of African American authoritarians similar to or different than the
worldview of White authoritarians? And are particular aspects of African American
authoritarians’ worldview more conservative than the attitudes held by White Americans
who are not authoritarians?
Core authoritarian demands and desires, identified by scholars over the last 65
years (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997;
85

Hetherington and Weiler’s thesis concerning authoritarianism and party polarization is founded on an
analysis of data (2009) from which African Americans are excluded. Stenner (2005) excludes African
Americans from all of her data analysis. She only studies Whites who are non-Hispanic. Hetherington and
Suhay (2011) include African Americans in the initial regression analyses of their negative interaction
theory, but drop Blacks from the predicted probability analyses that follow and focuses on White
Americans only. Thus, their thesis that those who are less authoritarian become more authoritarian when
confronted with threats is empirically supported by predicted probability analyses from which African
Americans are excluded.
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Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et al., 2005; Lipset, 1959; Merolla & Zechmeister,
2009; Stenner, 2005), comprise the working definition of authoritarianism and form the
foundation from which an authoritarian worldview emerges and authoritarian attitudes on
issues emanates.
By definition, authoritarians demand and defend established and accepted
mainstream norms. They desire order to maintain valued conventions. They possess a
rigid, black-and-white view of the world. And they submit to authority that works for the
order they demand.
Authoritarians also believe in higher powers that supersede worldly authority –
especially when that authority does not support enduring and ageless conventions. And
authoritarians act aggressively toward those, whose flaunting of norms and conventions
and questioning of the worldly or transcendent authority that defends them, present a
threat. In short, authoritarians view the world through a much different lens than
nonauthoritarians.
This working definition of how and when authoritarians act and react or, in other
words, how and when the authoritarian predisposition affects authoritarians’ political
behavior, forms the sieve through which survey items from the last two decades of
research are sifted to identify and examine survey respondents’ worldviews.86 The
expression of authoritarianism is estimated and differences among the worldviews of

86

Throughout this dissertation, the predisposition to authoritarianism is measured using four child-rearing
questions that first appeared on the ANES 1992 survey. Child-rearing questions designed to measure
authoritarianism were included on the General Social Survey (GSS) since 1973. From 1973 to 1985
thirteen child trait questions were asked. Starting in 1986, this list was paired down to five. The four
question child-rearing battery developed to measure authoritarianism was first included in the 1992 ANES.
The GSS questions do not perfectly match the questions used by ANES or other surveys analyzed by
Hetherington and Weiler, (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Stenner (2005), Feldman and Stenner
(1997), and Feldman (2003a). The four-question child-rearing battery is used throughout this dissertation to
estimate authoritarianism.
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African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are examined in six
different areas.
First, a standard battery of questions designed to assess moral traditionalism is
analyzed. These questions have been included on the American National Election Studies
(ANES) surveys and other polls since 1986. They are designed to gauge whether
respondents think morals are fixed or malleable and changing. African and White
American authoritarians’ preference for norms should make them more traditionally
moral than nonauthoritarians.
Second, questions probing the rigidity of respondents’ worldview and belief in the
existence of higher, transcendent moral authority are assessed through two questions
exploring the necessity of choosing between good and evil and whether government
should use science to try and solve important problems. As rigid, dichotomous thinkers,
who believe in the existence of higher authority, African American and White
authoritarians should be more likely to agree that people must choose between good and
evil and government should not use science to solve important problems because,
ostensibly, moral teachings and norms are a better guide.
Third, African American and White authoritarians’ demand for order should make
them more supportive of government institutions and authority. Several questions
gauging public trust in established institutions are analyzed to determine whether
authoritarian support for them is different than nonauthoritarians.
Fourth, support of fundamental democratic principles by African and White
Americans should be contingent on their estimated predisposition to authoritarianism. As
such, African American and White authoritarians should be more supportive of
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concentrating power in a singular leader to protect and reassert order. They should also
be less likely than nonauthoritarians to support democratic principles in general and the
constitutional rights of minorities and dissenters.
Questions asking whether the President should take action when Congress and the
Supreme Court stands in the way or opposition threatens the progress of the country are
examined to test the willingness of authoritarians to grant the President unconstitutional
powers to protect order. Questions asking if dissenters’ basic constitutional rights,
including the right to vote, should be protected are analyzed to determine the
commitment of authoritarians to democracy.
Fifth, authoritarians should be willing to act aggressively toward out-groups or
groups that they perceive to be inferior or outside of the mainstream norm of society.
Three questions that ask respondents about “certain,” “inferior,” and “other groups” lay
bare the authoritarian predisposition toward the other, providing a stark and unequivocal
example of the effect of authoritarianism on attitudes toward out-groups by White and
African Americans.
Finally, as supporters of the existing order and societal norms, African American
and White authoritarians should be more patriotic and nationalistic than
nonauthoritarians. They should also report greater support for fundamental American
beliefs, including the uniquely American assertion that through hard work individuals can
overcome adversity, seize opportunity, and succeed.
Written formally as premises that can be empirically tested, these statements form
six hypotheses that assert African American and White authoritarians, when compared to
nonauthoritarians from either race, will be more:
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traditionally moral (H1),



likely to agree that people must choose between good and evil and
government should not use science to solve important problems (H2),



supportive of government authority(H3),



supportive of concentrating power in a single leader to protect and reassert
order, and less likely to support the democratic principle of protecting
minority rights, especially when minorities are labeled as dissenters (H4),



aggressive toward outgroups (H5), and



patriotic and nationalistic (H6).

Conceptualizing these six hypotheses as a group of principles that comprise and
define in part the authoritarian worldview is a unique approach. Comparing the attitudes
African American and White authoritarians on these six dimensions also tills new
ground. But if, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue, worldview is “a set of beliefs
and ideals that a person uses as a guide to interpret the world” that shapes not only
identity but also political behavior (2009, p. 36), then identifying areas of congruence
between African American and White authoritarians’ worldviews is important step
toward explaining the political attitudes they share.
As I demonstrate next, the findings of this examination of the worldview of
authoritarians produces new and valuable insights into the behavior of African Americans
and African American authoritarians. On the six dimensions that I argue comprise an
important part of the authoritarian worldview, the opinions of African American and
White authoritarians are strikingly similar. By comparison, the attitudes of African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on these same six dimensions are quite
different.
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With that said, let us turn to the data, starting with moral traditionalism and the
hypothesis that African and White American authoritarians’ preference for norms will
make them more traditionally moral than nonauthoritarians (H1).
Authoritarians and Moral Traditionalism
Since 1986, the American National Election Survey (ANES) has asked four
questions designed to assess whether survey respondents think morals should be fixed
and unyielding in the face of changing social norms or malleable and changing. These
four questions, identified in surveys as the moral traditional battery, include:


“The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior
to those changes.”



“The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”



“We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own
moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.”



“This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on
traditional family ties.”

Answers to these questions are logged on a five-point scale where 1 is strongly agree and
5 represents strongly disagree. 87 Theoretically, African and White American
authoritarians’ preference for established norms should predispose them to favor a moral
code that does not change. As such, for example. they should disagree with the moral
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As noted in a previous chapter, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) use answers to two of these questions (1
and 3) to build an independent variable he calls “Newer Lifestyles” to account for moral conservative
orthodoxy in their analysis of the effect of authoritarianism on attitudes about gay rights. They also employ
the second question as an independent variable to capture the threat “people report feeling from gays and
lesbians” (2009, pp. 94-96). Altemeyer has not used these particular questions to construct the different
versions of his RWA scale (1981, 1988, 1996, 2006). But several questions on the different versions of the
RWA scale plumb opinions on morally traditional concerns. For example, questions 6, 9, 15, 16, and 31 on
the 1996 version of the RWA scale assess different dimensions of moral traditionalism (Altemeyer, 1996,
pp. 12-15). Pérez and Hetherington (2014) cite a moral traditionalism variable from the 2008 ANES survey
in their paper on authoritarian scale variance, but do not define how the variable is constructed. No scholars
appear to have used all four moral traditional scale questions to assess this dimension of the authoritarian
worldview.

134

traditional question that states “the world is always changing, and we should adjust our
view of moral behavior to those changes.”88
Bivariate and multivariate tests of the aggregated and scaled results from the four
moral traditional questions from the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys demonstrate that
African American authoritarians hold more morally traditional views than
nonauthoritarians.89 In both surveys, a bivariate test of the difference between African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians mean scores on the moral traditionalism
scale are statistically significant at a p-value of 0.0001 and less (Table 12).90

Table 12
Authoritarians and moral traditionalism
On 0 to 1 Scale w here 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional

African Americans White Americans

African Americans

White Americans

ANES 2008

ANES 2008

ANES 2012

ANES 2012

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Mean Score

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians

0.4089
0.5443

0.4467
0.6275

0.4375
0.5417

0.4473
0.6668

Difference of Means

0.1354

0.1808

0.1042

0.2195

P-value

0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

N

391

703

740

2378

Sources: 2008 and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

88

To avoid acquiescent response bias, researchers design survey questions so that morally traditional
responses to the four questions are divided equally into negative and positive answers. Post survey, the
morally traditional positive or “agree” answers are converted so that the more morally traditional answers
for each of the four questions are assigned higher scores. Scholars then sum the answers to the four
questions and array them onto a 0 to 1 scale where 1 represents the most morally traditional posture.
89
These surveys included child-rearing questions enabling an analysis of moral traditionalism in terms of
the authoritarian predisposition of African Americans.
90
For this test, African American and White authoritarians were defined as those respondents who scored
.75 and above on the authoritarian scale derived from the four child-rearing questions. Nonauthoritarians
were defined as those who scored .25 and below on the authoritarian scale.
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African American authoritarians are also statistically more morally traditional than White
nonauthoritarians while White authoritarians are the most morally traditional of all.
A multivariate analysis of the data from both the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys
supports the finding that African Americans authoritarians hold more morally traditional
views than nonauthoritarian African Americans. With the moral traditional scale as the
dependent variable, an ordinal logit model was estimated with independent variables for
authoritarianism, church attendance, gender, age, educational attainment, and party
identification. The results of the multivariate analysis show that authoritarianism is
statistically significant at a p-value of less than .001, and has a greater effect on moral
traditionalism than even church attendance (Appendix C – Table 28).91 A similar,
statistically significant and substantive authoritarian effect was found when the model is
run for White Americans.
Finally, predicted probabilities were calculated for each model to isolate the effect
of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism. This was accomplished by holding party
identification, gender, age, education, and church attendance variables at their means
while varying authoritarianism along a scale ranging between 0 (for most
nonauthoritarian) and 1 (for most authoritarian). The results of this analysis graphically
demonstrate the effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (Figures 19 and 20)
and, importantly, the similarity of its effect across race.

91

The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism is much greater than church attendance when both
variables are estimated across a five-point scale – as they are in the Table 29 in Appendix C.
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Figure 19: The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (ANES 2008).
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Figure 20: The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (ANES 2012).

In the 2008 ANES survey, African American nonauthoritarians (0) were predicted
to score a .453 on the moral traditional scale while the predicted score of African
American authoritarians (1) was .561 – a .108 point difference. By comparison, White
nonauthoritarians (0) in the 2008 ANES survey were predicted to score a .501 on the
moral traditional scale while the predicted score of White authoritarians (1) was .629 – a
.128 point difference.
In the 2012 ANES survey, African American nonauthoritarians (0) were predicted
to score a .432 on the moral traditional scale while the predicted score of African
American authoritarians (1) was .550 – a .118 point difference. In the same survey, White
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nonauthoritarians (0) were predicted to score a .472 on the moral traditional scale while
the predicted score of White authoritarians (1) was .671 – a .199 point difference.
Thus, while Whites are more morally traditional than Blacks, authoritarianism has
the same effect on members of both races. Authoritarians are more morally traditional
than nonauthoritarians. 92
The effect of authoritarianism on both African Americans and Whites on the
principles that comprise and define, in part, the authoritarian worldview will be evident in
almost every figure presented in this chapter. African American authoritarians are indeed
attitudinally different than nonauthoritarian African Americans and more conservative
than nonauthoritarian White Americans on principles that are fundamental components of
the authoritarian worldview.
Authoritarians and Moral Choices
Two survey questions asked between 2008 and 2012 provide a more detailed
glimpse into authoritarians’ moral thinking and underscore the fundamental differences
between how authoritarians and nonauthoritarians view the world. These moral choice
questions ask respondents whether it is necessary to choose between good and evil and
how often government should use science to try and solve important problems.93 As rigid

92

Since moral traditionalism is likely to play an important causal role in party identification, and party
identification varies among White but not as much among African Americans, including partisanship in
models analyzing moral traditionalism could be misleading. Table 30 in Appendix C reports the results of a
moral traditional model in which partisanship was omitted. The results do not change the findings as
presented.
93
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) write that there is “an extraordinary difference between authoritarians
and nonauthoritarians on the question of whether there is a right way and a wrong way to do things” (, but
does not provide data to support this claim. They also note “that authoritarianism is highly correlated with
belief in biblical inerrancy” (p. 35). Both of these observations led to the inclusion of these questions as
means for measuring a dimension of the authoritarian worldview. Altemeyer’s 1996 version of the RWA
scale (pp. 12-15) includes questions asking about “one right way to live life (question 14), church
attendance (question 8), and biblical inerrancy (question 22). None of the questions on the RWA scale,
however, are replicas of the three included here. Moreover, other scholars have not used the specific
questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview.
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thinkers who believe in the existence of a higher moral authority, I expect that African
American and White authoritarians will be more likely to agree that people must choose
between good and evil, and that moral teachings and norms are a better guide to solving
problems than science (H2).
The first moral choice question appeared on the AmericasBarometer poll in
200894 and asked whether there is a “struggle between good and evil” in today’s world
“and people must choose between them.” As rigid, black-and-white thinkers, who believe
in the existence of higher authority, African American and White authoritarians should be
more likely to agree that people must make a conscious choice between good and evil. To
authoritarians the world is divided into these two spheres. The difference between good
and evil is clearly delineated by a higher authority. It is incumbent upon people to choose
a side. Moral relativism is not a choice. Tradition and morality is. There are no grey areas
when it comes to the struggle between good and evil.
The results for authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans
on the AmericasBarometer “good versus evil” question are displayed in Figure 21. Using
predicted probabilities generated by an ordinal logit analysis of answers to this question
(Appendix C – Table 31), the figure clearly demonstrates that the more authoritarian
African and White Americans are, the more likely they are to agree strongly that there is
a struggle in the world between good and evil and people must choose a side.

94

The Latin American Public Opinion Project 2008 AmericasBarometer Poll was conducted by Vanderbilt
University. The complete poll question reads: “In today’s world there is a struggle between good and evil,
and people must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree that a struggle between good and
evil exists?” This poll includes a child-rearing authoritarian battery, probes several topics and questions not
normally asked on scholarly polls, and includes a sample of 153 African Americans. Because of this, it
plays an important role in my examination of African American authoritarians
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Figure 21: People must choose between good and evil.

Once again, African American authoritarians are statistically more likely to strongly
agree with the morally traditional position that people must choose sides in the war
between good and evil than either African or White American nonauthoritarians.
By comparison, African and White Americans who are not authoritarian think just
the opposite. They either are more likely to strongly disagree people must choose
between good and evil, or do not think there is a struggle between good and evil in the
world. Importantly, in terms of strongly agreeing or disagreeing with the statement, the
95% confidence intervals for nonauthoritarian (0) and authoritarian (1) African and
White Americans do not overlap, indicating a statistically significant and substantive
difference in their worldviews.
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The second glimpse of the morally traditional lens through which African
American authoritarians view the world comes from a moral choice question asked on the
2012 ANES poll. On this survey respondents were asked whether or not government
should use science to solve important problems. The answers ranged from always to
never and were arrayed across a 5-point scale. Using an ordinal logit model where
government use of science is the dependent variable and authoritarianism, party
identification, gender, age, church attendance, and education are the independent
variables, African American and White authoritarians are much more likely to assert that
government should not use science to solve important problems because, inferring from
our theoretical expectations, they believe moral teachings and guidance from a higher
power are better decision making tools (Appendix C - Table 32).95
Analyzing responses using predicted probabilities and graphing “always and most
of the time” responses on one set of lines and “never and some of the time” on a second
set (Figure 22) visually displays African American and White authoritarians greater
probability of agreeing that science should not be used to solve important problems. Once
again, African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians hold statistically significant
and substantively different opinions on this question. However, authoritarianism has a
greater effect on the opinions of Whites on this question than Blacks, and
nonauthoritarian Whites are more supportive of using science to solve problems than
African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.

95

Following Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) lead, I employ a one-tailed test of statistical significance on
this question for African Americans because the hypothesis includes a “clear directional claim” for
authoritarianism (p. 554). The two-tailed p-value of authoritarianism among African Americans when using
science to solve important problems is the dependent variable is .063.
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Figure 22: Use science to solve important problems.

As measured by moral traditionalism, the differences between African American
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians as well as White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians
are significant. The analysis of two moral choice questions (on good and evil and the use
of science to solve problems) adds breadth and nuance to the attitudinal differences
identified by the earlier analysis of the moral traditionalism scale. The sum of both
demonstrates that the basic worldviews of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and
White Americans on morally traditional values and the existence and importance of a
higher, non-temporal authority in the world are significantly different. But do the
differences found on matters of morality and other worldly authority between African
American and White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians repeat themselves when more
secular forms of authority are considered?
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Authoritarians’ Trust of Governmental and Institutional Authority
Theoretically, because of their need and demand for order, authoritarians should
support governmental and institutional authority more than nonauthoritarians when these
entities are perceived as either defenders of established societal norms and morality, or
guardians of the group to which authoritarians belong or aspire (H3). One simple measure
of support for governmental and institutional authority is trust. Logically, the more
someone trusts the government and institutions, the more likely he or she supports the
authority of these institutions. 96
The 2008 AmericasBarometer poll contains four questions measuring
respondents’ trust of government and institutions. Respondents are asked whether or not
they trust Congress, the government in Washington, political parties, and the President.
All four questions use the same answer template (a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “do
not trust at all” to 7 “trust a lot”) to measure respondents’ level of trust. An ordinal logit
regression is estimated to evaluate answers to each of these four questions. In each
estimate, the object of trust is the dependent variable and authoritarianism, party
identification, gender, age, church attendance, and education are the independent
variables.
Contextually, it is important to consider two points before assessing this data.
First, Republican George W. Bush was at the end of his presidency when these questions
were asked. At this time, he was a polarizing political figure with very low job
performance and personal approval ratings. As the so-called “captives” of the Democratic
Party (Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), African Americans were arguably
96

Altemeyer’s 1996 RWA scale includes one question (3) that touches on trust of “established authorities
in our country” (p. 13). Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the
authoritarian worldview.
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one of the least likely groups in the United States to trust the government in Washington
and the President as the Bush presidency came to its conclusion. At this moment in time,
and under the circumstances of heightened partisanship and strong prevailing partisan
headwinds, any statistically significant variation among African Americans in trust of the
President and the government in Washington that is correlated with authoritarianism
reveals the underlying potential of the authoritarian predisposition to structure political
behavior.
Second, trust in American institutions was approaching or at a nadir when these
questions were asked.97 Americans were simply much more distrustful of government
than trustful. Thus, the effect of authoritarianism on trust must be viewed through this
prism, and the right question to ask is not how much more trusting authoritarians are of
government and institutions than nonauthoritarians. Instead, it is how less distrustful they
are.
With this context in mind, and considering just African Americans,
authoritarianism is a statistically and substantively significant variable for each of the
four dependent variables tested. In all instances, the authoritarian coefficient is positive
and larger than every other coefficient reported (Appendix C – Table 33). The more
authoritarian an African American is, the less likely he or she is to distrust the
government in Washington, the President himself (even though George W. Bush was in
office when the question was asked), political parties, and Congress. For White
97

According to Gallup, Americans trust and confidence in the federal government in Washington to handle
domestic problems measured 47% in September 2007 and 48% in September 2008 (great deal or fair
amount of trust) – the lowest measurement since Gallup began asking the question more than thirty years
earlier in 1972. On another question asked by Gallup, Americans’ trust of the “government in Washington
to do what is right” just about always or most of the time fell from a high of 60% immediately after 9/11 to
a low of 19% in 2009 – the lowest rating in 15 years. Gallup, “Trust in Government,”
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx
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Americans, authoritarianism is statistically significant for three of these four dependent
variables, including government in Washington, political parties,98 and the President. In
these three cases, the more authoritarian a White American is, the less likely he or she is
to distrust these institutions (Appendix C – Table 34).99
These four trust questions represent the first evidence, cited so far in this chapter,
that the authoritarian predisposition structures not only authoritarians’ worldview on
fundamental moral values and choices, but also their probability of supporting existing
institutions – especially the government in Washington and the President.100
Authoritarians’ Contingent Support for Democratic Principles
Driven by their demand for order and need for norms, authoritarians are
predisposed to support unitary leaders with concentrated powers who stand up for what
authoritarians, with their binary sense of right and wrong, deem to be right.101
Theoretically, authoritarian demands for a unitary leader who takes action should be at
their apex when authoritarians perceive that order is threatened. It follows, then, that
African and White American authoritarians should be less likely to support democratic
principles when those principles empower political minorities and groups who are
perceived either to be outside of the mainstream or a threat to order. Authoritarians
should oppose constraining the power of the plebiscitary President (Canes-Wrone, 2001a,
2001b, 2006; Kernell, 1997) to work the will of the majority when that will is threatened.
98

The p-value of authoritarianism when the dependent variable is political parties is .093.
Trust of Congress was the one dependent variable where African American authoritarians were
statistically less distrustful of government and White authoritarians were not.
100
Even when ideology is added to party identification as a control in the government trust models,
authoritarianism structures institutional support (Appendix C – Tables 35 and 36).
101
Authoritarian desire for and support of a strong leader who maintains order has been a fundamental
component of scholarly theories of authoritarianism beginning with The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno
et al., 1950). Altemeyer’s 1996 RWA scale asks several questions (5, 21, 23, and 32) that explore this
aspect of authoritarianism. Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of
the authoritarian worldview.
99
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They should also be more likely to support unilateral action by Presidents (Moe &
Howell, 1999), with little concern for the constitutionally established balance of power
among the three branches of government, when the Supreme Court or Congress stands in
the way of the President maintaining or establishing order. In short, African and White
American authoritarians will favor strong, Presidential leadership when it is perceived to
be defending majoritarian order or asserting majoritarian will. Stated as a hypothesis, I
contend that when order is challenged, African American and White authoritarians will
be more supportive of concentrating power in a singular leader to protect and reassert
order (H4).
Authoritarian theory also predicts that authoritarians will support majority rule
over minority rights when the majority defends what authoritarians believe is the societal
norm. Authoritarians will doggedly support interpretations of the Constitution and
institutional power that enshrine and enforce conventional rules, norms, and order. And
no matter how unconstitutional the outcome, they will be more likely to favor
circumscribing the rights of minorities who criticize the order and conventions their
authoritarian predisposition demands. Again, stated as a hypothesis, African American
and White authoritarians will be less likely to support the democratic principle of
protecting minority rights, especially when minorities are labeled as dissenters (H4A).
Do authoritarians actually value order above democratic principles and
constitutional protections as theory predicts? On nine different questions that test the
commitment of Americans to fundamental, constitutional principles, African and White
American authoritarians consistently support the less democratic and more autocratic
position than nonauthoritarian Americans. These questions range from the scope of
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presidential power to the basic rights of minorities and dissenters under the Constitution.
African and White American authoritarians support for the less democratic and
unconstitutional position, as measured through ordinal logit models, is statistically
significant (at a p-value of .05 or less) and substantive on each of the nine questions.
Empower a Strong Leader
The first three of these questions (Appendix C – Tables 37 and 38) examine
opinions on the rightful scope of presidential power. These questions ask if the chief
executive should be able to limit the voice and vote of opposition parties to insure
progress, and whether the President should govern without Congress or ignore the
Supreme Court when either of these two branches of America’s constitutional democracy
hinders the work of government.102
The positive coefficients found in the tables for authoritarianism indicate that the
more authoritarian an African or White American is, the more likely he or she is to agree
that the President should ignore the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the minority and
the constitutionally vested powers of the legislative and judicial branches of government
when either becomes bothersome to the progress of the country. Importantly, when these
questions were asked the sitting President was Republican George W. Bush and his
approval ratings were at a nadir.
Graphs of the predicted probabilities for these three question demonstrate the
depth and marked similarity of African and White American authoritarians’ support for
102

The poll questions read: “Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to
tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 1. It is necessary for the progress of
this country that our Presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or
disagree with that view? 2. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our Presidents should
govern without the Congress, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? 3. When the Supreme
Court hinders the work of our government, it should not be paid attention to by our Presidents, how much
do you agree or disagree with that view?”
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the unitary exercise of presidential power to “limit the voice and vote of opposition
parties” when they stand in the way of progress or “govern without Congress” and “not
pay attention to the Supreme Court” when either hinders the work of government.
African American and White authoritarians are statistically and substantively less
likely to oppose (disagree with) the President limiting the voice and vote of opposition
parties than nonauthoritarian African and White Americans (Figure 23). For example, the
predicted value of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly disagreeing with the
President limiting the speech and vote of opposition parties to insure progress was .668
while the predicted score African Americans authoritarians strongly disagreeing was just
.294. Thus, moving across the authoritarian scale from nonauthoritarian (0) to
authoritarian (1) yields a 37 percentage point decrease in the probability that African
Americans strongly disagree with the President limiting the voice and vote of opposition
parties.
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Figure 23: Strongly oppose President limiting speech and vote of opposition parties to
ensure progress.

By comparison, White nonauthoritarians predicted value of strongly disagreeing
with this statement was .634.103 Once again, African American authoritarians are
statistically and substantively different than nonauthoritarian African Americans and hold
a less democratic and liberal view than nonauthoritarian White Americans. As
demonstrated in each of the previous figures in this chapter, the effect of the authoritarian
predisposition is also cross racial, structuring the preferences and behaviors of African
and White Americans.
The statistically significant and substantive differences between authoritarian and
nonauthoritarian Whites and African Americans on the use of presidential power when
103

The predicted probability of White authoritarians strongly disagreeing with this was .330 with a 95%
confidence interval of .280 to .380.
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the Executive confronts a recalcitrant Congress or Supreme Court further underscores the
willingness of authoritarians to set aside constitutional protections and procedures when
either becomes a threat to what they consider progress – ostensibly progress that protects
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Figure 24: Strongly oppose President governing without Congress when it hinders work
of government.

151

.75
0

.25

.5

Predicted Values

0

.25

.5

.75

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans

White Americans
LAPOP 2008

Figure 25: Strongly oppose President ignoring the Supreme Court when it hinders the
work of government.

Support Majority Tyranny
The next two questions examining respondents’ commitment to basic democratic
principles (Appendix C – Tables 39 and 40) remove presidential power from the
equation to focus on whether minorities should be protected from the tyranny of the
majority. Specifically, these questions ask if minority opposition must be prevented when
the majority has decided the right way to proceed, and whether those who disagree with
the majority are a threat to the nation. These questions are excellent tests of authoritarian
aggression toward out groups;104 and African American and White authoritarians perform

104

Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian
worldview. Altemeyer’s 1996 RWA scale, however, asks two questions (24 and 29) that touch on the role
of free thinkers and those who challenge majority norms in society. These questions are not framed in
terms of minority and majority rights in a democracy.
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just as theory predicts. The more authoritarian an African or White American is, the more
likely he or she is to agree with abridging the rights of political minorities (Figures 26

0

.25

.5

Predicted Values

.75

1

and 27).105

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans

White Americans

Disagree
Agree

Disagree
Agree
LAPOP 2008

Figure 26: Must prevent minority opposition when people decide what is right.

105

Answers to these questions are arrayed on a seven-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
In Figures 26 and 27, answers have been collapsed into agree and disagree with neither, the midpoint
answer on the scale, omitted.
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Figure 27: Those who disagree with the majority are a threat to the country.

The differences on these questions between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African
Americans and White Americans are statistically significant at a p-value of less than .05
and substantively different.
Examining these two questions from the same perspective as the three presidential
power questions discussed above, African and White American authoritarians are also
less likely to strongly disagree that minority opposition must be prevented “when people
(the majority) decides what is right” and minority opinion is a “threat to the country”
(Figures 28 and 29). For example, the predicted value of nonauthoritarian African
Americans strongly disagreeing that “those who disagree with the majority are a threat to
the interests of the country” was .652 while the predicted score African Americans
authoritarians strongly disagreeing was .220. Thus, moving across the authoritarian scale
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from nonauthoritarian (0) to authoritarian (1) yields a 43 percentage point decrease in the
probability that African Americans strongly disagree that the opinions of minorities are a
threat to the country.
By comparison, White nonauthoritarians predicted value of strongly disagreeing
with this statement was .582.106 Once again, African American authoritarians are
statistically and substantively different than nonauthoritarian African Americans, hold a
less democratic view than nonauthoritarian White Americans, and are statistically similar
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Figure 28: Strongly disagree that the opinions of minorities are a threat to the country.
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The predicted probability of White authoritarians strongly disagreeing with this was .208 with a 95%
confidence interval of .170 to .246.
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Figure 29: Strongly disagree that we must prevent minority opposition when people
decide what is right.

As members of a racial minority whose civil and human rights were oppressed for
centuries in the United States, why would some African Americans be so quick to call
opposition to the majority a threat and so ready to suppress constitutionally guaranteed
minority rights? The framing of the first question speaks to authoritarians. It says: a
decision has been made by the “people” about “what is right” and minority opposition
must be prevented. As defenders of an order that stands for right against wrong, African
American authoritarians identify themselves with the people (or majority) invoked in the
question and are more than willing to quash minority opposition to what is right.
The second question also engages authoritarianism by framing dissent as a threat
to the order that is supported by the majority. African American authoritarians perceive
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themselves as part of the majority seeking order. A minority who opposes that order is a
threat. Thus, when the question at hand engages their authoritarian predisposition, the
racial gap between African and White Americans is bridged. Authoritarians from both
races appear attitudinally quite similar to each other and very dissimilar from their racial
brethren.
Authoritarians think those who question the opinion of the majority are a threat to
the country. And if it is necessary for the progress of the country, authoritarians –
irrespective of their race– also believe the President should have unconstitutional power
to limit the voice and vote of the opposition.
Suppress Dissent
Dissenters contest the conventional, challenge the existing order, and by
definition do not obey. Dissenters questioning of authority is an anathema to
authoritarians. Their existence is a threat to the order authoritarians’ demand. When
confronted by dissenters, authoritarians should demonstrate a predilection to abridge
democratic principles and suppress dissenters’ democratic rights.107
Four questions on the AmericasBarometer Poll in 2008 focused on whether
dissenters described as “people who only say bad things about the American form of
government, not just the incumbent government, but the system of government” should
have the same rights as others in the United States. Specifically, these questions108 asked
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Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian
worldview. Altemeyer’s 1996 RWA scale, however, asks questions about “getting rid of the ‘rotten
apples’” (question 7), using the “strongest methods to get rid of “troublemakers” (question 17), silencing
“troublemakers spreading bad ideas” (question 23), and inversely “treating protestors and radicals with
open arms and open minds” (question 33).
108
The poll questions read: “There are people who only say bad things about the American form of
government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. 1. How strongly do you
approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote? 2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that
such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views. 3. How strongly
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if dissenters should be allowed to vote, demonstrate peacefully, run for office, or make
speeches on television. The results provide empirical proof that African and White
American authoritarians are statistically less likely than nonauthoritarians to support
democratic principles when those principles are tested by the actions of dissenters
(Appendix C – Tables 41 and 42). As indicated by the negative signs next to each
authoritarian coefficient in these tables, the more authoritarian African and White
Americans are, the more likely they are to oppose protecting dissenters’ right to vote,
demonstrate peacefully, run for office, and make speeches on television.
Graphed using predicted probabilities, the effect of authoritarianism on each
question is substantive and similar. African and White authoritarian are more likely than
nonauthoritarians to oppose protecting dissenters’ right to vote (Figure 30), ability to run
for office (Figure 31), free speech rights (Figure 32), and right to demonstrate peacefully.

do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office? 4. How strongly do
you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?”

158

1
.75
.5
0

Predicted Values

.25

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans

White Americans

Disapprove
Approve

Disapprove
Approve
LAPOP 2008

Figure 30: Protect right to vote of people who criticize the American form of
government.
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Figure 31: Protect right of people who criticize American form of government to run for
office.
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Figure 32: Protect right of people who criticize American form of government to make
speeches on television.

Clearly, African and White American authoritarians believe dissenters forfeit their
constitutional rights when they question conventions and the existing order. Dissenters
are out-groups. When they take action, they become targets of authoritarian suppression.
African and White American authoritarian aggression towards them comports with the
description of the authoritarian predisposition defined earlier in this chapter. It is a primal
component of the authoritarianism that transcends race and shapes the worldview of
African American and White authoritarians.
Authoritarianism and The Other
Three questions from the 2011 Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity,
Race, and Sexuality (WISER) poll lay bare the authoritarian predisposition toward the
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other.109 These questions ask respondents opinion about “certain,” “inferior,” and “other
groups” outside of a particular political, institutional, or governmental frame.110 The
questions provide a stark and unequivocal test of authoritarianism. On each question,
African and White American authoritarians perform quite differently than
nonauthoritarians (Appendix C – Tables 43 and 44) with the authoritarian independent
variable statistically significant and substantive in each instance.
In particular, African American authoritarians are more likely to agree there
would be fewer problems “if certain groups of people stayed in their place.” They are
more likely than nonauthoritarians to agree that “inferior groups should stay in their
place” and “sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.” For each one of the
questions, the scaled authoritarian variable is statistically significant at a p-value less
than, or equal to .001.
Put in terms of predicted probabilities, while only 2% of African American
nonauthoritarians111 (those scoring 0 on the authoritarian scale) strongly agree that “if
certain groups stayed in their place there would be fewer problems,” 17% of African
American authoritarians strongly agree with this statement.112
Graphs derived from predicted values of these questions reveal the statistically
significant and substantive pattern of authoritarian antipathy toward out groups (Figures
33, 34, and 35). Authoritarianism structures the attitudes of not only Whites, but also
African Americans toward out-groups on these questions with the result that both White
109

Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian
worldview.
110
The poll questions read: “1. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer
problems. 2. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 3. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their
place. The responses are in an agree/disagree format on a seven point scale.”
111
The 95% confidence interval is .0034 to .0420.
112
The 95% confidence interval is .1137 to .2327.
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and African American authoritarians are statistically more likely to agree there are
certain, inferior groups who should know their place in society and stay in it. This is a
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central component of the authoritarian worldview.
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Figure 33: If certain groups stay in their place, we would have fewer problems.
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Figure 34: Inferior groups should stay in their place.
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Figure 35: Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
Theoretical arguments that African Americans cannot display authoritarian
attitudes because they have no “other group” below them in society (Blumer, 1958)
simply do not square with the results reported here. African American authoritarians react
to questions about “the other” just as White authoritarians do. They believe that there are
other groups in society that must be kept in their place and, if these groups attempt to
change their position in society, they must be forced back to where they belong.
Authoritarians’ Patriotic Pride and American Dreaming
While African American authoritarians are hostile to what they deem to be other
inferior groups, they identify closely, as authoritarian theory predicts, with the particular
group to which they see themselves belonging – mainstream, conventional Americans.
Thus, I expect that as supporters of the existing order and societal norms, African
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American and White authoritarians will be more patriotic and nationalistic, and more
likely to agree with fundamental American beliefs, than nonauthoritarians (H6). And
that is exactly what I find.
Both African and White American authoritarians are prouder to be Americans
than nonauthoritarians (Appendix C – Table 45). Authoritarian pride in being an
American is statistically significant at p-values of less than .05 for African and White
Americans. The predicted value of an African American authoritarian strongly agreeing
that he or she is proud to be an American is .931 or 19 percentage points greater than the
predicted probability of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly agreeing they are
proud to be an American.113 A boxplot of predicted values of pride in being an American
with 95% confidence intervals demonstrates the substantive difference between African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on this important question of patriotic and
aspirational belonging (Figure 36).

113

The predicted value of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly agreeing that they are proud to be
an American is .745. The 95% confidence intervals between authoritarians (.893 and .968) and
nonauthoritarians (.587 and .904) strongly agreeing that they are proud to be an American overlap slightly.
The overlap of 95% confidence intervals is .011.
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Figure 36: Proud to be an American.

African American and White authoritarians are also more likely than their
nonauthoritarian counterparts to buy into the Horatio Alger mythos – sitting at the core of
the American Dream – that hard work leads to success (Appendix C—Table 45). On this
question, African American authoritarians are statistically and substantively different
than African American and White nonauthoritarians with African American
authoritarians strongly agreeing that hard work leads to success at a predicted value of
.812 compared to a predicted value of .430 for nonauthoritarian African Americans and
.573 for nonauthoritarian White Americans. Importantly, White and African American
authoritarians are statistical look-alikes when it comes to hard work leading to success
with the predicted value of White authoritarians agreeing with concept of .880. Arrayed
across the authoritarian scale, the belief of African and White American authoritarians in
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the Horatio Alger myth at the core of the American Dream, and the contrasting attitude of
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all nonauthoritarians, is eminently apparent (Figure 37).
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Figure 37: Horatio Alger: If you work hard, you can succeed.

As supporters of the existing order and societal norms, African American and White
authoritarians evince greater pride in being American and support for fundamental
American myths than nonauthoritarians. American is their reference group. The group
they identify with or aspire to belong. And as authoritarians, they will defend their chosen
group from all others.
African American authoritarians’ pride in and connection to their American
identity, as well as their belief in the majoritarian mythos of the American Dream, is not
an unimportant statistical oddity. It is the final piece of evidence offered in this chapter
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that significant differences exist between the fundamental worldviews of African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.
Chapter Summary
The existing literatures on African American and authoritarian political behaviors
lead to one contradictory and quite unlikely conclusion at the heart of this dissertation:
African Americans are at once the most liberal and most authoritarian group in America.
From this conclusion came the question explored in this chapter: Are the worldviews of
authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans different? To explore
this question data from twelve different national surveys, conducted from 1992 through
2014, were analyzed. The findings of this analysis are clear.
Authoritarianism vies with race to structure the worldview of African Americans.
On the six dimensions that were theorized at the beginning of this chapter to form a group
of principles comprising and defining in part the authoritarian worldview, African
Americans’ authoritarianism surpasses racial identity in shaping their view of the world.
The result: African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians observe the world
from quite different perspectives. African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians
worldviews are so demonstrably different that contemporary scholarship contending
African Americans are politically monolithic and move en masse (Dawson, 1995;
Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004; Kinder,
1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Tate, 1994) must be carefully reassessed and, at a
minimum, carefully qualified.
On the other hand, when traditional morality, good and evil, trust in institutional
order, support of unitary leadership, allegiance to democratic principles, denigration of
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the other, nationalistic pride, and belief in majoritarian mythos are considered, the
attitudes and resulting worldviews of African and White American authoritarians are
quite similar. This similarity in worldview between African and White American
authoritarians may also necessitate a reconsideration of the scholarly conventional
wisdom that African Americans are “always more liberal than Whites” (Kinder &
Winter, 2001)
Two questions follow from these findings. First, Do the differences between
authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans’ worldviews and racial
identification lead to different political behaviors when actual policies, political figures
and groups of people are considered? And second, How does the political behavior of
African American authoritarians on these issues compare to the behavior of authoritarian
and nonauthoritarian White Americans?
I focus these questions in the next chapter on the wedge issues that Hetherington
and Weiler argue are at the core of the worldview evolution restructuring politics and
driving political polarization among White Americans today (Hetherington & Weiler,
2009). These issues include gay rights, the effects of terrorism on civil rights, the use of
force around the world by the United States, immigration, and the legalization of
marijuana. For good measure, I round out this list of issues by comparing the attitudes of
African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians toward different
politicians, governmental leaders, and out-groups in American society whose presence
should theoretically engage the authoritarian predisposition.
The answers unearthed are possibly quite consequential. I have shown that
significant differences exist between the racial identities and worldviews of African
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American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. If these differences affect the attitudes of
African Americans on the wedge issues that are considered to be behind the evolution
driving political polarization differentially, then the precursors for African American
party sorting may be extant and opportunities for dog whistle political messaging may
abound (Hillygus & Shields, 2008). While the barriers to sorting are said to be two fold –
history and racial identity (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), authoritarianism has already
been shown to neutralize and breach racial identity, leaving history as the only bulwark
between African Americans authoritarians evolving worldview and present party
identification. With the advent of political microtargeting and the addressable, cookiematched delivery of advertising messages over the web, the communications options for
dog whistle campaigning are increasing. African American authoritarians may present a
ripe target for this messaging. And in 2016, some whistles and bullhorns may already
have been blown by Ben Carson and Donald Trump.114

114

Carson’s first radio ad aimed at African American voters repeated the Horatio Alger myth that resonates
so well with authoritarians White and Black. My 2015 national primary poll found statistically and
substantively significant authoritarian support for Donald Trump.
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CHAPTER 6
THE POLITICAL AND POLICY PREFERENCES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
AUTHORITARIANS
The last chapter focused on an examination of some of the principles shaping the
worldviews of African and White American authoritarians. Authoritarianism’s
structuring of behavior is unlikely to stop, however, at some imaginary boundary between
principles and policy. The worldview of authoritarians inevitably shapes their political
attitudes on questions of policy, creating differences between their behavior and the
behavior of nonauthoritarians (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
In this chapter, I examine a hypothesis that builds on Hetherington and Weiler’s
worldview theory.115 I submit that African American authoritarians will hold opinions
about policies and political figures that are different than nonauthoritarian African
Americans and, in many instances, similar to authoritarians who are White (H1). The
investigation of this hypothesis that follows focuses on policy areas that form much of the
contested issue turf in contemporary American politics, including the salient issues which
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue are structured by authoritarianism and behind
partisan polarization. It also includes an examination of authoritarian attitudes on some
important political figures and identifiable out-groups.
Both components of this hypothesis (the contentions that the opinions of African
Americans are not homogeneous and that African American and White authoritarians
hold similar attitudes on many policy issues) question directly two, well-established
tenets of conventional scholarly wisdom. First, linked by what is described as a common
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Hetherington and Weiler (2009) “characterize American politics as undergoing a worldview evolution in
which politics is increasingly contested over issues for which preferences are structured by
authoritarianism” (p. 9).
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racial fate (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994), African Americans are assumed to sublimate
their diverse individual interests to the unidimensional group interest of their race and, in
so doing, reduce African American opinions to a monolithic block (Dawson, 1995;
Frymer, 1999; Haynie, 2001; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Tate, 1994).116 The linked
fate theory, also known as the Black utility heuristic, is said to explain the continued
“homogeneity seen in African American public opinion” as “class-based differences in
the African American community” grow (Nteta, 2012, p. 151).117
The issues domains in which homogeneity of African American preferences are
observed, and on which the notion of the monolithic nature of African American attitudes
rests, however, have been limited primarily to “social welfare, economic redistribution,
and civil rights issues” like affirmative action (Whitby, 2000, pp. 2-3) or what are called
“Black interests” (Nteta et al., 2015, p. 6). This myopic definition of Black interests has
had “pivotal consequences for our theories and interpretations and understandings of
African Americans” (Nteta et al., 2015, p. 6).
The scholarly assumption that African American preferences are universally
homogeneous, demonstrated through the use of a narrow and limiting definition of Black
interest, is demonstrably incorrect when issues beyond affirmative action and social
welfare policy are analyzed. African American preferences are only likely to be
homogeneous when race and social welfare questions are front and center. In most other
situations, African American attitudes will be heterogeneous reflecting fundamental
differences among Blacks including authoritarianism.
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This notion was debunked in Chapter 3.
Nteta (2015) argues that when the scope of inquiry is expanded to matters and concerns beyond Black
interests, African American attitudes are not homogeneous.
117
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The second part of the hypothesis examined in this chapter asserts that the
attitudes of African American and White authoritarians will be similar on a wide range of
issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition and are the driving forces behind
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) theorized worldview evolution. The assertion that
African Americans and Whites will hold similar attitudes on contested issues at the
forefront of the political debate runs counter to another established and widely accepted
convention in political science that “Black and White Americans disagree consistently
and often substantially in their views on national policy” and “racial difference in public
opinion are well documented” (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 439; Schuman,
1997; Tate, 1994).
As with linked fate, the racial divide between African and White American
opinion is most pronounced when issues involve race directly (for example, affirmative
action) or social welfare policy. It is “much less impressive on other social issues,
immigration, and foreign policy” (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 441). Not coincidentally,
culture war social issues, immigration, and foreign policy are the issue domains in which
the authoritarian predisposition and resulting worldview is more likely to shape attitudes
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
Kinder and Winter’s (2001) exploration of the racial divide between Black and
White Americans on race and social welfare issues produced an important, and seemingly
overlooked or, at least, underappreciated finding with important ramifications for this
chapter and dissertation. Kinder and Winter found that race – both in-group identification
(linked fate) and out-group resentment (racial resentment) – is not at the core of the
identified divide between African American and White opinions. In other words, race had
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“no effect” or is a “weak predictor of opinion” in the two issue areas where there is a
wide gap in the attitudes of African Americans and Whites (p. 447).118 The key to the
divided opinion between African and White Americans on race and social welfare issues
was their divergent views of two principles – equal opportunity and limited government.
As Kinder and Winter note “principles turn out to account for a sizable share of the racial
divide in opinion” (p. 447).119
Kinder and Winter’s (2001) finding about the role of principles in opinion
formation led to this question: If divergence on fundamental principles drives differences
of opinions between Blacks and Whites on issues of race and social welfare, could
convergence on principles, the congruency between African American and White
authoritarians detailed in the last chapter on a wide range of principles that comprise an
important part of the authoritarian worldview, lead to similarities in opinions across races
on issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition? This question frames the second
part of the hypothesis examined in this chapter.
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) contend worldview “should translate into certain
political preferences.” Since worldview “is situated near the beginning of the causal chain
of political reasoning… it will serve as a determinant of public opinion and political
behavior (2009, p. 36). I add that many of the principles on which the authoritarian
worldview rests are shared by both African American and White authoritarians. Since
there is congruence between African Americans and White authoritarians on these
principles, and, according to Kinder and Winter’s (2001) work, principles drive attitudes
more than race and class interest, the opinions of African American and White
118

Kinder (2001) notes, “This is true except on the issue of affirmative action” ( p. 447).
Differences in “social class” (also labelled as “material interests”) had no effect on the racial gap on race
issues but were “part of the story” on social welfare issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, pp. 446-449).
119
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authoritarians should be similar on a wide range of contested issue in American politics
that theoretically engage or provoke the authoritarian predisposition.
The data examined in this chapter finds both the hypothesized similarities
between the opinions of African American and White authoritarians and the differences
between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on gay and lesbian
issues, civil liberties, foreign policy, immigration, emerging societal threats, out-groups,
and political leaders. African American and White authoritarians’ moral traditionalism,
need for authority and order, willingness to sacrifice democratic principles for security,
aggressiveness toward outsiders, and allegiance to the American in-group and its norms
fundamentally structures their political and policy preferences. In short, on the key wedge
issues that are thought to be the causal force behind polarization in America
(Hetherington & Weiler (2009), the political behavior and policy preferences of African
American authoritarians are measurably different than nonauthoritarians and quite often
similar to Whites who are authoritarians.
Obviously, race is an important factor that structures the behavior of African
Americans, but it does not structure that behavior equally nor it is not the only factor that
shapes the behavior of African Americans authoritarians. The fact is that authoritarianism
is a powerful force which structures not only the way some White Americans behave, but
also the way many African Americans think and act politically. African Americans’
racial identity simply does not insulate them from the siren demands of their
predisposition to authoritarianism and the authoritarian worldview that follows. That is
why, as was demonstrated unequivocally earlier, African American authoritarians are
statistically less likely to agree that their individual fate is linked to their racial identity
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The evidence of the differences between the political behavior and policy
preferences of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians resides in the same
places (contemporary issues of growing salience) where Hetherington and Weiler found
evidence of authoritarianism structuring the preferences of Whites. Additional evidence
can be found by examining policy concerns that have grown in salience in the years since
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) book on polarization and authoritarianism was written.
For example, African American views on immigration and the legalization of marijuana.
This is a sprawling and unwieldy body of evidence. It is examined piece-by-piece
and, when viewed as a whole, establishes clearly that authoritarian and nonauthoritarian
African Americans hold significantly different political and policy preferences on issues
that are increasingly salient to politics and polarization. An excellent place to begin this
examination is authoritarian perceptions of policies affecting gay and lesbian Americans.
Authoritarians and Gays and Lesbians
Authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans hold
significantly different opinions about gays and lesbians as well as gay and lesbian issues.
Over two decades, from the first election study survey that measured authoritarianism
using child-rearing questions (the 1992 ANES survey) through the 2012 ANES poll,
African American and White authoritarians have consistently reported lower mean
feeling thermometer scores for gays and lesbians than nonauthoritarians.120 The
difference between the mean feeling thermometer scores authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians reported for gays and lesbians is statistically significant among African

120

Feeling Thermometer scores are typically reported on a 0-to-100 scale. In the surveys reported here a
score of 0 represents the coldest feeling toward the object item in question, and a score of 100 represents
the warmest feeling toward the object.
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Americans in four of the five polls analyzed and in all five of the same surveys for White
Americans (Tables 13 and 14).121

Table 13
African Americans—Feeling Thermometer scores: Gays and lesbians
On 0 to 100 Scales w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

1992 ANES

2000 ANES

2004 ANES

2008 ANES

2012 ANES

Mean Score
57.20
37.86

Mean Score
61.94
32.08

Mean Score
54.17
41.68

Mean Score
65.65
43.76

Mean Score
61.35
51.13

19.34

29.87

12.48

21.91

10.22

P-value

0.0012

<.0001

0.1391

0.0004

0.0009

N

205

99

122

381

729

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Table 14
White Americans—Feeling Thermometer scores: Gays and lesbians
On 0 to 100 Scales w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

1992 ANES

2000 ANES

2004 ANES

2008 ANES

2012 ANES

Mean Score
50.32
28.81

Mean Score
54.04
34.82

Mean Score
60.07
37.98

Mean Score
61.71
42.01

Mean Score
62.31
42.85

21.52

19.58

22.09

19.70

19.46

P-value

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

N

1173

810

502

695

2369

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.
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Once again, please note 1996 ANES is omitted from this analysis because child-rearing questions were
not asked on the survey.
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The lower feeling thermometer scores for gay and lesbians reported by African
and White American authoritarians are not surprising. By definition, authoritarianism
includes aggression and hostility toward the unconventional and those who are perceived
outside of the mainstream of society. While acceptance of gays and lesbians has
increased over the last two decades, they are still perceived more negatively by
authoritarians.
Differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian opinions about gays and
lesbians are not limited to feeling thermometer scores. Authoritarian fears of gays and
lesbians, coupled with their willingness to abridge or limit the constitutional rights of
minority out groups (discussed in the last chapter), also make African and White
American authoritarians statistically much less likely to support “homosexuals running
for office” (Appendix C – Table 46). Once again, African American authoritarians are
more conservative on this question, meaning they are less likely to support gays and
lesbians running for office than nonauthoritarian White Americans (Figure 38).
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Figure 38: Gays and lesbians should be allowed to run for office.
To authoritarians, gays and lesbians are the quintessential “other.” When they seek
political power, the will of the majority and the social norms, conventions, and order
authoritarians’ demand are threatened. Authoritarians reason that order must be
maintained. The Constitution is a means of maintaining order. Abridging the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of gay and lesbian minorities to run for office is simply
a constitutional exercise of the rights of the majority to impose its will and thwart a
minority, who is outside the mainstream of society, from gaining undue power and
threatening the established order. Thus, the theoretically predictable response from
authoritarians is to stop gays and lesbians from obtaining political power even if this is
accomplished by limiting the constitutional right of gays and lesbians to run for office.
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The opinions of African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians
on other salient policy issues involving gays and lesbians are also anything but
monolithic. Statistically significant and substantive differences in the opinions of
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on gay marriage, the ability of gay and lesbian
couples to adopt children, and discrimination against gays in the workplace exist across
numerous polls fielded during the last twenty years -- including ANES surveys conducted
in 1992, 1996, 2004, 2008, and 2012; the 2006 CCES survey; and the 2011 WISER poll
(Appendix C – Tables 47 and 48). For example, African and White American
authoritarians are more likely to believe that gay marriage should not be allowed than are
nonauthoritarians of either race (Figure 39). They are also more likely to oppose gay
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adoption (Figure 40).
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Figure 39: Gay marriage.
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Figure 40: Gay adoption.

While the differences between African and White American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians are less pronounced when it comes to laws that protect gays from
employment discrimination, they are still statistically and substantively significant
(Figure 41). For example, almost one quarter of African American authoritarians strongly
oppose laws that protect gays from job discrimination. The predicted value of African
American authoritarians opposing laws that protect gays from job discrimination is .222
while the predicted score of African Americans nonauthoritarians strongly opposing the
same law was just .095. Thus, moving across the authoritarian scale from
nonauthoritarian (0) to authoritarian (1) yields a 13 percentage point increase in the
probability that African Americans strongly oppose laws protecting gays from
discrimination in the workplace.
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Figure 41: Laws that protect gays from job discrimination.

Statistically significant differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian
African Americans are not found on gay and lesbian rights questions every time they are
asked. This is not surprising. Following the logic of Stenner’s (2005) Authoritarian
Dynamic, differences between the attitudes of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians do not
always need to be observed because the dynamics of authoritarianism are not always
engaged. But the results from the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys, which included large
samples of African Americans, indicate that authoritarian African and White Americans
are more likely than nonauthoritarians to oppose gay marriage, gay adoption, and approve
of job discrimination against gays and lesbians in the workplace.
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Authoritarians and Civil Liberties
As discussed in Chapter 5, African and White American authoritarians
consistently support the less democratic and more autocratic position than
nonauthoritarians on a wide range of questions concerning basic constitutional principles.
Three questions from two polls conducted post-911 demonstrate that the penchant of
African and White American authoritarians to favor abridging constitutional and human
rights does not stop when abstract questions about constitutional principles are
transformed into specific policy proposals to limit civil liberties domestically and human
rights globally.
When it comes to fighting terrorism, African and White American authoritarians
favor requiring every American to carry a nationally-issued identification card and agree
that the media should not report “secret methods the government uses to fight terrorism.”
The effect of authoritarianism is statistically and substantively significant in both of these
questions. African American and White authoritarians are also more likely to agree that
warrantless electronic surveillance, a constitutionally questionable practice, is acceptable
(Appendix C– Tables 49 and 50).122
A graph of predicted probabilities arrayed across the authoritarian scale
displaying whether African and White Americans agree or disagree that citizens should
be required to carry a national identification card to prevent terrorism (Figure 42) and the
media should be gagged when it comes to reporting on secret methods employed by the
government to fight terrorism (Figure 43) reveals the same attitudinal pattern found on

122

Following Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) lead, I employ a one-tailed test of statistical significance on
the question of warrantless electronic surveillance because I make a “clear directional claim” for the effect
of authoritarianism (p. 554). The two-tailed p-value of authoritarianism among African Americans when
warrantless electronic surveillance is the dependent variable is .084.
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questions as diverse as gay adoption, gay marriage, linked fate, protecting the rights of
dissenters in American, using science to solve problems, and choosing between good and
evil. When the question is the establishment of a national identification card or gagging
the press in order to prevent terrorism, authoritarians, no matter what their race, once
again stand ready to support measures that circumscribe or abrogate civil liberties and the
First Amendment. To authoritarians, Ben Franklin’s admonition that “those who sacrifice
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liberty for security deserve neither” falls on deaf ears.123
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Figure 42: Require national identification card to prevent terrorism.

123

What Franklin intended by this comment is a matter of discussion with some scholars saying it is the
opposite of what is connoted here (New England Public Radio, 2015).
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Figure 43: Media (should/should not) report information on secret methods used to fight
terrorism.
When the policy question turns to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA)
torturing of suspected terrorists, African and White American authoritarians once again
behave on this question exactly as theory predicts (Appendix C – Table 51). With torture
as the dependent variable (where 1 means the “CIA should torture” and 0 stands for
“torture should not be allowed”) and authoritarianism, party identification, gender,
education, church attendance, and age the independent variables, African and White
American authoritarians are both statistically and substantively more likely to agree the
CIA should be allowed to torture suspected terrorists than nonauthoritarians (Figure 44).

186

.75
.5
0

Predicted Values

.25

0

.25

.5

.75

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans White Americans
No
Yes

No
Yes
LAPOP 2008

Figure 44: CIA should be allowed to torture suspected terrorists.

The predicted value of an African American authoritarian agreeing that torture should be
allowed is .507 compared to a predicted value of just .129 for nonauthoritarian African
Americans – a 38 percentage point difference. The predicted values for White
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on torture by the CIA are also statistically and
substantively different. And the predicted value of White authoritarians supporting CIA
torture at .646 overlaps the predicted confidence interval of African American
authoritarians on this question.
Authoritarians and Immigration
Authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans hold
significantly different opinions concerning immigrants and immigration. First, in
bivariate tests of survey data spanning two decades, African and White American
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authoritarians report lower mean feeling thermometer scores for immigrants (1992
ANES) and illegal immigrants (2011 WISER) than nonauthoritarians.124 The difference
between the mean feeling thermometer scores for authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is
statistically significant in both surveys (Table 15).

Table 15
Feelings toward immigrants
On 0 to 100 Scale w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

1992 ANES
African Americans
Mean Score
66.30
53.85

1992 ANES
White Americans
Mean Score
61.80
55.37

2011 WISER
African Americans
Mean Score
53.61
41.85

2011 WISER
White Americans
Mean Score
47.22
30.87

12.45

6.45

11.76

16.34

P-value

<0.0058

<0.0001

0.0253

<0.0001

N

201

1177

220

477

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Sources: 1992 American National Election Studies survey and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

A multivariate analysis of feeling thermometer scores toward illegal immigrants from the
2011 WISER poll, which controls, as we do throughout this study, for authoritarianism,
age, gender, education, party identification, and church attendance, reveals that
authoritarianism is a statistically and substantively significant variable for both African
and White Americans (Appendix C – Table 53) with White and African American
authoritarians holding statistically significant colder predicted feelings toward
immigrants than their nonauthoritarian brethren (Figure 45).

124

Except for the 2004 ANES, feeling thermometer questions about immigrants were not included on other
surveys analyzed for this dissertation. The results of the 2004 ANES are not included in Table 15 because
of the small number (N=12) of nonauthoritarian African American respondents. The feeling thermometer
results on illegal immigrants for this survey are included in Appendix C – Table 52.
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Figure 45: Feelings toward immigrants.
The lower feeling thermometer scores for immigrants (1992 ANES wording) and
illegal immigrants (2011 WISER wording) found among African and White American
authoritarians using bivariate and multivariate analyses are not surprising. By definition,
immigrants are outsiders. To authoritarians outsiders can pose threats to the established
order that must be minimized or aggressively addressed.
Differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian opinions on immigrants
and immigration are not limited, however, to feeling thermometer scores. African and
White American authoritarians are also more likely to agree that new immigrants are a
burden on the country (Appendix C – Tables 54 and 55).
The graph of predicted values on whether “new immigrants are a burden” on
America demonstrate that African and White American authoritarians hold the same
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opinions about new immigrants, and those opinions are the opposite of those held by their
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nonauthoritarian brethren (Figure 46).
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Figure 46: New immigrants are a burden on the country.

The threat perceived by African and White American authoritarians from immigrants is
palpable. Authoritarians agree that immigrants are an economic threat taking jobs and
opportunities away from those who are already a part of America (Figure 47) and,
possibly as a result, support policies that will decrease legal immigration (Appendix C –
Tables 54 and 55).

190

.75
.5
0

Predicted Values

.25

0

.25

.5

.75

1

Authoritarian Scale
African Americans

White Americans

Agree
Disagree

Agree
Disagree

WISER 2011

Figure 47: More jobs for immigrants means fewer jobs for people like me.
The threat posed by new immigrants to America – the America to which African
and White authoritarians see themselves belonging – elicits an aggressive response from
authoritarians. But that response is not limited to dislike of immigrants and support for
limiting immigration. African and White American authoritarians are also more
supportive of giving the police additional power to stop and check the immigration status
of those who look as though they may be illegal immigrants (Appendix C – Table 56).
In the name of promoting law and order, stop and frisk policing has abridged the
civil rights of African Americans in cities across the country (Alexander, 2012). African
American authoritarians, many of whom have (in all likelihood) experienced this
constitutionally questionable policing technique firsthand, along with their White
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authoritarian counterparts who have not, are more than willing to have similar tactics
used against what they view as a threat to order – “the other.”
The difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on
making it legal to stop people who the police suspect are undocumented is clearly shown
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in Figure 48 (see solid lines).125
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Figure 48: State laws that allow police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion
the person is undocumented.

African American authoritarians are statistically and substantively more likely to favor
granting the police the authority to stop people who they suspect are undocumented than
125

The difference between Whites and African Americans on this question is also obvious. That difference
was explained in the discussion of symmetric and asymmetric threat in Chapter 4. Theoretically, the
empowerment of police at the core of this proposed policy represents an asymmetric threat to African
Americans and Whites, depressing African American authoritarian support for it when compared to their
White brethren.
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nonauthoritarian African Americans. The predicted probability of an African American
authoritarian granting police this power is .403. By comparison, the predicted probability
of nonauthoritarian African Americans supporting police stops of suspected
undocumented immigrants is just .189.
Omitting the oppose answer from Figure 48 clarifies another important finding,
White authoritarians are more likely to favor empowering the police to stop those they
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suspect are undocumented than African American authoritarians (Figure 49). This
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Figure 49: State laws that require police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion
the person is undocumented.

difference of opinion among authoritarians is explained by the discussion of symmetric
and asymmetric threat presented in Chapter 4. The empowerment of police at the core of
the policy tested in this survey question represents an asymmetric threat to African

193

Americans and Whites. Conceptually, for African American authoritarians both
undocumented immigrants and the state and local police present a threat. On the other
hand, for White authoritarians, undocumented immigrants are a threat but the police are
not. Thus, the difference between White and Black assessment of the threat represented
by police is, quite possibly, behind the racial differences found among authoritarians on
this question. Expanding police powers is a common sense approach to control “the
other” and protect the order with no downside for White authoritarians. Granting the
police more power is a threat to Black authoritarians.
Authoritarians and Emerging Threats:
Muslims and Marijuana Legalization
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that authoritarianism “has reshaped
American political competition and changed the nature of the political debate itself” ( p.
54). The authoritarian predisposition is at the foundation of this profound transformation.
Tied to it are an ever changing group of issues that have one element in common – they
engage people’s authoritarianism. Over time the salience of these issues transforms the
extant political debate and produces a transformed worldview that reshapes political
reality and behavior. Thus, the “issue evolution” based on race (Carmines & Stimson,
1990) that reshaped the New Deal Coalition is supplanted by a “worldview evolution”
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 9) that has hastened party sorting126 and increased
political polarization.
According to Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the cluster of salient issues causing
this polarization is not static. Since the inception of the process of worldview evolution in
the 1960s, the list of issues has grown and changed in response to changing threats to the
126

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) limit this party sorting to nonblack Americans.
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conventions, norms, and order that authoritarians are so ready to defend. Thus, gay rights
and gay marriage have supplanted feminism and the Equal Rights Amendment; and the
War on Terror has replaced the Vietnam War in salience (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
Two new threats to Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) changing rotisserie of
challenges to the established order may be the legalization of marijuana and the rise of a
new “other” – Muslims. The legalization of marijuana is the emerging and salient wedge
issue while, in the wake of 9/11, Muslims are the new, threatening out-group.
Polling of African and White Americans on both of these new potential threats to
order reveals a strong divide between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. First, as we
have seen with gays and immigrants, authoritarians express much lower feeling
thermometer ratings of Muslims than nonauthoritarians. The mean difference between
African and White American authoritarian and nonauthoritarian feelings toward Muslims
is statistically significant at p-values of <.05 (Appendix C – Table 57).
A multivariate analysis of feeling thermometer scores toward Muslims from the
2011 WISER poll, which controls for authoritarianism, age, gender, education, party
identification, and church attendance, also finds that authoritarianism is a statistically and
substantively significant variable in accounting for both African and White Americans
feelings toward Muslims (Appendix C – Table 58). Stated simply, the more authoritarian
one is, the more likely he or she is to feel less favorable toward Muslims (Figure 50).
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Figure 50: Feelings toward Muslims.

African American authoritarians feel colder toward Muslims than nonauthoritarians who
are Black. White authoritarians feel colder to Muslims than nonauthoritarian Whites. And
in both cases, the differences are statistically significant.
African and White American authoritarians are also statistically and substantively
more likely to oppose the legalization of marijuana than nonauthoritarians (Figure 51 and
Appendix C – Table 59). The predicted probability of an African American authoritarian
opposing the legalization of marijuana is .379 while White authoritarians probability of
opposing the legalization of marijuana is .431. By contrast African American and White
nonauthoritarians probability of opposing marijuana legalization is .197 and .229
respectively.
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Figure 51: Legalization of marijuana.

Authoritarians and Political Leaders and Leadership
Authoritarians’ moral traditionalism, their search for order, and their support of
institutions and leaders who advocate for both create attitudinal differences between
African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians that transcend partisan
identification and ideological lines. These significant attitudinal differences demonstrate
the power of authoritarianism in structuring political perceptions and preferences. As
with the rest of the evidence presented in this and the previous chapter, they also raise a
clear and present challenge to the scholarly notion that African American opinion is
homogeneous.
For example, as a result of his heated, televised Senate confirmation hearing in
1992, Justice Clarence Thomas became a political lightening rod. His Originalist judicial
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philosophy made him a darling of the political right and a bogeyman of the left. To say
the least, Justice Thomas was a polarizing, political figure. His support for the existing
order embodied in and supported by his view of the Constitution as an unchanging,
secularly sacred text, also spoke to the basic authoritarian worldview.
To date, scholarship explaining African American’s strong support for the
conservative Justice Thomas has focused on race arguing that “Thomas’s support in the
Black community was based on his ability to put the accusations [advanced to oppose
him] in a powerful racial frame, by referring to the [confirmation] process as a ‘high-tech
lynching’” (Tate, 2010, p. 6).
This race-based argument, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the variation in
African American support for Thomas. African American support for Justice Thomas
was not at all monolithic. Support for Justice Thomas, as measured through the feeling
thermometer scores scholars used to estimate his backing in the African America
community and assert the primacy of race in attitude formation, varies by
authoritarianism – and the variation is both statistically and substantively significant.
African American nonauthoritarians were not statistically different than White
nonauthoritarians in their dislike of Justice Thomas. By comparison, no matter what their
race, authoritarians were more likely to like Justice Thomas. Evidence of
authoritarianism’s structuring of feelings toward Justice Thomas and the heterogeneity of
African American support of him is found in both bivariate and multivariate analyses of
the 1992 feeling thermometer scores.
First a bivariate, difference of means test of feeling thermometer scores for Justice
Thomas from the 1992 ANES survey reveals a difference between African American
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authoritarians and nonauthoritarian feelings toward Justice Thomas of 17.76 percentage
points.127 African Americans authoritarians were more favorable toward Justice Thomas
(54.38 thermometer score); African American nonauthoritarians were much less
favorable (36.62 score); and the difference between them was statistically significant at a
p-value of .0005. Moreover, White and African American nonauthoritarians feelings
toward Justice Thomas (at a 95% confidence interval) were statistically the same and the
feelings of White and African American authoritarians toward Justice Thomas were also
statistically indistinguishable (Table 16).
Table 16
Feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas
On 0 to 100 Scale w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

African Americans
Mean Score (with 95% CI)
36.62 (26.64 to 46.59)
54.38 (50.65 to 58.10)

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

White Americans
Mean Score (with 95% CI)
37.17 (34.96 to 39.38)
49.50 (47.86 to 51.15)

17.76

12.33

P-value

0.0005

<0.0001

N

178

1023

Source: American National Election Studies 1992.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

A multivariate analysis of feelings toward Justice Thomas with authoritarianism,
gender, age, education, party identification, and church attendance confirms the findings
of the bivariate analysis. The effect of authoritarianism on feelings toward Justice
Thomas is statistically significant at a p-value of <.01 for both African and White
Americans. The only other independent variable reaching statistical significance is
127

Feeling thermometer scores range from 0-to-100 with 0 representing the coldest and 100 the warmest
feelings toward a person or concept.
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education at a p-value of <.05. But the substantive effect of authoritarianism on feelings
toward Justice Thomas dwarfs educational differences (Table 17).

Table 17
OLS analysis of feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas
On 0 to 100 Scale w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

African Americans
Authoritarianism

White Americans

17.645 ***
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

2.013

-1.907

-5.222

3.307

1.142

-8.847

-9.225

7.279

-2.780 **
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

13.576 ***

6.237

2.494

-0.447 **

1.087

0.383

1.387

17.271

6.789

1.700

2.47

4.556

3.814

1.321

52.600

35.074

8.325

2.680

R-Squared

0.11

0.15

N

211

1374

Source: American National Election Studies 1992.
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS model.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

Predicted probabilities of the feelings of African and White American
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians complete the picture demonstrating that
authoritarianism played an important role in structuring support for and opposition to
Justice Thomas (Figure 52).
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Figure 52: Predicted Values of Feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas.

Once again, the theoretical assumption that African American attitudes are
monolithic because race is the primary variable structuring the political behavior of
Blacks preempted a deeper analysis of feelings toward Justice Thomas and obscured a
fact observable to any analyst – the critical role played by each respondent’s
predisposition to authoritarianism.
Chapter Summary
Authoritarian theory has always conceptualized authoritarianism as a universal
condition. It is not limited to Europeans or Whites. It does not discriminate. It is a
predisposition that is found in every culture and among members of every race. Bringing
African Americans back into the scholarly discussion of authoritarianism in America is
not a luxury; it is a necessity.
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Authoritarianism’s structuring of African Americans’ worldview does not stop at
some imaginary boundary between principles and policy. It fundamentally structures
their political and policy preferences on key wedge issues that are thought to be the
causal force behind polarization in America (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
Authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans hold significantly different
preferences on these issues. As such, African Americans are not a politically monolithic
group. They do not necessarily move en masse because the difference between African
American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is neither erased nor bridged by their
shared racial identity. Race is an important factor that structures the behavior of African
Americans, but it is not the only factor that shapes the behavior of African American who
are also authoritarians.
On the other hand, the attitudes of African American and White authoritarians on
salient wedge concerns are often quite similar. Thus, authoritarianism is a powerful force
that structures not only the way some White Americans behave, but also the way many
African Americans think and act politically. African American and White authoritarians
hold quite similar attitudes across a range of salient issues because African Americans’
racial identity does not insulate them from the siren demands of their authoritarian
predisposition.
These findings pose a significant challenge to scholars who contend African
Americans’ political behavior is monolithic. Empirically, it is not. The findings also
contradict the conventional scholarly tenet that African Americans and Whites “disagree
consistently and often substantially” on national policy issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p.
439). On concerns as disparate as feeling thermometer ratings of Clarence Thomas, CIA
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torture, the need for national identity cards, views of immigrants and immigration, and
the rights of gays and lesbian, African American and White authoritarians hold
remarkably similar views.
The attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians
on fundamental principles that comprise the authoritarian worldview and a wide range of
salient issues that are theorized to engage the authoritarian predisposition also present a
significant problem for a recent theory that questions the racial validity of the
authoritarian scale based on child-rearing questions (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). As
was discussed in Chapter 2, the study cites observed attitudinal differences between
African American and White authoritarians (from the ANES 2008 and 2010 YGP
surveys) to support its claim that the child-rearing scale used to estimate authoritarianism
is valid for Whites, but not for African Americans. The data presented in this and the last
chapter leave little doubt of the attitudinal kinship of authoritarians whether they are
White or Black.
Finally, the observation that African Americans are and will continue to be a
political captive of the Democratic Party (Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009)
may need to be reassessed based on findings on Chapters 6 and 7. 128 The values and
opinions of African American authoritarians on numerous issues are out of synch with
the core of the Democratic Party. African American Republican legislators and
candidates, including Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina, presidential candidate Ben
Carson, Congresswoman Mia Love, Congressman William Hurd, and former
128

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) assert that African Americans “are a group that is clearly tethered to the
Democratic Party for now” for “obvious historical reasons.” (p. 141). To Hetherington and Weiler, the
racial identity of African Americans trumps their authoritarianism and creates political behavior that is
monolithic.
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Congressman Allen West are giving voice to the preferences and principles of African
American authoritarians. As such, African American authoritarians past allegiance to the
Democratic Party is, therefore, not necessarily a harbinger of the future. While the party
identification of most African American authoritarians has not changed yet, the
differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarians political and policy preferences
are significant, demonstrably affect their political behavior, and may be a precursor of a
worldview-driven evolution (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) in the party identification of
African Americans as it has been for White Americans. As such, it is possible that
African American authoritarians may be primed and on the cusp of changing their
partisan identification.
The role of authoritarianism in party sorting is the topic of the next chapter.
Ironically, the exclusion of African Americans from the key figure from which
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) party sorting theory sprung, as well as from many
subsequent parts of this analysis, demonstrates the need, once again, for political
scientists to make authoritarian inquiries inclusive.
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CHAPTER 7
AUTHORITARIANISM AND PARTISAN POLARIZATION
So far, I have demonstrated that the worldviews of authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians, whether they are African American or White, differ in significant
ways. African American and White authoritarians think morality is not malleable. It is
fixed. They believe there is an unambiguous difference between good and evil in the
world that creates clear choices. They are more supportive of governmental authority,
more ready to agree to the concentration of power in a single leader, and more patriotic
and nationalistic than nonauthoritarians. African American and White authoritarians are
also less likely to support democratic principles when those principles are tested by
dissenters or outsiders.
Authoritarianism not only structures the worldview of many African Americans,
it also structures how they view themselves and the identities they choose (Waters, 2009).
African American authoritarians are much less likely than their nonauthoritarian brethren
to believe their individual fate is linked (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) to their racial group
identity. As measured by the questions geared to estimate racial resentment (Kinder,
1996), they are statistically more likely to agree with the symbolically racist (Kinder &
Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1993; Sears, 1988;
Sears & Kinder, 1971) negative stereotypes of members of their own race still broadcast
by much of mainstream America. African American authoritarians are believers in the
America of Horatio Alger and take greater pride in being American than nonauthoritarian
African Americans. Americans is one of their reference groups. It is an identity they have
chosen (Waters, 2009) or to which they aspire to belong. Their claim of Americanism is
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an assertion that they are different than the mainstream stereotypes of Black Americans.
They are not them. They do not hold those values. They aspire like Horatio Alger to rise
up; not to be burdened by the downward mobility of being perceived as only Black
(Waters, 2009, p. 65). For African Americans, who are also authoritarians, race is not the
only factor that shapes their worldview or identity choices. Authoritarianism and race
compete to structure the lens through which they view the world, their attitudes on salient
issues, and, at times, as I discuss next, their political behavior.
I have also shown that on the issues that form much of the contested policy turf of
contemporary American politics over the last two decades, and which are allegedly at the
root of political polarization (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009),129 the attitudes of African
American authoritarians are also demonstrably different than nonauthoritarians and
remarkably similar to White authoritarians. Quite simply, African American
authoritarians are neither “always more liberal than Whites” (Kinder & Winter, 2001) nor
a political monolith.
In the chapter that follows, I turn to explore what the identity, worldview, and
attitudinal differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, as
well as the similarities between White and African American authoritarians, mean to the
theory that is central to our current understanding of authoritarianism’s effect on political
behavior – the political polarization theory articulated by Hetherington and Weiler
(2009).

129

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) write: “Issues such as gay rights, terrorism, and war are all now
prominent on the issue agenda and all have the ability to provoke strong feelings. And, as we demonstrate
in later chapters, all are structured by authoritarianism, which has, itself, come to divide Republicans from
Democrats” (p. 32).
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In this theory, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) contend that authoritarianism has
become an important determinant of partisan identification. They argue that “consistent
with the issues evolution framework (Carmines & Stimson, 1986, 1990), a coalitional
reconfiguration of the parties is in the works, with authoritarians increasingly gravitating
toward the Republican Party and nonauthoritarians increasingly gravitating toward the
Democratic” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p.158).
To Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the mechanism behind partisan
reconfiguration is an extension of the issues evolution process, in which dormant issues
increase in salience and persist over time, creating new lines of cleavage between parties.
The evolution of these issues as important markers of partisan differences slowly but
surely cause some voters to shift allegiances to the party more aligned with their issue
interests. Hetherington and Weiler assert that as more new issues arise and are
organically added to the issues separating parties, an issues evolution can morph into a
worldview evolution. The recent transformation from an issues to a worldview evolution
began with the addition of gut-level issues to the political debate. These gut-level issues,
Cultural War concerns that elites have added to the issue agenda since the 1960s, drove
the existing wedge between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians deeper – expanding,
sharpening, and calcifying a new cleavage line that first formed at the beginning of the
issues evolution.
Changing feelings toward both parties, falling voter turnout, and shifting voter
choice in presidential and Senate contests are cited by Hetherington and Weiler as
quantifiable, political manifestations of the shift from an issues to worldview evolution
structured along the predispositional and socially-learned division between authoritarians
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and nonauthoritarians. These observable political outcomes are also the precursors of an
authoritarian-catalyzed, partisan transformation that they theorize is extant.
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) dissection of the data on which these claims are
made, however, omits African Americans from the analysis. Even though African
Americans are “the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far,”
Hetherington and Weiler focus their analysis of changing party feeling thermometer
scores, falling voter turnout, and shifting choices in Senate and presidential contest on
nonblacks “for obvious historical reasons” (2009, p. 141). 130 In making this
methodological choice, Hetherington and Weiler elect to exclude the most authoritarian
segment of the American electorate from his analysis of authoritarianism’s effect on
American partisanship.
The data Hetherington and Weiler (2009) examine to investigate their theory that
political polarization is structured by authoritarianism is also temporally constrained.
Their analysis of changing attitudes toward parties is limited to two surveys.131 Their
scrutiny of voter turnout and presidential choice stands on cross sectional data from three
surveys – the 1992, 2000, and 2004 ANES data sets. And the core of their partisan
transformation argument is based on cross sectional data from four surveys – with the
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In this dissertation, I focus on African Americans and Whites. In this chapter, following Hetherington
and Weiler’s (2009) methodology required changing the racial units of analysis to African Americans and
nonblacks. Whites represent a significant majority of the nonblacks in each survey sample examined. That
said nonblacks also include Latinos, Native Americans, Asian Americans, and any other group that does
not identify as Black. Hetherington and Weiler chose to draw this analytical line between nonblacks and
African Americans throughout their book on authoritarianism and polarization in American politics (2009).
Hetherington and Suhay (2011) do not make this distinction in their article on authoritarianism and threat,
though the predicted probabilities they use in their article to explore this hypothesis are limited to “males
who are not Black or Hispanic” (p. 553).
131
These are feeling thermometer scores from the 2000 and 2004 ANES surveys.
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fourth and final survey, conducted by ANES in 2006, providing the critical evidence in
support of the argument (p. 147).132
The data from this fourth survey (2006 ANES) is the most convincing piece of
data supporting Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) partisan polarization theory. It shows
an increase of almost twenty percentage points in authoritarianism’s influence on
partisanship (from 16.9 in 2004 to 36.6 in 2006) significantly extending the upward trend
measured since 1992. Mapping partisanship and authoritarianism onto a 0-to-1 interval
with the 2006 ANES results included, Hetherington and Weiler find that
authoritarianism’s effect on partisanship is the equivalent of one-third of the entire
partisan scale’s range – more than 2 points on the 7-point party identification scale (pp.
146-149).
But, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) dutifully warn twice in their discussion of
this data, only half of survey respondents in the 2006 ANES were asked a partisanship
question. The result: the twenty percentage point surge in authoritarianism’s effect on
partisanship observed by them from 2004 to 2006 is based on an exceedingly small
sample (just 249 respondents) from which African Americans were excluded. The
definitive piece of evidence offered by Hetherington and Weiler in support of their
intriguing theory of authoritarian structured polarization ultimately rests on this slim reed.
In this chapter, I test that reed. Given the significant similarities between African
American and White authoritarians in terms of worldview and policy preferences
demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, and the existence of two additional years of ANES
survey data (2008 and 2012) that include robust oversamples of African Americans,
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This is the 2006 ANES Pilot Study. This study reinterviewed 675 people from the 2004 ANES. Only
half of the 2006 sample was asked a partisan identification question.
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authoritarian question batteries and tracking questions,133 I ask: What effect, if any, does
the addition of African Americans to the analysis and the expansion of the time period
studied to 2012 have on Hetherington and Weiler’s theory of authoritarian structured
political polarization?
I begin the pursuit of this question with an examination of the data from which
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) authoritarian polarization theory sprung. This is
followed by an analysis of authoritarianism’s effect on voter turnout and voter choice,
with the voter choice investigation expanded beyond presidential and Senate campaigns
to include races for the House of Representatives. After examining voter choice, I use
data pooled from five ANES surveys taken from 1992 through 2012 to reassess
Hetherington and Weiler’s finding that authoritarianism is restructuring party
identification and driving polarization.
When all is said and done, I find that when African Americans are added back
into the analysis and the time period studied is extended through 2012, the empirical
support for Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) theory of authoritarian-driven partisan
polarization is weakened but still intact. While, as Hetherington and Weiler argued,
authoritarianism appears to be behind some of the shift in the party identification of
Whites, it has affected the partisan loyalties of African American authoritarians less.
As I demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, African American and White
authoritarians hold similar worldviews and attitudes on a wide range of issues that engage
133

Because both the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys include authoritarian child-rearing questions, it is
possible to construct an authoritarian scale that is identical to the tool used by Hetherington and Weiler
(2009). Party identification, moral traditionalism, racial resentment, and a raft of other key questions used
in the 1992, 2000, and 2004 surveys (and at the core of Hetherington and Weiler’s research) are also
repeated in the 2008 and 2012 surveys, allowing apples-to-apples comparisons of the cross sectional data.
Finally, the sample sizes of African Americans on both the 2008 and 2012 surveys are robust, providing
ample samples for analysis.
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their authoritarian predisposition. In this chapter, I demonstrate that while the siren call of
authoritarianism may be changing some of the voting choices made by African American
authoritarians – especially in down ballot races – it has not yet begun to shift their
partisan identification significantly.
Partisan Polarization
Ground zero for Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) theory that authoritarianism is
the causal factor sorting partisans and propelling political polarization is a simple graph
that summarizes their fundamental observation (p. 28, Figure 2.2). In this figure, the
difference between the mean scores of self-identified Republicans and Democrats are
mapped on four different dimensions using ANES surveys from 1988 through 2004.134
The first dimension plotted is moral traditionalism. A battery of four different
questions is used to assess whether respondents think morals are malleable or fixed and
unchanging.135 These questions and this scale have been used by ANES since 1986.
Answers to the four moral questions are added and mapped across a 0-to-1 scale. A 1 on
the scale represents a completely orthodox view of morality. A 0 on the scale equals a
completely relative or secular view. To arrive at the percentage difference between party
partisans in each survey, Republicans’ and Democrats’ individual scores are grouped and
added together. Then, they are divided to calculate a mean score for both parties. Finally,
the Democratic mean is subtracted from the Republican mean to arrive at the percentage
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The 1988 ANES survey did not include an authoritarian question battery and is not included in this
analysis. Following Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) approach, mean scores are derived by adding the
scores of strong and weak partisans from each party together and then dividing by the number of total
scores summed by party. The scores of self-identified Independents, Independent Democrats, and
Independent Republicans are excluded from this analysis.
135
Moral traditionalism is different than “Newer Lifestyles” – the variable Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
develops to estimate normative threat. Four questions are combined to measure moral traditionalism. Only
two of these four questions are employed to calculate the threat from “Newer Lifestyles” (Hetherington &
Weiler, 2009, p. 94).
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difference between Republican and Democrat partisans on moral traditionalism. A
positive score on the graph means that Republicans are more morally traditional than
Democrats.
A battery of racial resentment questions designed to capture symbolic racism
(Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Sears & Kinder, 1971)
form the second dimension arrayed on Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) seminal graph.
The racial resentment scale is built from four questions. The difference between the mean
Republican and Democratic partisan scores on racial resentment is calculated using the
same procedure followed in the construction of the moral traditionalism scale. The
number 1 represents the highest level of racial resentment and, when graphed, a positive
score means that Republicans are more symbolically racist than Democrats.
The third dimension charted on the graph is support for defense spending. This is
a measure of hawkishness. It is calculated from a standard 7-point scale and plotted on a
0-to-1 interval, making it comparable to moral traditional and racial resentment measures.
A positive percentage difference on the graph means that Republicans are more hawkish
than Democrats.
Finally, the four child-rearing questions are used to estimate mean authoritarian
scores for Republican and Democratic partisans. The difference between these scores is
then calculated. A negative score means Democratic partisans are more authoritarian than
Republican partisans. A positive score indicates Republican partisans are more
authoritarian than Democrats. And values around 0 means there is little difference
between Republican and Democratic mean scores on authoritarianism.

212

Figure 53 charts the mean authoritarian score differences (expressed as
percentages) between Republican and Democratic partisans using Hetherington and
Weiler’s original findings that exclude African Americans and revised authoritarian
scores that include African Americans. It also projects Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009)
calculations through 2012. The difference between the two lines represents the effect of
including African Americans in the analysis of authoritarianism. Unlike Hetherington and
Weiler’s findings, when African Americans are included (the red line in Figure 53), the
percentage difference between the mean authoritarian scores of Republicans and
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Figure 53: Difference between the mean authoritarian scores of self-identified Republican
and Democratic partisans.
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Figure 54 adds the mean score differences between Republican and Democratic
partisans on moral traditionalism, racial resentment, and defense spending to
authoritarianism – the four dimensions originally studied and graphed by Hetherington
and Weiler (2009) who found increasing partisan differences on all four dimensions
between 1988 and 2004. Importantly, in Figure 54, African Americans are included in the
analysis and the time period studied is extended to 2012.136 In contrast to the
authoritarian findings graphed in Figure 53, the trend between Republican and
Democratic partisans’ mean score differences on moral traditionalism, racial resentment,
and defense spending is decidedly upward from 1992 to 2012 even when African
Americans are included in the analysis (Figure 54).

136

Figure 53 includes data from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys. The authoritarian
child-rearing battery was not asked in the 1996 ANES survey.

214

Figure 54: Difference between mean scores of self-identified Republican and Democratic
partisans with African Americans included.

Relying on ANES surveys from 1988 to 2004 and excluding African Americans
from their analysis, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) concluded that “the underlying
orientation that structures all these things – race, morals, and hawkishness – is
authoritarianism…[and] importantly…[the data] shows that partisans are also now sorted
by authoritarianism” (p. 29). Figures 53 and 54 do not support this claim. When African
Americans are included in the analysis and the time period is extended, the percentage
differences between Republican and Democratic scores simply do not support the
observation that authoritarianism underlies the growing difference between partisans on
race, morality, and defense.
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Voter Turnout and Authoritarianism
Changes in voter turnout, shifting voter choices in presidential and Senate
contests, and changing feelings toward both parties among authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians are identified by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) as indicators that an
authoritarian structured and catalyzed partisan transformation is now in motion. If
observed, these precursors of a shift from an issues to a worldview evolution support the
theory that authoritarianism, and the rise of public debate around issues that engage the
authoritarian predisposition, are the causal mechanism behind recent partisan
polarization.
Analyzing ANES surveys from 1992 to 2004 and excluding African Americans
from his inquiry, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) observed that, as the Republican Party
adopted more authoritarian positions on issues that engage the authoritarian
predisposition, authoritarian Republican turnout increased.137 Conversely, as the
Democratic Party increasingly embraced a nonauthoritarian worldview, turnout among
authoritarian Democrats decreased.138
Adding African Americans to the analysis and extending the time period
examined to 2012 (Figure 55) produces a somewhat different snapshot of authoritarian
turnout than described by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). Between the 1992 and 2000
ANES surveys,139 there was a marked increase in Republican authoritarian turnout and a

137

It is important to note that all voter turnout data analyzed here is not validated. Since survey respondents
have been shown to over report voting, it is likely all data in this section exaggerates actual voter turnout
(Bernstein, Chadha, & Montjoy, 2001).
138
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) state, “As Republicans adopted a larger number of issue positions
friendly to those with an authoritarian worldview and Democrats took the other side, self-identified
nonblack Democrats who score high in authoritarianism began to turn out at lower rates while selfidentified Republicans who score high in authoritarianism started to vote at high rates” ( p. 141). In this
case, “high in authoritarianism” means those people who score a 1 on the authoritarian scale.
139
Again, the 1996 ANES survey did not include an authoritarian battery of questions.
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concomitant drop in nonauthoritarian140 Republican voting. From 2000 through 2008,
however, the trends in voter turnout among Republicans reversed, as nonauthoritarian
turnout increased and authoritarian turnout decreased. By 2012, however, turnout among
both nonauthoritarian and authoritarian Republicans reached the highest level over the
20-year period studied.

Figure 55: Republican voter turnout.

Thus, from 1992 to 2012, turnout of Republican authoritarians increased
markedly but, after dipping precipitously between 1992 and 2000, so did the turnout of
nonauthoritarian Republicans. Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) singular focus on the
effect of the Republican elite’s embrace of authoritarianism on Republican authoritarians

140

In this instance, nonauthoritarians are those who score 0 on the authoritarian scale.
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overlooks a question that begs an explanation. If the embrace of the authoritarian
worldview by the Republican Party elicits an increase in Republican authoritarian turnout
as authoritarians “feel more enthusiasm about politics,” why isn’t there a concomitant
decrease in turnout among Republican nonauthoritarians as they see their party
abandoning values and positions they hold dear?
Of course, this is only half the story. Hetherington and Weiler also contend that a
drop in Democratic authoritarian turnout occurred as Democratic Party elites adopted
nonauthoritarian positions and Democratic authoritarians became less excited about
politics.141 Adding African Americans back into the analysis, however, erases most of the
Democratic authoritarian turnout decrease found by Hetherington and Weiler between
1992 and 2004 (Figure 56). Extending the time period studied to include the 2008 and
2012 ANES surveys reverses the slight downward trend and replaces it with a surge in
Democratic authoritarian turnout as, presumably, African American authoritarians turned
out to vote for Barack Obama.142

141

Democratic authoritarian turnout (with African Americans excluded) fell from 63% in 1992 to 56% in
2000 and remained at 56% in 2004 according to Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009), calculations.
142
The behavior of Democratic nonauthoritarians does not demonstrate the theoretically expected increase
in turnout expected as Democratic Party elites embraced more nonauthoritarian positions. Instead,
Democratic nonauthoritarian turnout vacillates between the low-to-mid nineties over the five surveys
studied. The already high turnout of nonauthoritarian Democrats, however, is probably the culprit behind
this deviation from the theoretically expected outcome.
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Figure 56: Democratic voter turnout.

Voter Choices and Authoritarianism
A singular focus on turnout, however, may obscure other changes in voting
patterns that are a precursor of a partisan shift in party identification driven by
authoritarianism. For example, an increase in Democratic authoritarian turnout does not
necessarily mean an increase in Democratic votes. Democratic authoritarians may be
turning out to vote for Republican candidates. Conversely, the turnout of Republican
nonauthoritarians may remain steady, but more of those nonauthoritarians may be
defecting from their party and voting for Democratic candidates.
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) examined voter choices in campaigns for
President and U.S. Senate to untangle voting patterns of loyal and defecting members of
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both parties viewed through the lens of authoritarianism.143 Excluding African Americans
from their analysis, they observed that the difference between the mean authoritarian
scores of all voters voting for the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate,
irrespective of their party identification, grew from 8.5 percentage points to 14.5
percentage points between 1992 and 2004.144 When African Americans are included in
this analysis, however, the difference between Republican and Democratic presidential
voters mean authoritarian scores between 1992 and 2004 are less than half of what
Hetherington and Weiler found (Figure 57). Extending the time period studied to include
2008 and 2012 ANES surveys reveals no difference in the mean authoritarian scores of
Republican and Democratic presidential voters in 2008 and a less than 5 percentage point
difference in 2012.

143

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) say, they “suspect[ed that] authoritarianism will have started to guide
decision about vote choice by the 1990s” (2009, p. 142).
144
The authoritarian scores of third party candidates are not included in this calculation. Given the strong
candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992, the exclusion of third party candidate voters from this analysis may have
depressed Republican authoritarian scores in this base year resulting in an exaggerated trend line from 1992
to 2000 and 2004. As calculated by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the difference in mean authoritarian
scores between Republican and Democratic candidates in 2000 was 12.2 percentage points. In 2004, it was
14.5 percentage points – a small increase.
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Figure 57: Difference in mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic voters
for President.

Once again, the effect of including and excluding African Americans in the analysis is
represented by the area between the two lines in the figure.
Defining Democratic partisans who voted for the Republican candidate for
President as defectors and subtracting loyal Democrats’ mean authoritarian score from
the defecting Democrats’ score, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) conclude that
authoritarianism was “driving defections among Democrats” (p. 142) in presidential
elections. They cite this observation as another precursive indicator of authoritariancatalyzed, partisan sorting.145

145

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) say, “To the degree that differences between defectors and loyal
partisans exist, it suggests partisan changes might soon be in the offing.” ( p. 142).
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Including African Americans in the analysis of the mean authoritarian score
difference between Democratic loyalists and defectors in presidential campaigns between
1992 and 2012 produces results that are quite similar to Hetherington and Weiler’s
(2009) (Figure 58). In four of the five presidential contests studied, the mean
authoritarian score differential between loyal and defecting Democrats was significant at
a one-tailed, p-value of less than .05. 146 Only during the 2008 presidential contest, as
African American authoritarians surged to vote for Barack Obama, did the statistical
difference between the authoritarian mean scores of loyal and defecting Democrats
disappear at the presidential level. Thus, in the 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2012 presidential
contests, Democratic defectors had a higher and statistically significant mean
authoritarian score than Democratic loyalists.147

146

A one-tailed test of significance is an appropriate test of statistical significance because the assumption
that defecting Democrats should score higher on the authoritarian scale than loyal Democrats has been
clearly stated here and in Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) work.
147
The 1996 presidential contest is not included in this analysis because authoritarian questions were not
asked on the 1996 ANES survey.
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Figure 58: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal
Democrats – including African American voters.

By comparison, the authoritarian mean score differential in presidential voting
among Republican loyalists and defectors achieves statistical significance only once – in
2000. In this year, the mean authoritarian score of Republican defectors was more than 10
percentage points lower than the score of loyalists (Figure 59).
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Figure 59: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal
Republicans – including African American voters.

In the presidential contests after 2000 and in 1992, there were no statistical
differences between the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting Republicans.
Even though African Americans are included in this analysis, the findings also track with
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) results for the three contests (1992, 2000, and 2004)
they studied.148
Given these results it seems clear that, with or without the inclusion of African
American voters, Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) initial conclusion that
authoritarianism affects the presidential vote choices of some Democrats, causing them to
defect from their party and vote Republican, is supported. Hetherington and Weiler
148

Only a few African American in each survey identify as Republicans. Thus, their addition to this
analysis makes little difference statistically.
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caution, however, about the folly of relying solely on presidential data to support claims
that authoritarianism’s structuring of vote choice is a precursor to partisan polarization.149
And they turn to the results of Senate contests for further evidence that authoritarianism
is driving partisan voting defections.
Examining Senate results for information to bolster their presidential findings,
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) report that “Senate results follow a similar pattern (to the
Presidential data), but they depart in ways that even more aptly fit our data” (p. 144). The
results, mapped by the top line in Figure 60 reveal that the difference between the mean
authoritarian scores of those who voted for Republican and Democratic Senate candidates
rose steadily and markedly from 1992 through 2004, growing from 6.1 percentage points
in 1992 to 14.2 percentage points in 2004.150

149

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) note, “Presidential voting might not reflect general trends because the
characteristics of specific candidate and themes of specific campaigns play a vital role. The pattern of
results above might reflect a particular set of candidacies” (p. 143).
150
They also find that the percentage point difference between the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and
defecting Democratic Senate voters in 2004 was 18.8 points (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
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Figure 60: Difference in mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic voters
for Senate.

When African Americans are added to the analysis and the time period is once
again extended to include the 2008 and 2012 surveys, much of the evidence Hetherington
and Weiler found in Senate vote data to support their vote choice theory evaporates (see
the red line in Figure 60).151 With African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians
added to the analysis, the difference between the mean authoritarian scores of people
voting for Republican or Democratic Senate candidates rises to just under 10 percentage
points in 2004. In 2008, this difference is completely erased as the mean authoritarian
151

A cautionary, red flag should also be raised concerning the methodological assumption implicitly made
by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) that elections from different Senate classes can be conflated to produce
a single trend line. For example, the 1992 and 2000 Senate elections were held in different states and, as a
result, were contested among quite different voters. The same observation is true for the 2000 and 2004
Senate contests. Apples-to-apples comparisons can only be made between 1992 and 2004 elections as well
as 2000 and 2006 elections. A direct comparison between 2004 and 2012 Senate results or 2008 and 2012
Senate statistics is inherently flawed because a completely different set of states and voters went to the
ballot box in each year studied.
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score of voters for Democratic Senate candidates was actually higher than the mean
authoritarian score of Republican Senate voters. In 2012, the Republican Senate voters
mean authoritarian score bounces back to just over 5 percentage points more than
Democratic Senate voters.
When African Americans are included in the analysis, a more in-depth inspection
of loyal and defecting Democrats’ authoritarian mean scores in Senate elections further
erodes Hetherington and Weiler’s supporting evidence that authoritarianism is driving
vote choice and is a precursive warning sign of partisan polarization. In only two (2000
and 2004) of the five elections studied did the difference between the mean authoritarian
scores of defecting and loyal Democrats in Senate contests reach a one-tailed, p-value of
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Figure 61: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal
Democrats–including African American voters
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Moreover, in 1992, 2008, and 2012 the mean authoritarian scores of defecting and loyal
Democrats were statistically the same.152
While the Senate data with African Americans added into the analysis offers little
support for Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) vote choice hypothesis, data from House
elections, which were not included in their original analysis, provide an indication that
authoritarianism may be beginning to affect the outcomes of races for the United State
House of Representatives. Moreover, the analysis of election data in U.S. House contests
does not confront the statistical problem presented by the six-year election cycle for U.S.
Senate.
The mean authoritarian score of defecting and loyal Democrats in House elections
was statistically significant at a one-tailed, p-value of less than .05 in 2000 and 2012. In
both election years, Democrats with higher authoritarian scores were more likely to
defect and vote for the Republican candidate for Congress (see Figure 62).

152

A statistical difference appeared between the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting
Republicans in Senate contests only once in five years – the 2000 election. This was the same election in
which a difference in the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting Republican Presidential voters
attained statistical significance.

228

Figure 62: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal
Democrats—including African American voters.
The difference between defecting and loyal Democrats’ authoritarian mean score in
House elections also approached statistical significance in a third year (2008) – a year in
which authoritarian, African American voter turnout surged for Barack Obama and
should have completely obscured the authoritarian voting cleavage in down ballot races.
Moreover, from 1992 to 2012, the mean authoritarian score of Democratic defectors in
House contests rose more than 10 points (from 52.8 to 63.6), while the mean
authoritarian score of loyal Democrats began (56.3) and ended (56.7) this two decade
period at statistically the same point.
Thus, when the choices of all voters, including African Americans, are included
in the analysis, the rise in the authoritarian score of Democratic defectors in House
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contests represents the greatest change among defectors and loyalists from both parties
across all contests examined between 1992 and 2012. Figure 63 displays the significant
rise in the authoritarian mean score differential between Democratic defectors and
loyalists in House contests (blue line). This rise is contrasted with the relatively stable
and negative mean score authoritarian difference between Republican loyalists and
defectors starting in 2000.153 As such, it puts the magnitude of the authoritarian change in
Democratic and Republican House voting over the last two decades in context. While
authoritarian differences in Presidential and Senate contests have vacillated around zero,
the authoritarian difference between defecting and loyal Democrats in House races rose
to 10 percentage points in 2000 and has remained above 7 percentage points ever since.
On the other hand, the authoritarian difference between defecting and loyal Republicans
grew to approximately 4 percentage points in 2000 (expressed as a negative number in
Figure 63 to better reveal the gap between party loyalists and defectors) and has remained
there through 2012.

153

See Appendix C – Figure 67 for comparison of authoritarian mean score differential for loyal and
defecting partisans in Presidential, Senate and House contests from 1992 through 2012.
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Figure 63: Authoritarian mean score differential between loyal and defecting Republican
and Democratic voters in the House contests with 1992 as the base year.

Ideological differences between members of the U.S. House and Senate continue
to grow and are now at historic levels (Poole & Rosenthal, 2011). The increasing political
polarization in Congress “rests on a firm electoral base” (Jacobson, 2013, p. 688) and
discourages “ideological moderates from running for office” (Thomsen, 2014, p. 2). The
authoritarian scores of Democratic defectors and Republican loyalists in House races may
be the confirmation of authoritarianism’s effect on vote choice that Hetherington and
Weiler (2009) were searching for in Senate data. It may also be evidence of the
authoritarian-driven partisan polarization of the electorate theorized by them – though
more years of election data is certainly needed to confirm it. While waiting for that data,
however, it is important to note that the rising authoritarian scores of Democratic
defectors in House elections were observed even though an African American was
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leading the Democratic Party at the end of the time period studied, African Americans
were included in the analysis, and turnout among African Americans was rising.
Partisan Polarization: Revisited
Turnout, partisan vote choice, and changing feeling thermometer scores are
identified by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) as early manifestations of
authoritarianism’s effect on political behavior. They hypothesize that this effect
inexorably culminates in a slow partisan sorting by authoritarianism as “authoritarians
increasingly gravitat[e] to the Republican Party and nonauthoritarians increasingly
gravitat[e] toward the Democratic [Party]” (p. 158). Their evidence of the existence of
partisan sorting driven by authoritarianism comes from cross sectional data from four
surveys in which the data from the fourth survey, conducted by ANES in 2006, provides
the critical and most convincing piece of information (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p.
147, Table 7.4). Between the 2004 and 2006 ANES surveys, Hetherington and Weiler
find an increase in authoritarianism’s influence on partisanship of almost twenty
percentage points (from 16.9 in 2004 to 36.6 in 2006), extending the upward trend of
authoritarianism’s effect on partisanship measured since 1992. (According to their table,
authoritarianism’s effect on partisan identification first achieved statistical and
substantive significance in 2004.)
With partisanship and authoritarianism mapped onto a 0-to-1 interval,
authoritarianism’s effect on partisanship in the 2006 ANES results is the equivalent of
one-third of the entire scale’s range, or more than 2 points on the 7-point party
identification scale. Authoritarianism’s effect on partisanship, as found in the 2006
survey, is both statistically and substantively significant. It is also greater than
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Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) stand-in for ideology (a support for government
spending scale), moral traditionalism (based on a two-question scale), race (with African
Americans omitted and Hispanics included), income – which, referencing Stonecash
(2000), Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue is “an increasingly important predictor of
party identification” (p. 146), education, age, and church attendance.154
Unfortunately, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) dutifully warn readers twice,
only half of the 675 survey respondents to the 2006 ANES were asked a partisanship
question. Thus, their intriguing theory that authoritarianism is driving party polarization
rests on survey results from a sample of just 249 Americans – a sample from which the
most authoritarian group in the United States, African Americans, was excluded.
To deepen the understanding of the role, if any, of authoritarianism in partisan
polarization and the effect of adding African Americans into the analysis, I pooled data
from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys.155 This extended the time
frame of Hetherington and Weiler’s partisanship inquiry by six years and yielded a robust
sample of 8,549 when African Americans were excluded and 10,925 with African
Americans included. As with all analyses in this dissertation, authoritarianism, gender,
age, education, and church attendance were included in the model. The dependent
variable is partisanship in which 0 is a strong Democrat and 1 is a strong Republican. All
variables were either scaled on a 0 to 1 interval or were binary. Finally, an ordinal
dummy variable for each survey year was appended to the data and an interaction term
multiplying authoritarianism and survey year was created to assess the effect of
authoritarianism on party identification over time. If the interaction term is positive and
154

All variables were converted to 0-to-1 scales (or 0 and 1 intervals) to allow for direct comparison of
coefficients.
155
The partial sample from the 2006 ANES survey (N=249) is not included in the pooled data.
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statistically significant there is evidence that authoritarianism has had an increasing
influence on partisanship. In other words, authoritarians became more Republican during
the twenty year period studied.
Table 18 reports the results of the analysis with and without African Americans.
In the first data column in which African Americans are excluded from the sample the
interaction term between authoritarianism and survey year is positive and statistically
significant, meaning that authoritarianism has indeed had an effect on partisanship during
the 20 years studied.

Table 18
Partisanship as a function of authoritarianism 1992-2012
Ordinal dummy variable for survey years. All non-binary variables scaled 0 to 1.

Nonblack Americans
Authoritarianism

All Americans

0.056 **
Std. Err .

0.024

Year

-0.080 ****
Std. Err .

Interaction: Authoritarianism*Year
Std. Err .

0.020

0.019

0.059 **

-0.055 ****
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

0.023

-0.080 ****

0.107 ****
0.030

Gender

-0.011

0.028

-0.063 ****

0.007

0.007

-0.014

-0.004

0.016

0.014

0.131 ****

0.128 ****

0.013

0.012

0.121 ****

0.089 ****

0.008

0.008

0.403

0.417

0.019

0.018

R-Squared

0.05

0.035

N

8954

10925

Source: Pooled Data 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys.
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS model.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

The interaction term in the second data column, which reports findings for a
sample that includes African Americans, is also positive and significant. Thus, even with
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the inclusion of African Americans in the analysis, authoritarianism had an effect on
partisanship. This effect, however, is less than what is observed when African Americans
are excluded from the analysis.
While Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) conclusion that authoritarianism’s effect
on partisanship is the equivalent of more than 2 points on the 7-point party identification
scale seems to overstate reality, the core of their thesis appears intact. Authoritarianism is
a factor in partisan polarization among nonblack Americans. To a lesser extent, this
finding also appears true even when African Americans are included in the analysis.
Chapter Summary
Through their work, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have demonstrated the
importance of revivifying the study of authoritarianism’s effect on political behavior.
Their theories of authoritarianism are central to our current understanding of the
predisposition. But, as I have argued in this chapter, the theories are also not without
flaws.
Since authoritarianism is defined as a predisposition that crosses racial, cultural,
and ethnic boundaries and the child-rearing question currently used to estimate it is valid
across races, excluding African Americans, the most authoritarian group in America,
from any study of authoritarianism’s effect on partisan identification is theoretically
problematic. Moreover, including African Americans in the analysis yields intriguing
insights and puzzles.
While Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that African American and White
authoritarians hold similar worldviews and attitudes on a wide range of issues that engage
their authoritarian predisposition, Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) argument that
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authoritarianism underlies the growing difference between Republican and Democratic
partisans on race, morality, and defense does not hold up when African Americans are
considered. That said some of Hetherington and Weiler’s keen insights still ring true even
with African Americans included in the analysis. Most importantly, in contests for
President and the House of Representatives, authoritarianism appears to be an
explanatory factor in the defection of partisan Democrats to Republican candidates.
The effect of authoritarianism on vote choice is one of the harbingers of partisan
sorting predicted by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). The data from 2008 and 2012 and
House races shows it may well be afoot. But the culmination of the evolution of the
authoritarian worldview – partisan polarization driven by authoritarianism – does not
appear as advanced as Hetherington and Weiler argued. Their conclusion, however, may
have simply been premature.
The 20 years of pooled data examined in this Chapter demonstrates that
authoritarianism has driven some change in the partisan identification of nonblacks. And
even when African Americans are included in the analysis, authoritarianism has
influenced party identification.
In the near future, the process of White authoritarian movement into the
Republican Party may be hastened by the rise of Trumpism. And the presence of
authoritarians like Ben Carson within the Republican leadership may also be a precursor
to the movement of some African American authoritarians away from the Democratic
Party. In either case, the importance of the study of authoritarianism to attitudes, vote
choice, and partisanship is no longer a fringe concern of political scientists, it is central to
our understanding of politics in America and, quite possibly, the world.
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CHAPTER 8
AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANISM IN BLACK AND WHITE
The conundrum at the core of my dissertation is this: How can African Americans
be described simultaneously by political scientists as one of the most liberal and most
authoritarian groups in the United States? This puzzle framed the central question
explored over the last seven chapters and provoked a cascade of other queries.
I have argued that the political behavior of many African Americans is caught in a
tug of war between their racial identity and their predisposition to authoritarianism. When
the issue at hand engages African Americans’ authoritarian predisposition,
authoritarianism can trump racial identity, produce attitudes that defy conventional
wisdom, and dash the common theoretical assumption that African American political
behavior is homogeneous. Counter to some of the accepted theories of political science, I
have also demonstrated that African American authoritarians are less likely to agree their
individual fate is linked to their racial identity, African American political behavior is not
always more liberal than Whites, and African American worldviews and political
behaviors, when viewed through the lens of authoritarianism, are quite often
heterogeneous and differentiated.
Based on these findings, I contend that any theory of authoritarianism must
include African Americans in its analysis or, at least, present very persuasive arguments
for their exclusion. The fact is that 65 years after Adorno et al.’s (1950) Authoritarian
Personality was published, the study of authoritarianism finds itself once again at a cross
roads. Authoritarianism was originally conceived as a universal personality trait whose
scope recognized no cultural, racial, geographic, or political boundaries. But the central
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theories of authoritarian activation and polarization today are predicated on data that
exclude the most authoritarian racial group in America – African Americans – from
analysis.
It is time for political science to revise the contemporary research on
authoritarianism to include African Americans. This is not an abstract exercise. It is a
theoretical necessity. The result will not only improve the study of authoritarianism; it
will also advance the broader inquiry that is political science as some of the discipline’s
theoretical certainties become shibboleths, the collateral damage of an empirical inquiry
into American Authoritarianism in Black and White.
What contributions do the examination of my core question and the resulting
addition of African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism make to political
science? There are at least six.
First, my investigation takes the study of authoritarianism back to its universal
roots. By adding African Americans back into this important realm of inquiry, I explore
issues and concerns not considered by contemporary scholars. As such, my inquiry is
corrective. It acknowledges key scholarly works already completed while underscoring
the importance of including African Americans in analyses to deepen and refine our
understanding of American authoritarians.
Second, defining six components of the authoritarian worldview and using them
to explore similarities and differences between the worldviews of White and African
Americans is a unique approach. Using these six components to identify issues that
should theoretically engage authoritarians and then comparing the attitudes of White and
African American authoritarians on these issues tills new empirical ground.
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My examination of the congruency of worldview and attitudes among White and
African American authoritarians expands on Kinder and Winter’s critical insights on the
racial divide (1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001). To review, Kinder and Winter found that
differences of opinions between Whites and Blacks were driven by particular principles –
not linked fate (in-group identification) or racial resentment (out-group resentment) – and
limited to race and social welfare issue domains.
Building on this work, I asked whether congruence on worldview principles
among Whites and Blacks (the principles that comprise the authoritarian worldview)
leads to similarities in opinions on issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition. I
demonstrated that when African Americans’ authoritarian worldview is engaged and the
issue at hand does not cross into race and social welfare domains, the attitudes of White
and Black authoritarians are, most often, similar.
My third contribution is the conceptualization of authoritarianism as a shield
people use to protect themselves from real and imagined threat. This builds on recent
research that found, “Authoritarianism is, in part, a response to [societal] rejection
associated with stigma” (Brandt & Henry, 2012, p. 1301). And it leads to a concept that is
unlikely to be articulated or even explored by contemporary studies of authoritarianism
that exclude African Americans and other minorities from their analysis. I call this
concept the Irony of Intolerance. It links directly to Stenner’s (2005) important
authoritarian dynamic theory. Here is how it works.
Threat to norms activates authoritarians and authoritarian aggression. This is
Stenner’s (2005) authoritarian dynamic theory. Those who feel threatened and
stigmatized by activated authoritarians act to protect themselves. They meet authoritarian
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threats and stigmatization with their own authoritarian response. This is what I call the
Authoritarian Shield. The result is a cycle of aggression and response leading to greater
authoritarian behavior among in-groups and the groups they stigmatize. This cycle is the
Irony of Intolerance.
While the label Authoritarian Shield is new, the theory on which it is based is not.
In 1957, in a forgotten or ignored study, C. U. Smith and Prothro (1957) advanced it to
explain the higher levels of authoritarianism they found among Blacks in the South. Their
insight offers a possible theoretical explanation for the prevalence of African American
authoritarianism that I look forward to developing in future years.
Fourth, as I alluded to earlier, bringing African Americans back into the study of
authoritarianism challenges some accepted theories, builds on others, and raises new
questions that are central to our understanding political behavior and critically important
in a world in which authoritarianism is on the rise.
For example, my findings challenge the Black utility heuristic and the findings of
those scholars who contend that African Americans’ political behavior is monolithic.
Empirically, it is not. Whether considering African Americans’ political worldviews,
behaviors, or chosen identities, it is clear their opinions, attitudes, and group
identifications are simply not homogeneous.
My results refute the newly advanced claim that the child-rearing questions on
which the authoritarian scale is based are variant. When “both” is simply omitted as a
response option, the questions are invariant and excellent estimators of authoritarianism.
And my research also qualifies but supports the theory that authoritarianism is the
causal agent behind American political polarization. With data pooled from 20 years of
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polling and African Americans added to the analysis, I find the authoritarian-driven
political polarization theorized by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) is slower than what
they found but still extant with or without the inclusion of African Americans.
I believe it may simply take longer for authoritarians to find their way into the
Republican Party than Hetherington and Weiler (2009) expected. Or, quite possibly, the
right event may not yet have come along to catalyze the sorting more completely.
Perhaps the candidacy of Donald Trump will be the precipitating event that spurs a
partisan realignment driven by authoritarianism. In either case, the 2016 election provides
an important laboratory and impetus for further study of authoritarianism in American
politics.
My fifth contribution is to raise a caution – a warning flag – that at a minimum
contemporary scholars whose work appears to make universal claims about
authoritarianism but whose methods focus on just one or more racial group must either
explicitly qualify their findings or provide compelling reasons for excluding what will
soon comprise the majority of Americans. If a methodological choice is made to focus on
one subgroup, that choice must be thoroughly explained and the universality of the
findings resulting from it qualified. As such, Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009)
contention that nonauthoritarians become more authoritarian when confronting physical
threats – and Stenner’s (2005) theory of the authoritarian dynamic – forfeit claims to
universality because African Americans and (in Stenner’s work) Latinos are excluded
from the analysis.
Theoretically, authoritarianism has always been conceptualized as a universal
condition. It is not limited to Europeans or Whites. Authoritarianism does not
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discriminate. It is a predisposition that is found in every culture and among all races.
Bringing African Americans back into the scholarly discussion of American
authoritarianism is not a luxury; it is a scientific necessity.
The inclusion of Black in analyses of authoritarianism in America yields a sixth
contribution to political science – some specific findings that I briefly summarize next.
To start, I find that while the worldviews of White and African American authoritarians
are remarkably similar, the worldviews of African American authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians are quite different, underscoring the heterogeneity of African
Americans attitudes and behaviors.
In terms of political behavior, an analysis of 12 national polls spanning 22 years
reveals that White and African American authoritarians hold remarkably similar views on
a bevy of issues that are theorized to activate authoritarianism, including the rights of
gays and lesbians, the role of immigrants and immigration in America, the use of force
and American power, the importance of first amendment rights in a threatening
environment, the religious and civil rights of Muslims, and even the legalization of
marijuana.
These findings contradict the conventional scholarly tenet that African Americans
and Whites “disagree consistently and often substantially” on national policy issues
(Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 439). As with worldview, it is African American
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians who are statistically dissimilar on these issues.
Moreover, many of these issues are the key wedge concerns identified by Hetherington
and Weiler that are thought to be the causal force behind polarization in America.
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I also demonstrate that authoritarianism is consistently more prevalent among
African Americans than Whites, adding empirical heft to Hetherington and Weiler’s
(2009) assertion that “African Americans are the most authoritarian racial group by far”
(p. 141). And by bringing African Americans back into the analysis of authoritarianism, I
begin to establish that threat is not a one-size-fits-all concept and should not be treated as
such theoretically. Some threats are symmetric and perceived equally by White and
Blacks, such as the threat to person and family from terrorism. Other threats are
asymmetric and perceived differently by Whites and Blacks, such as the fear of losing a
job, worries about neighborhood safety, or fears of local police.
Finally, my dissertation underscores the danger of making sweeping, empirically
unproven assumptions about the attitudes and behaviors of particular people and groups.
For too long, some political scientists have assumed that African Americans are a
homogenous and monolithically behaving group. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Race is not the sole identity that governs the behavior of African Americans – or Whites
for that matter – just as ethnicity is not the only identity that determines the attitudes of
Latinos. People possess multiple identities that influence their political attitudes and
behavior. The key question is which identity or identities are activated or predominate
before an attitude is expressed.
In terms of African Americans, when their racial identity is fully engaged, certain
behaviors will result. Thus, as Kinder and Winter (2001) argue, when issues of race or
social welfare are on the table, African Americans’ racial identity will govern and
produce what has been categorized as liberal, homogeneous responses. However, when
issues that engage only the authoritarian worldview are under discussion, the behaviors of
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African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians will be heterogeneous – and the
attitudes of White and Black authoritarians will be similar.
Identity activation and the relative importance or hierarchy of activated identities
are the fundamental drivers of individual behavior, not the theoretically static and broad
brush concept of racial identity. And as identities go, authoritarianism is a potent player.
The fact is authoritarianism is a powerful force that structures not only the way
some White Americans behave, but also the way many African Americans think and act
politically. The widely held assumption that African American opinion is homogeneous
and that African Americans have no choice but to embrace their identity as a member of a
racially-stereotyped underclass is simply wrong.
The authoritarianism of African Americans matters. In many cases, it is not
trumped by racial identity. Exploring African Americans authoritarianism and
understanding how, when, and under what conditions authoritarianism shapes the
behavior of all Americans, including African Americans, is an important undertaking for
anyone concerned about securing the future of democracy in the United States.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THREAT AND AUTHORITARIANISM
Whether it activates authoritarians (Stenner, 2005) or causes nonauthoritarians to
behave like authoritarians (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), threat is a powerful shaper of
authoritarian behavior. But when it comes to threat, one size does not fit all. Racial
differences in authoritarian behavior may be explained by asymmetrically perceived or
experienced threats. And over time, threat and the psychological furies that accompany it
may have differentially increased African Americans predisposition to authoritarianism.
Authoritarian behavior is antithetical to democracy (Fromm, 1994; Stenner,
2005). When exacerbated by clear and present threat, it can put democratic ideals
(therington & Suhay, 2011) and democracy itself at risk (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009).
It may be behind the partisan polarization in America today (Hetherington, 2009;
Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). It may also be influencing the candidates for President,
U.S. Senate (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) and the House of Representative for whom
some voters cast their votes.
The potential attitudinal and behavioral consequences of threat-driven
authoritarianism form an important and full research agenda. In this chapter, I hope to
move that agenda a small step forward by broadening the scope of inquiry of one
important new theory of authoritarian behavior – Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and
Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction thesis.
I ask if their theory that a negative interaction exists between threat and
authoritarianism is universal or threat specific. In other words, when confronted by threat
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do nonauthoritarians always act more authoritarian and, Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011)
keen insight, is the “effect of threat” always the “largest on the less authoritarian and
smallest on the more authoritarian” (p. 553)?
The implications of Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and
Suhay’s (2011) theory are quite important. The possibility that threat always elicits a
more authoritarian response from nonauthoritarians than authoritarians has significant
political and policy implications. It also raises numerous concerns about the ability of
states and societies to maintain democratic institutions and protect liberties when
confronted by external and internal threats. For if threat always causes nonauthoritarians
to demand authoritarian solutions and act more authoritarian than the most authoritarian
among us, then the pillars on which democracy rests stand on a thixotropic foundation
whose support liquefies when faced with threat.
I contend, however, that a negative interaction between threat and
authoritarianism is threat specific and not universal. Thus, there will be certain threats
that do not cause a more authoritarian reaction in nonauthoritarians than authoritarians.
To test this hypothesis, I use the national identity card question from the LAPOP
2008 survey (one of the questions used by Hetherington and Suhay [2011] in their work)
and change the threat variable specified to determine if different threats do indeed
produce different outcomes that are counter to the expectations of the negative interaction
theory. The threat used by Hetherington and Suhay on this question was the personal fear
of terrorism, which I demonstrated earlier affects African and White Americans
symmetrically. In what follows, I replace the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by
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police, which is perceived asymmetrically by African and White Americans.156 Both of
these threats appear in the national identity card question wording. Conveniently,
perceptions of these threats are also estimated in different questions asked of LAPOP
2008 survey respondents, enabling a comparison of the different interaction of these
threats with authoritarianism and the dependent variable – support for a national identity
card.
The exploration of the universality of a negative interaction between threat and
authoritarianism begins with a review of Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and
Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) theory that is followed by a test of my hypothesis. I
find that the negative interaction thesis is specific to the threat specified and not
universal.
The Negative Interaction Theory
Hetherington and Suhay (2011) submit that in the presence of normative or
physical threat it is nonauthoritarians who become more aggressive and authoritarian,
while authoritarians, already in a state of heightened vigilance born from anxiety, have
“little place to travel in terms of their opinions” (p. 547).157 Thus, in the presence of
mortal physical threat or moral normative danger, nonauthoritarians become more
aggressive and behave more like authoritarians.
The statistical implications and behavioral ramifications of Hetherington and
Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction theory are

156

The question used to estimate this variable asks (using a seven point scale) whether respondents trust or
do not trust the police. The scale ranges from “do not trust at all” to “trust a lot.” In my analysis, I consider
those who do not trust the police at all fear them while those who trust the police a lot do not fear them.
157
Statistically, “authoritarianism has a very large [substantive] effect when people perceive less
threat…[but when people] express feeling high levels of threat, knowing whether a person is authoritarian
or not provides no guidance” to behavior (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
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clear. When threat and authoritarian independent variables’ signs are positive and
combined in an interaction term, the sign of the resulting interaction term will be
negative, indicating an inverse relationship between the effect of threat and
authoritarianism on the dependent variable in question. Ironically, then, when normative
and corporeal threats rise in salience, Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington
and Suhay’s (2011) theory predicts that the increasing public demand for authoritarian
action, including actions like the abridgement of civil rights and the use of force
internally and externally, emanates from nonauthoritarians who are alerted to the danger,
not authoritarians. It is nonauthoritarians who become more aggressive in the presence of
physical and normative threat, while authoritarians, already chronically near the apex of
aggressive behavior, have much less room for their aggressiveness to grow.
Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) theory is
founded on the assumption that authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are not only moved
differently by threat, but also perceive threat in a different way. Authoritarians stuck in a
perpetual state of hypervigilance feel threatened constantly. Compared to authoritarians,
nonauthoritarians are less likely to feel threatened. As such, when threat has not been
primed, authoritarians – no matter what their race – will be statistically more fearful of
normative and physical threats than nonauthoritarians. On the other hand, when threat has
been primed, nonauthoritarians’ reaction to threat will resemble the aggressive response
of authoritarians. In this circumstance, threat will be a more important variable for
explaining behavior than authoritarianism.
In testing their negative interaction theory, Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
operationalize threat in two ways. Normative threat is estimated from two questions on
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the standard ANES moral traditionalist battery that they argue get to the root of
normative threat (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hunter, 1992; Layman, 2001).158
Hetherington and Weiler call this the moral threat posed by “Newer Lifestyles.”
Physical threat is estimated using a question that personalizes it and links threat to
a prevalent concern. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) use, “How worried are you that you
personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?”159 to measure physical threat.
The variable is labeled in their data tables: “Perceived Threat from Terrorism”
(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 551).
Both threats are combined with authoritarianism to produce independent variables
that account for the interaction between authoritarianism and normative threat or
authoritarianism and physical threat on different dependent variables.i The graphs of
predicted probabilities that result, which are displayed in Chapter 6 of Hetherington and
Weiler’s book (2009) and in Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) paper that appeared in the
American Journal of Political Science comport with their theoretical expectations.
Nonauthoritarians who are the most threatened by normative or physical threats to
personal safety act more authoritarian than the most threated authoritarians.
Negative Interaction Theory Reexamined
The list of clear and present physical threats to personal safety and well-being,
however, are certainly not limited to terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 4, the LAPOP
2008 survey, one of the datasets used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011) to assess the
personal, physical dimension of their negative interaction theory, offers three other
158

The two questions used to scale perceptions of normative threat are: 1. “The world is always changing
and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes,” and 2. “We should be more tolerant of
people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our
own.” The two omitted questions focus on the rights of gays and lesbians.
159
Wording from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study – CCES.
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measurements of physical threat that may be both more immediate and hit closer to home
than terrorism for many Americans. The survey asked respondents whether they worried
about losing their job, the safety of their neighborhood, and the trustworthiness of the
police. As was demonstrated earlier, racial differences exist between authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians perceptions of threat on each of these questions. These differences run
counter to Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011)
assumptions and are not observed when analyzing the threats (“Newer Lifestyles” and
terrorism) they used to examine their negative interaction theory. The different
perceptions of these three threats lead to an obvious question: What are the implications
for the negative interaction theory when a physical threat other than terrorism is
estimated?
Again, I expect that in the presence of a different threat a negative interaction
between authoritarianism and threat will not exist. Thus, the attitudes of those who
perceive the threat similarly will vary according to their estimated authoritarianism and,
as a consequence, nonauthoritarians who feel most threatened will not react in a more
authoritarian manner than authoritarians who also feel most threatened.
To explore this hypothesis, I turn to one of the dependent variables from the
LAPOP 2008 survey used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011) (the national identity card
question) and replace the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by the police160 to
ascertain whether the negative interaction thesis is universal or idiomatic to the threat
specified.

160

The fear of police is estimated from a question on the LAPOP 2008 survey that asks how much people
trust police. The answer scale is seven points. It is hypothesized that those who do not trust police at all fear
them.
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Two potential threats – terrorism and police – appear in the wording of this
question.161 In their analysis, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) multiply authoritarianism
by terrorist threat to produce an interaction term.162 As predicted, their regression model
finds a negative interaction between authoritarianism and terrorism threat variables, and
the predicted probability graphs generated from the data demonstrate that differing
perceptions of threat have less effect on authoritarians than nonauthoritarians
In my analysis, I replace the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by the
police163 and estimate predicted probabilities of African American support for the
national identity card as authoritarianism, fear of police, and the resulting interaction term
are varied across their ranges and all other independent variables, including partisanship,
age, religiosity, sex and education are held at their mean values.164 The graph resulting
from this predicted probability analysis is the opposite of what the negative interaction
theory predicts (Figure 64).

161

The question asks: “To curb terrorism, how strongly would you agree or disagree (on a 7-point scale) to
requiring that all citizens carry a national identity card at all times to show a police officer on request?”
162
The question in the LAPOP 2008 survey reads: “How worried are you that you or someone in your
family will become a victim of terrorism?” The questions Hetherington and Suhay (2011) use to specify the
personal, physical threat embodied by terrorism in their article on threat and authoritarians have different
question wordings and response scales. In the 2006 CCES the question asks: “How worried are you that
you personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?” Possible answers are offered on a 4-point scale
that ranges from “Not Worried at All” to “Very Worried.” The 2008 LAPOP survey question responses
range from “Not at All” to “A Lot” and are arrayed across a 7-point scale. The survey question wording is
also somewhat different than the 2006 CCES question. Hetherington and Suhay note that the mean threat
responses from the different questions with different answer scales in the two surveys were quite similar – a
.33 mean for the 2006 CCES and a .30 mean for the 2008 LAPOP question.
163
The fear of police is estimated from a question on the LAPOP 2008 survey that asks how much people
trust police. The answer scale is seven points. It is hypothesized that those who do not trust police at all fear
them.
164
This is the approach used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011).
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Figure 64: African Americans’ support for National Identity Card.

Instead of threat having a minimal effect on authoritarians and its maximum effect on
nonauthoritarians as the negative interaction theory predicts, the opposite occurs.
Nonauthoritarian African Americans who feel more threatened by police do not act more
authoritarian than African American authoritarians. Support for the national identity card
varies with authoritarianism. Authoritarianism structures support for the national identity
card, not threat.
Using the same statistical approach, in which threat, authoritarianism and the
interaction term vary across their ranges and other independent variable are held at their
means, to generate predicted probabilities of support for a national identity card among
White voters produces a second graph that is also antithetical to the expectation of the
negative interaction theory (Figure 65).
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Figure 65: White Americans’ support for National Identity Card.

When the perception of threat is held constant across the authoritarian scale, the more
authoritarian a person is, the more likely that person is to support a national identity card.
Conclusion
In the important realm of personal physical threats, the negative interaction theory
is not universal. The nature of each personal threat and how the threat is perceived
determines if nonauthoritarians actually behave more like authoritarians and whether
authoritarians concern about a threat is already at it apex or not.
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APPENDIX B
NATIONAL SURVEYS USED IN THIS DISSERTATION
Table 19
National surveys used in this dissertation
Survey Dataset
1 American National Election Studies, 1992 T ime Series Study
Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J, Rosenstone, and the
National Election Studies.

Sample Description
3284 total eligible respondents, including

Method
T elephone interview

1769 respondents previously interviewed in the 1990 ANES (1992 panel respondents)
1515 additional respondents (new cross-section cases)
2485 completed pre-election interviews (1359 panel, 1126 new)
2255 completed post-election reinterviews (1250 panel, 1005 new)

2 American National Election Studies, T he 2000 T ime Series Study
University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies

2984 total eligible respondents (cross section, all fresh cases)

Face-to-face and telephone

1807 completed pre-election interviews
1555 completed post-election reinterviews

3 T he National Election Studies, T he ANES 2004 T ime Series Study
University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies

1833 total eligible respondents (cross section, all fresh cases)

Face-to-face

1211 completed pre-election interviews
1066 completed post-election reinterviews

4 T he National Election Studies, T he ANES 2008 T ime Series Study
University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies

2322 completed pre-election interviews (cross section, all fresh cases)

Face-to-face and ACASI

2102 completed post-election reinterviews

(Audio Computer-Assisted Self
Interviewing)

5 T he American National Election Studies, T he ANES 2010-2012 Evaluations of

1189 respondents (cross section, all fresh cases)

Internet

2054 respondents (face-to-face, cross section, 2 oversamples, all fresh cases)

Face-to-face, CASI and Internet

Government and Society Study (EGSS), EGGS 1 Survey
University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies

6 T he American National Election Studies, T he ANES 2012 T ime Series Study
Stanford University and the University of Michigan

7 T he 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Vanderbilt University Module

3860 respondents (internet, cross section, internet panel group)

36000 respondents (Common Content)

Internet

1000 respondents (Vanderbilt T eam Content)

8 T he 2008 AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opion Project (LAPOP)

1500 respondents

Internet

1500 respondents

Internet

1512 respondents

T elephone

11 T he 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Univeristy of Massachusetts Module

2500 respondents (Univeristy of Massachusetts T eam)

Internet

12 2015 National Poll of Registered Voters, University of Massachusetts (Sponsor)

1911 respondents

Internet

Vanderbilt University

9 T he 2012 AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opion Project (LAPOP)
Vanderbilt University

10 Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race and Sexuality (WISER), 2011 Survey
University of Washington

Matthew C. MacWilliams, Researcher
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 20
Incidence of authoritarianism in African and White Americans over time as measured by the fourquestion, child-rearing scale.
Year
Survey

American National Election Studies, 1992
American National Election Studies, 2000
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American

African American
Authoritarian
%

White American
Authoritarians
%

Sample
Size

1992
2000
2008

42.01
31.45
32.68

N=269

2008
2011

39.20
32.84

N=523

2012
2014

36.30
29.31

N=945

16.02
12.40
16.85

N=159
N=153

Sample
Size
N=1692
N=1,226
N=1,092

Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), United States, 2008
American National Election Studies, 2008
Washington Institute for the Study of

N=341

17.07
7.57

N=1,084

16.71
16.83

N=3,243

N=872

Ethnicity, Race and Sexuality, 2011
American National Election Studies, 2012
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2014

N=232

N=1,515

Note: Authoritarians are those scoring 1 on the child rearing scale w here "0" is Not At All Authoritarian and "1" is Completely Authoritarian

Table 21
Mean authoritarian scores for African Americans and White Americans
0 is Nonauthoritarian and 1 is Authoritarian

1992 ANES

African Americans
White Americans
Difference of Means
P-value
N

2000 ANES

2008 LAPOP

2008 ANES

2011 WISER

2012 ANES

Mean Score
0.5601
0.7083

Mean Score
0.5601
0.7083

Mean Score
0.7173
0.5476

Mean Score
0.7756
0.5962

Mean Score
0.7056
0.4839

Mean Score
0.7405
0.564

2014 UMASS
CCES
Mean Score
0.6929
0.5383

0.1483

0.1483

0.2052

0.1181

0.1181

0.2440

0.1546

<0.0001
518

<0.0001
518

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

1,245

1607

1213

4188

1747

Sources: American National Election Studies 1992, 2000, 2008, and 2012, Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011,
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), United States, 2008, UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.
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Table 22
African Americans’ mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale
0 is Least Racially Resentful and 1 is Most Racially Resentful

1992 ANES

2000 ANES

2004 ANES

2008 ANES

2011 WISER

2012 ANES

Mean Score
0.2453
0.3842

Mean Score
0.3689
0.4615

Mean Score
0.3077
0.4312

Mean Score
0.4614
0.4940

Mean Score
0.2726
0.3832

Mean Score
0.3506
0.4151

0.1389

0.0926

0.1235

0.0326

0.1106

0.0644

P-value, one tailed

0.0008

0.0079

0.0269

0.0883

0.0115

0.0157

P-value, two tailed

0.0016

0.0157

0.0538

0.1766

0.0230

0.0314

N

209

106

122

346

717

719

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality, 2011.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Table 23
White Americans’ mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale
Where 0 is Least Racially Resentful and 1 is Most Racially Resentful

1992 ANES

2000 ANES

2004 ANES

2008 ANES

2011 WISER

2012 ANES

Mean Score
0.5139
0.6631

Mean Score
0.5684
0.7057

Mean Score
0.5036
0.7088

Mean Score
0.5909
0.7095

Mean Score
0.4764
0.7204

Mean Score
0.5272
0.7360

0.1493

0.1373

0.2052

0.1186

0.2440

0.2088

P-value

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

N

1186

840

501

743

430

2377

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.
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Table 24
Racial resentment
Where 0 is the Least Racially Resentment and 1 is the Most

African Americans

Authoritarianism

2011 WISER
0.156 ***

Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

White Americans
2011 WISER
0.237 ****

0.055

0.034

0.005

-0.011

0.031

-0.167 **
Std. Err.

Education

0.078

-0.047 ****

0.018

-0.031
0.044

-0.027 ***

African Americans

White Americans

2012 ANES
0.090 ***
0.028

0.026 *
0.015

-0.002 ***
0.001

-0.026 ****

2012 ANES
0.194 ****
0.013

-0.015 ****
0.007

0.000 **
0.000

0.030

Std. Err.

0.013

0.008

0.007

0.003

Party Identification

0.014

0.045 ****

0.021 ****

0.042

Std. Err.

0.011

0.004

0.006

Church Attendance

-0.021

-0.001

0.017

Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

0.002

-0.041 ***

0.032

0.020

0.017

0.009

0.515

0.468

0.442

0.481
0.020

0.088

0.053

0.041

R-Squared

0.11

0.27

0.06

0.28

N

283

707

908

3166

Source: American National Election Studies 2012 & Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 25
Linked fate
1 is Fate is Linked A Lot, 2 is Some, 3 is Not Much and 4 is Not At All

African Americans
Authoritarianism

1.491 ****
Std. Err .

0.410

Gender

0.485 **
Std. Err.

0.23

Age

-0.173
Std. Err.

0.135

Education

-0.186 **
Std. Err.

0.091

Party Identification

0.099
Std. Err.

0.074

Church Attendance

-0.053
Std. Err.

0.23

Cut 1

-0.271

Cut 2

0.963

Cut 3

1.744

Count R2

0.42

Adjusted Count R2

0.06

N

299

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Figure 66: Linked fate among African Americans.
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Table 26
Linked fate 2012
1 is Fate is Linked A Lot, 2 is Some, 3 is Not Much, and 4 is Not At All

African Americans
Authoritarianism

0.823 ***
Std. Err .

0.245

Gender

0.568 ****
Std. Err.

0.127

Age

-0.002
Std. Err.

0.004

Education

-0.136 **
Std. Err.

0.057

Party Identification

0.109 **
Std. Err.

0.049

Church Attendance

0.209
Std. Err.

0.144

Cut 1

-0.412

Cut 2

1.167

Cut 3

1.449

Count R2

0.40

Adjusted Count R2

0.07

N

899

Source: American National Election Studies 2012.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 27
Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism by racial group
On 0 to 1 Scale w here 0 is Not Worried At All and 1 is Worried A Lot

African Americans
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

1.382 **
0.582

-0.171
Std. Err.

Age

0.307

-0.051
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

White Americans

1
2
3
4
5
6

0.841 ****
0.191

0.412 ****
0.115

0.156 **

0.190

0.063

0.049

0.066 **

0.094

0.027

-0.147

-0.041

0.109

0.039

-0.388

0.367 ***

0.320

0.133

-0.623

0.156

0.445

1.232

0.951

1.958

1.927

2.831

2.577

3.678

3.025

4.460

Count R2

0.322

0.318

Adjusted Count R2

0.038

-0.004

149

1042

N

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using Ordinal Logistic regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 28
Authoritarians and moral traditionalism (2008 ANES and 2012 ANES data)
On 0 to 1 Scale w here 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional

African Americans

White Americans

African Americans

White Americans

2008 ANES

2008 ANES

2012 ANES

2012 ANES

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

0.108 ***

0.128 ****

0.118 ****

0.034

0.023

0.022

0.012

0.003

0.006

-0.063
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

-0.171 ****

0.199 ****

0.044

0.029

0.016

0.007

0.009

0.051 ****

0.002 ****

0.003 ****

0.009

0.010 *

0.007

0.000

-0.002

0.006

0.000

-0.009 ***

Std. Err.

0.006

0.004

0.005

0.003

Party Identification

0.002

0.031 ****

0.010 **

0.047 ****
0.002

Std. Err.

0.006

0.003

0.004

0.101 ****

0.106 ****

0.075 ****

Std. Err.

0.018

0.015

0.013

0.008

0.37

0.284

0.299

0.129

Std. Err

0.049

0.031

0.032

0.019

R-Squared

0.12

0.31

0.11

0.42

N

487

1025

914

3168

Church Attendance
Intercept

Source: 2008 and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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0.12 ****

Table 29
Authoritarians and moral traditionalism when authoritarianism and church attendance are both
estimated across a five-point scale
On 0 to 1 Scale w here 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional

African Americans

White Americans

2008 ANES

2008 ANES

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

0.105 ***

0.116 ****

0.034

0.023

-0.055
Std. Err.

Age

-0.16 ****

0.044

0.029

0.012
Std. Err.

Education

0.05 ****

0.009

0.007

0.009 *

-0.005

Std. Err.

0.006

0.004

Party Identification

0.003

0.029 ****

Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

0.006

0.003

-0.032 ****

-0.035 ****

0.005

0.004

0.488

0.453

0.051

0.037

R-Squared

0.12

0.33

N

487

1025

Source: 2008 American National Election Studies survey.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 30
Authoritarians and moral traditionalism with party identification omitted from the model
On 0 to 1 Scale w here 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional

African Americans

White Americans

2008 ANES

2008 ANES

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

0.106 ***

0.140 ****

0.033

0.023

-0.054
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

-0.186 ****

0.043

0.029

0.012

0.048 ****

0.009

Education

0.007

0.008 *

-0.001

Std. Err.

0.006

0.004

Party Identification

omitted

omitted

Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

omitted

omitted

-0.032 ****

-0.042 ****

0.005

0.004

0.495

0.545

0.050

0.038

R-Squared

0.12

0.327

N

497

1034

Source: 2008 American National Election Studies survey.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 31
Struggle between good and evil in the world and people must choose
7 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 is Strongly Agree

African Americans
Authoritarianism

White Americans

2.416 ****
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

0.602

0.197

0.247

0.124

0.326

0.115

-0.195
Education

Education

1.604 ****

0.758

0.248

-0.248 **
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

1.542 ****

-0.134 ***

0.116

0.039

0.013

0.277 ****

0.010

0.028

0.683 **

0.740 ****

0.330

0.137

-0.930

-0.241

-0.219

0.320

0.303

0.845

1.211

1.717

1.547

2.497

2.337

3.307

Count R2

0.342

0.340

Adjusted Count R2

0.067

0.097

149

1042

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

N

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 32
Use science to solve important problems
5 Point Scale Where 1 is Alw ays and 5 is Never

African Americans
Authoritarianism

White Americans

0.443 **
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

0.120

0.350 ***

0.551 ****

0.124

-0.004
Std. Err.

0.004

Education

0.128 **
Std. Err.

Party Identification

0.057

-0.012

Std. Err.

1.503 ****

0.238

0.067

0.010 ****
0.002

-351.000 ****
0.032

0.151 ****

0.048

0.017

0.304 **

0.197 **

0.143

0.083

-1.293

-1.383

-0.131

0.775

0.932

1.843

3.624

4.779

Count R2

0.406

0.436

Adjusted Count R2

0.002

0.150

904

3127

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4

N
Source: American National Election Studies 2012.

Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression model. The p-value for authoritarianism
used is one-tailed because the hypothesized direction of the effect of authoritarianism on the
dependent variable w as clearly stated.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 33
African Americans – trust of government and institutions
7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot

Congress
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification

1.390 **

Government In
Washington
1.946 ***

Political
Parties
1.719 ***

President
2.104 ***

0.587

0.603

0.595

0.738

-0.465

-0.022

0.178

-0.181

0.324

0.318

0.321

0.349

-0.187

-0.033

-0.055

0.476

0.761

0.774

0.753

0.861

-0.093

-0.078

-0.032

-0.140

0.113

-0.307 ***

0.110

-0.011

0.114

-0.375 ****

0.130

0.434 ****

Std. Err.

0.097

0.095

0.102

0.109

Church Attendance

0.393

0.457

0.773 **

0.287

Std. Err.

0.331

0.324

0.337

0.359

-1.61

0.479

-0.789

2.150

-0.660

1.269

0.328

2.878

0.106

1.999

1.473

3.377

1.704

3.131

3.168

4.016

2.313

4.414

4.526

4.912

4.601

6.414

5.667

7.253

Count R2

0.336

0.349

0.349

0.604

Adjusted Count R2

0.039

0.030

0.102

0.017

149

149

149

149

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

N

1
2
3
4
5
6

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 34
White Americans – trust of government and institutions
7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot)

Congress
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

0.153

Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Party Identification

Political
Parties
0.314 *

President
0.893 ****

0.186

0.190

0.187

0.201

0.418 ****

0.233 **

0.209 *

0.020

0.113

0.113

0.119

-0.373

-0.16

0.494 **

0.113

-0.711 ***

Education

Government In
Washington
0.502 ***

0.237

0.237

0.236

0.251

0.028

0.033

0.021

0.032

0.038

-0.105 ****

0.038

0.099 ****

0.038

-0.052 *

0.041

0.619 ****

Std. Err.

0.027

0.027

0.027

0.033

Church Attendance

0.109

0.282 **

0.447 ***

0.464 ***

Std. Err.

0.131

0.132

0.135

0.136

-1.707

-0.499

-0.981

1.882

-0.711

0.391

-0.073

2.541

0.094

1.136

0.805

3.08

1.182

2.153

1.984

3,817

2.663

3.528

3.754

4.696

4.277

5.464

6.118

5.990

Count R2

0.240

0.244

0.259

0.430

Adjusted Count R2

0.014

0.021

0.037

0.119

N

1043

1043

1040

1043

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 35
African Americans – trust of government and institutions with ideology added into the model
7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot

Congress
Authoritarianism

2.155 ***

Std. Err . 0..663

Gender

-0.164
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Ideology
Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Political
Parties
2.122 ***

President
2.493 ***

0.673

0.665

0.850

0.251

0.226

0.124

0.355

0.353

0.349

0.398

0.121

0.498

0.129

0.506

0.827

0.852

0.817

0.934

-0.196

-0.176

-0.102

-0.310

0.127

0.124

0.125

-0.184

0.107

-0.232 *

0.117

-0.575 ***

Church Attendance

Government In
Washington
2.598 ****

0.115

-0.483 **

0.125

-0.527 ***

0.154

0.574 ****
0.141

-0.148

0.197

0.201

0.196

0.227

0.635 *

0.716 **

0.879 **

0.505

0.367

0.357

0.368

0.404

-1.964

0.332

-1.372

2.203

-0.863

1.266

-0.074

3.020

-0.109

2.084

1.209

3.509

1.628

3.340

2.89

4.212

2.177

4.46

4.139

4.992

4.434

6.361

5.121

7.261

Count R2

0.362

0.362

0.346

0.638

Adjusted Count R2

0.080

0.047

0.126

0.042

127

127

127

127

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

N

1
2
3
4
5
6

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 36
White Americans – trust of government and institutions with ideology added into the model
7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot

Congress
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

0.185

Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Ideology

President
0.767 ****

0.205

0.203

0.215

0.394 ***

0.224 *

0.225 *

0.120

0.120

0.120

0.119

0.127

-0.454 *

-0.207

0.391

0.248

0.249

0.246

0.264

0.032

0.038

0.021

0.031

0.039

-0.065 *
0.036

-0.170 **
Std. Err.

0.131

Church Attendance

0.195

Std. Err.

Political
Parties
0.336 *

0.201

-0.811 ***

Education

Government In
Washington
0.529 **

0.039

0.116 ***
0.036

-0.073
0.074

0.34 **

0.040

-0.013

0.043

0.546 ****

0.036

0.041

-0.14 *

0.281 ****

0.074

0.078

0.541 ****

0.325 **

0.138

0.139

0.142

0.144

-1.963

-0.591

-1.161

2.167

-0.940

0.306

-0.216

2.838

-0.118

1.071

0.658

3.371

0.966

2.069

1.829

4.074

2.477

3.497

3.541

4.973

4.032

5.281

5.874

6.314

Count R2

0.241

0.243

0.253

0.430

Adjusted Count R2

0.020

0.020

0.037

0.125

947

947

945

947

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

N

1
2
3
4
5
6

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 37
African Americans – Presidential power or democratic principles
Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree

Authoritarianism

President: Limit Voice &
Vote of Opposition to
Insure Progress
1.578 **

Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err

Age
Std. Err

Education

President: Govern Without
Congress When Congress
Hinders Work
1.628 **

0.623

0.642

0.618

1.334 ****

1.016 ***

0.366

0.364

0.363

0.328

1.162

0.460

-0.403

0.806

0.784

-0.373 ***
Std. Err

Party Identification
Std. Err

President: Ignore Supreme
Court When Court
Hinders Work
1.418 **

-0.376 ***

0.125

-0.056

0.128

0.118

0.329 ***

0.168 *

0.103

0.100

0.004

0.611 *

0.338

0.340

0.335

0.716

0.885

0.038

1.13

1.40

0.58

1.911

1.914

1.112

3.769

3.001

2.414

5.138

4.084

3.734

5.442

5.178

4.459

Count R2

0.483

0.450

0.362

Adj. Count R2

0.115

0.057

0.010

149

149

149

Church Attendance
Std. Err

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

N

0.100

0.775

-0.280

-0.198 ***

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

271

Table 38
White Americans – Presidential power or democratic principles
Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree

Authoritarianism

President: Limit Voice &
President: Govern Without
President: Ignore Supreme
Vote of Opposition to
Congress When Congress
Court When Court
Insure Progress
Hinders Work
Hinders Work
1.261 ****
1.200 ****
0.964 ****

Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err

Age
Std. Err

Education

0.208

0.203

0.198

0.879 ****

0.777 ****

0.393 ***

0.123

0.121

0.117

-0.287

0.185

0.272

0.252

0.246

-0.134 ***
Std. Err

Party Identification
Std. Err

-0.162 ****

0.042

0.19 ****

0.245

-0.188 ****

0.041

0.040

0.309 ****

0.086 ***

0.029

0.030

0.028

-0.104

-0.044

0.051

0.140

0.138

0.135

1.044

1.143

0.133

1.50

1.74

0.77

1.933

2.323

1.313

3.357

3.339

2.503

4.683

4.190

3.409

5.308

4.999

4.289

Count R2

0.490

0.442

0.414

Adj. Count R2

0.035

0.033

-0.013

N

1042

1042

1041

Church Attendance
Std. Err

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 39
African Americans – majoritarian rule or democratic principles
Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree

When People Decide What's
Right Must Prevent Minority
Opposition
1.144 **

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

Those Who Disagree With
Majority Are a Threat to
Country

0.58

0.377
Std. Err

Age
Std. Err

Education
Std. Err
Std. Err

0.636

1.053 ***

0.322

0.352

1.391 *

0.476

0.760

-0.409 ****

Party Identification

1.856 ***

0.752

-0.562 ****

0.117

0.135

0.148

0.158

0.101

0.098

0.412

0.434

Std. Err

0.325

0.337

/cut1

-0.548

0.13

/cut2

-0.124

0.91

/cut3

0.615

1.59

/cut4

1.801

2.79

/cut5

2.76

3.62

/cut6

3.489

4.40

0.322

0.416

Adj. Count R2

0.07

0.103

N

149

149

Church Attendance

Count R2

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 40
White Americans – majoritarian rule or democratic principles
Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree

When People Decide What's
Right Must Prevent Minority
Opposition
1.491 ****

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err

Age
Std. Err

Education

Those Who Disagree With
Majority Are a Threat to
Country
0.202

0.478 ****

0.463 ***

0.116

0.118

0.910 ****

0.983

0.243

-0.215 ****
Std. Err

Party Identification
Std. Err

1.670 ***

0.195

0.245

-0.165 ****

0.039

0.041

0.161 ****

0.161

0.027

0.028

-0.054

-0.055

Std. Err

0.133

0.136

/cut1

0.118

0.838

/cut2

0.784

1.519

/cut3

1.453

2.246

/cut4

2.493

3.399

/cut5

3.41

4.165

/cut6

4.204

4.971

0.332

0.392

Adj. Count R2

0.05

0.019

N

1042

1042

Church Attendance

Count R2

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

274

Table 41
African Americans – support for democratic principles
Ten Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disapprove to Strongly Approve

Authoritarianism

Protecting Right to Vote
of People Who Say Bad
Things About Am. Govt.
-2.799 ***

Std. Err .

Allowing People Who Say
Protecting Right of People
Bad Things About Am. Govt. Who Say Bad Things About
To Demonstrate Peacefully
Am. Govt.To Run for Office
-1.842 ***
-3.434 ****

0.840

Gender

0.693

-0.463
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

-1.047 ***

Std. Err.

0.867

-0.637

0.459

0.378

0.518

0.473

0.387

0.279

0.353

0.362

1.098

0.906

0.568 ***

Party Identification

0.949

-1.257 **

Prohibiting People Who Say
Bad Things About Am. Govt.
From Mak ing Speeches on TV
-2.585 ***

0.29 **

1.241

1.133

0.379

0.224

0.162

0.134

0.183

0.167

-0.027

-0.179

-0.174

0.018

Std. Err.

0.139

0.114

0.157

0.143

Church Attendance

0.49

0.220

0.254

-0.411

Std. Err.

0.467

0.385

0.527

0.482

Intercept

7.208

9.407

8.310

8.174

Std. Err

0.999

0.824

1.129

1.030

R-Squared

0.18

0.13

0.15

0.10

N

149

149

149

149

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001

Table 42
White Americans – support for democratic principles
Ten Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disapprove to Strongly Approve

Authoritarianism

Protecting Right to Vote
of People Who Say Bad
Things About Am. Govt.
-2.251 ****

Std. Err .

Gender

0.290

-0.449 **
Std. Err.

Age

0.174

-1.290 ****
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification

Allowing People Who Say
Protecting Right of People
Bad Things About Am. Govt. Who Say Bad Things About
To Demonstrate Peacefully
Am. Govt.To Run for Office
-1.618 ****
-2.55 ****
0.226

-0.391 ***
0.135

-1.117 ****

0.313

-1.186 ****
0.188

-1.224 ***

Prohibiting People Who Say
Bad Things About Am. Govt.
From Mak ing Speeches on TV
-2.400 ***
0.285

-0.857
0.171

-1.844

0.364

0.283

0.392

0.357

0.165 ***

0.222 ****

0.392 ****

0.298

0.059

-0.099 **

Std. Err.

0.041

Church Attendance

-0.050

0.046

-0.126 ****
0.032

0.317 **

0.063

-0.125 ***

0.058

-0.133

0.044

0.04

-0.267

-0.096

Std. Err.

0.204

0.159

0.220

0.2

Intercept

9.044

9.297

8.181

8.477

Std. Err

0.312

0.242

0.335

0.306

12

0.15

0.20

0.20

1041

1042

1040

1042

R-Squared
N

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS regression.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 43
African Americans – views of “The Other”
Seven Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 7 is Strongly Disagree

Authoritarianism

If Certain Groups Stay in
Their Place, We Would
Have Fewer Problems
-2.199 ****

Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification

Inferior Groups
Should Stay
In Their Place
-1.876 ****

0.507

0.513

-0.478 *

-0.324

Sometimes Other
Groups Must Be Kept
In Their Place
-1.613 ***
0.495

-0.545 **

0.264

0.262

0.264

0.182

1.093 *

0.661

0.611

0.619

0.616

0.598 ****

0.590 ****

0.567 *****

0.105

0.107

0.104

0.039

0.013

-0.022

Std. Err.

0.091

0.089

0.090

Church Attendance

0.061

-0.250

0.098

Std. Err.

0.262

0.264

0.262

-1.284

-0.715

-0.727

-0.968

-0.575

-0.487

-0.692

-0.393

-0.246

-0.318

0.227

0.216

-0.025

0.498

0.491

0.277

0.753

0.628

Count R2

0.644

0.649

0.650

Adjusted Count R2

0.035

0.027

0.028

306

305

305

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

N

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 44
White Americans – view of “The Other”
Seven Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 7 is Strongly Disagree

Authoritarianism

If Certain Groups Stay in
Their Place, We Would
Have Fewer Problems
-1.583 ****

Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

Inferior Groups
Should Stay
In Their Place
-1.749 ****

0.281

0.295

0.279

0.142

0.109

0.071

0.146

-0.695 **
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification

Sometimes Other
Groups Must Be Kept
In Their Place
-1.557 ****

0.154

0.144

-0.501

-0.650 *

0.347

0.362

0.347

0.312 ****

0.259 ****

0.372 ****

0.065

0.067

-0.100 ***

-0.059 *

0.064

-0.067 **

Std. Err.

0.034

0.035

0.033

Church Attendance

-0.162

-0.091

-0.051

Std. Err.

0.156

0.164

0.154

-2.550

-0.274

-1.958

-2.099

-2.395

-1.579

-1.795

-2.029

-1.290

-1.146

-1.392

-0.596

-0.775

-1.087

-0.308

-0.445

-0.761

0.064

Count R2

0.581

0.633

0.571

Adjusted Count R2

0.012

0.000

0.026

767

753

772

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

N

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 45
American pride and American mythos
Five Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 5 is Strongly Disagree

African Americans

Authoritarianism

I Am Proud To Be
An American
-1.524 **

Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

White Americans
I Am Proud To Be
An American
-0.981 ****

Std. Err.
Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

If You Work Hard
You Can Succeed
-1.700 ****

0.608

0.472

0.462

0.319

0.299

-0.091

0.243

0.373
0.841

-0.202

Party Identification

If You Work Hard
You Can Succeed
-1.743 ****

White Americans

-0.167
-2.267 ***

Education

African Americans

0.147

0.028

0.250

0.269

0.166

-1.403

0.990

0.417

0.605

0.662

0.406

0.283 **

0.076

0.206 ***

0.119

-0.177 **

0.108

0.076

0.077

-0.230 ****

0.118

0.060

0.092

0.039

-104

-0.237

0.141

0.159

0.374

0.284

0.268

0.180

-1.116

1.829

0.727

0.700

0.419

3.361

2.195

1.900

0.656

3.809

2.319

2.016

1.379

4.785

3.157

3.278

Count R2

0.878

0.901

0.708

0.720

Adjusted Count R2

0.000

0.000

-0.011

0.004

319

816

319

819

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4

N

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 46
Gays and lesbians running for office
On a 1 to 10 Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 10 is Strongly Agree

African Americans
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

White Americans

-2.174 **
0.886

0.285

-0.611
Std. Err.

Age

-0.857 ****

0.483

0.171

-1.078
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

-2.400 ****

-1.844 ****

1.158

0.357

0.319

0.298 ****

0.171

0.058

-0.322 **
0.146

-0.133 ***
0.040

-1.706 ***

-0.096

0.492

0.200

9.581

8.477

1.053

0.31

R-Squared

0.18

0.20

N

149

1042

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 47
African Americans – gay and lesbian issues
Question 1: Where 1 is Allow ed, 2 is Not Allow ed but Civil Union Allow ed, and 3 is No Legal Recognition at All
Question 2: Where 0 represents Yes and 1 represents No
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Favor Strongly and 4 is Oppose Strongly
Question 4: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Strong Yes and 4 is Strong No

Q1: Gay Marriage

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

Q2: Gay Adoption

Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Education

1.309 ****

0.998 **

0.252

0.302

0.397

0.431

-0.382

-1.370 *

Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

-0.34 **

1.384 ***

0.129

0.151

0.525

0.786

0.010 **

0.008

-0.015

0.006

0.004

-0.072

Party Identification

Q4: Allow Gays to
Serve in the Military

1.198 ****
-0.187

Age

Q3: Laws Protecting
Gays From Discrimination

0.005

-0.201 ***

0.108

-0.211 ***

0.111

-0.129 *

0.059

0.069

0.068

0.070

0.064

0.073

0.016

-0.018

0.049

0.057

0.068

0.072

1.235 ****

1.263 ****

0.386 *

0.512 **

0.153

0.171

0.199

0.209

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3

0.752

0.022

1.017

2.416

0.816

1.992

n/a

1.569

2.513

Count R2

0.457

0.665

0.481

0.570

Adjusted Count R2

0.157

0.205

-0.004

-0.005

900

878

482

484

N

Sources: Questions 1 & 2 -- American National Election Studies 2012.
& Questions 3 & 4-- American National Election Studies 2008.
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for Questions 1, 3, and 4. Logit analysis w as used for Question 2.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 48
White Americans – gay and lesbian issues
Question 1: Where 1 is Allow ed, 2 is Not Allow ed but Civil Union Allow ed, and 3 is No Legal Recognition at All
Question 2: Where 0 represents Yes and 1 represents No
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Favor Strongly and 4 is Oppose Strongly
Question 4: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Strong Yes and 4 is Strong No

Q1: Gay Marriage

Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

Q2: Gay Adoption

1.638 ****

1.767 ****

0.707 ***

0.131

0.161

0.241

-0.236 ***
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

-0.499 ****

0.072

0.088

0.020 ****

0.023 ****

0.002

-0.153 ****

Party Identification

Q3: Laws Protecting
Gays From Discrimination

0.003

-0.177 ****

-2.548 ****
0.731

0.12 *
0.069

-0.098 **

Q4: Allow Gays to
Serve in the Military
0.873 ***
0.241

-1.703 *
0.533

0.141
0.069

-0.129 *

0.034

0.041

0.045

0.047

0.403 ****

0.341 ****

0.259 ****

0.175

0.019

0.023

0.033

0.033

1.082 ****

1.184 ****

0.107

0.343 **

0.089

0.104

0.152

0.153

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3

2.817

1.198

1.077

4.861

2.318

2.382

n/a

3.066

2.865

Count R2

0.566

0.743

0.537

0.563

Adjusted Count R2

0.261

0.279

-0.009

0.015

N

3167

3128

1011

1019

Sources: Questions 1 & 2 -- American National Election Studies 2012.
& Questions 3 & 4-- American National Election Studies 2008.
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for Questions 1, 3, and 4. Logit analysis w as used for Question 2.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 49
African Americans – civil liberties
Question 1: 7 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 Strongly Agree
Question 2: Where 0 represents Should and 1 represents Shold Not
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Stongly Acceptable and 4 is Strongly Unacceptable

Q1. Require National ID Card
To Prevent Terrorism
Authoritarianism

1.764 ***
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

Q2. Media (Should/Should Not
Report Info on Secret Methods
Used to Fight Terrorism
3.928 ***

0.600

1.506

0.414

1.606 *

Std. Err.
Std. Err.

-1.994 *
1.155

-0.568

0.327

0.889

1.151

-0.024

0.776

0.032

0.030

-0.213

0.356

-0.348 ***

Party Identification

Q1: Electronic Surveilliance
Allowed in U.S. Without Warrant

0.722

-0.07 **

0.115

0.330

0.291

0.051

0.364

-0.615

0.096

0.327

0.281

0.482

-1.340

0.208

0.326

0.830

0.697

n/a

-1.643

n/a

n/a

0.439

n/a

-0.112

n/a

-5.858

0.572

n/a

-4.332

0.992

n/a

-3.746

2.022

n/a

n/a

2.950

n/a

n/a

3.445

n/a

n/a

Count R2

0.322

0.783

0.617

Adjusted Count R2

0.082

0.375

0.100

149

46

47

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

N

Sources : Question 1 -- The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Questions 2 and 3 -- Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2006.
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for questions 1 and 3 and a Logit regression for question 2.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 50
White Americans—civil liberties
Question 1: 7 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 Strongly Agree
Question 2: Where 0 represents Should and 1 represents Shold Not
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Stongly Acceptable and 4 is Strongly Unacceptable

Q1. Require National ID Card
To Prevent Terrorism
Authoritarianism

1.153 ****
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

Q2. Media (Should/Should Not)
Report Info on Secret Methods
Used to Fight Terrorism
1.872 ****

0.195

0.327

0.168

0.581 ***

Std. Err.
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

-1.232 ****
0.282

-0.188

0.114

0.197

0.167

0.839 ****

0.000

-0.009 *

0.238

0.005

-0.058

Party Identification

Q1: Electronic Surveilliance
Allowed in U.S. Without Warrant

-0.183 **

0.038

0.072

0.071 ***

0.588 ****

0.027

0.056

0.099

0.509 **

0.005

0.127 **
0.063

-0.678 ****
0.048

-0.044

0.132

0.255

0.202

n/a

-1.643

n/a

n/a

0.439

n/a

0.230

n/a

-3.420

0.742

n/a

-2.853

1.180

n/a

-2.487

1.747

n/a

n/a

2.131

n/a

n/a

2.980

n/a

n/a

Count R2

0.322

0.786

0.716

Adjusted Count R2

0.017

0.392

0.500

N

1043

737

743

Intercept
Std. Err

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4
5
6

Sources : Question 1 -- The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Questions 2 and 3 -- Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2006.
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for questions 1 and 3 and a Logit regression for question 2.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 51
CIA and torture
Where 0 represents Torture Not Allow ed and 1 represents CIA Allow ed to Torture

African Americans

Authoritarianism

White Americans

Should the CIA Be Allowed to
Torture Suspected Terrorists
1.937 ***

Std. Err .

Gender

Should the CIA Be Allowed to
Torture Suspected Terrorists
1.084 ****

0.743

0.371
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

0.233

-0.190 ****

0.400

0.139

-1.034

0.057

0.944

0.291

0.033

-0.065

0.139

0.047

0.347 ***

0.329

0.121

0.034

-0.570

-0.252

0.406

0.164

-2.147

-1.282

0.891

0.249

Count R2

0.646

0.674

Adjusted Count R2

0.071

0.346

147

1040

Intercept
Std. Err

N

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.
Note: All estimates produced using a Logit regression model.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 52
Feelings toward immigrants (2004 data)
On 0 to 100 Scale w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

2004 ANES
African Americans
Mean Score
46.67
44.81

2004 ANES
White Americans
Mean Score
43.57
33.55

1.86

10.02

P-value

0.7923

<0.0001

N

116

501

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians
Difference of Means

Source: 2004 American National Election Studies survey
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.
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Table 53
Feelings toward illegal immigrants
On 0 to 100 Scale Where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

African Americans
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

White Americans

-1.344 **

-1.582 ****

0.612

0.352

0.085
Std. Err.

Age

-0.075 ****

0.353

0.190

-0.334
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Intercept
Std. Err
R-Squared
N

-1.221 ***

0.859

0.459

0.135

0.079 ****

0.144

0.084

0.089

-0.347 ****

0.121

0.044

0.293

0.297

0.353

0.205

4.721

6.244

0.983

0.552

0.029

0.134

294

773

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS modell.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 54
African American attitudes on immigrants and immigration
Questions 1 & 2: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Stongly Agree and 5 is Strongly Disagree
Question 3: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Increased a Lot and 5 is Decreased a Lot)

Q1: New Immigrants
Are A Burden
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender

-1.211 ***

Q2: More Jobs for Immigrants Q3: Immigration Should Be
Means Fewer Jobs for
Increased or Decreased
People Lik e Me
-0.849 **
0.504 **

0.388

-0.804 ****
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

0.392

0.251

-0.197

-0.020

0.230

0.225

0.575

-0.265

0.521

0.557

0.460 ****

0.504 ****

0.129

0.013 ***
0.004

-0.073

Std. Err.

0.091

0.092

0.059

Party Identification

0.038

0.068

0.009

Std. Err.

0.077

0.077

0.051

Church Attendance

0.016

-0.027

0.108

Std. Err.

0.220

0.226

0.149

-0.090

0.526

-2.435

0.768

1.260

-1.203

0.990

1.439

1.405

1.984

2.261

2.507

Count R2

0.402

0.461

0.521

Adjusted Count R2

0.149

0.202

0.000

316

308

897

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4

N

Source: Questions 1 & 2 -- Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011
& Question 3 -- American National Election Studies 2012.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 55
White American attitudes on immigrants and immigration
Questions 1 & 2: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Stongly Agree and 5 is Strongly Disagree
Question 3: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Increased a Lot and 5 is Decreased a Lot)

Q1: New Immigrants
Are A Burden
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification

-1.492 ****

Q2: More Jobs for Immigrants Q3: Immigration Should Be
Means Fewer Jobs for
Increased or Decreased
People Lik e Me
-0.601 **
1.581 **

0.253

0.250

0.119

-0.03

-0.254 *

0.241

0.133

0.134

0.066

0.327

0.242

0.005 ***

0.309

0.323

0.002

0.327 ****

0.393 ****

-0.24

0.059

0.061

-0.083 ***

-0.112 ****

0.031

0.112

Std. Err.

0.030

0.032

0.017

Church Attendance

0.107

-0.142

-0.435

Std. Err.

0.144

0.146

0.083

-0.969

-0.744

-2.650

0.168

0.203

-1.170

0.374

0.360

0.991

1.402

1.456

2.021

Count R2

0.384

0.408

0.427

Adjusted Count R2

0.079

0.027

0.066

791

781

3134

Cut
Cut
Cut
Cut

1
2
3
4

N

Source: Questions 1 & 2 -- Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011
& Question 3 -- American National Election Studies 2012.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 56
State laws that require state and local police to stop a person if there is a reasonable
suspicion that person is an undocumented immigrant
O is Opposed, 1 Neither Support of Oppose, and 2 is Favor

African Americans
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age

White Americans

1.060 ****
0.253

0.133

0.029

-0.110

0.129

0.076

-0.006
Std. Err.

Education

0.018 ****

0.004

0.002

-0.323 ****
Std. Err.

Party Identificatiom
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

Cut 1
Cut 2
Count R2

1.367 ****

-0.215 ****

0.059

0.036

0.095 *

0.408 ****

0.050

0.020

-0.038

-0.219 **

0.148

0.099

-0.64
0.481

0.657
1.813

0.459

0.671

Adjusted Count R2

0.11

0.175

N

911

3162

Source: American National Election Studies 2012
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression model.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 57
Bivariate analysis: Feelings toward Muslims
On 0 to 100 Scale Where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

African Americans
Mean Score

White Americans
Mean Score

Non Authoritarians
Authoritarians

0.7000
0.5984

0.6433
0.4644

Difference of Means

0.1016

0.18

P-value

<0.0386

<0.0001

N

220

452

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Table 58
Multivariate analysis: Feelings toward Muslims
On 0 to 100 Scale w here 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling

African Americans
Authoritarianism

White Americans

-1.733 ***
Std. Err .

Gender

0.577

-0.132
Std. Err.

Age

0.332

0.169
Std. Err.

Education
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Church Attendance
Std. Err.

-1.382 ****
0.364

0.303 ****
0.196

-0.477 ***

0.198

0.117

0.120

0.240 ****

0.135

-0.209 *

0.090

-0.367 ****

0.112

0.045

0.065

0.012

0.335

0.214

7.055

7.853

0.976

0.591

R-Squared

0.05

0.16

N

292

731

Intercept
Std. Err

Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS modell.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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Table 59
Legalization of marijuana
Where 0 is Favor, 1 is Neither Favor or Oppose, and 2 is Oppose

African Americans
Authoritarianism
Std. Err .

Gender
Std. Err.

Age
Std. Err.

Education

White Americans

0.910 ****

0.936 **

0.249

0.123

0.299 **

0.286 **

0.127

0.069

0.011 ***

0.017 **

0.004

0.002

-0.121 **
Std. Err.

Party Identification
Std. Err.

Chruch Attendance
Std. Err.

0.042 **

0.058

0.032

0.115 **

0.238 **

0.048

0.018

0.586 ****

0.965 ***

0.149

0.089

Cut 1
Cut 2

0.862

2.373

2.147

3.561

Count R2

0.445

0.534

Adjusted Count R2

0.116

0.224

910

3169

N

Source: American National Election Studies 2012.
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression model.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001
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APPENDIX D
HISTORIC AND EPIGENETIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO AUTHORITARIANISM
The asymmetric threats experienced by African Americans day in and out are
without a doubt an important source of the higher rate of authoritarianism measured
consistently among Americans Blacks. Obviously, these threats are not recent
manifestations. They are historic. And in all likelihood, their historical provenance and
persistence also plays a role in shaping African American authoritarianism today in two
different ways.
1. Historic Threat: Cumulative Effect
Any history of the United States demonstrates unequivocally that the current clear
and present threats experienced daily by African Americans are not an aberration. These
contemporary threats are nested in 400 years of “American terrorism – Jim Crow and
lynching – as well as American barbarism – slave trade and slave labor” (West, 2001, p.
XIII) .
The cumulative effect on this history on African Americans as individuals, as well
as the ramifications for Black identity, culture and social structure in the United States,
has been thoroughly documented. While characterizing this literature in a sentence or two
is a fool’s errand, one scholar’s words come close to capturing the consequences of four
centuries of oppression inflicted on African Americans. He wrote, “Black people in the
United States differ from all other modern people owing to the unprecedented levels of
unregulated and unrestrained violence directed at them” (C. West, 2001, p. XIII).
The cumulative effect of more than 400 years of asymmetric violence is a legacy
of threat, anxiety and stress that echoes within African Americans today and, as Davis
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(1995) argues, produces an authoritarian intolerance that serves “as an emancipatory
strategy to protect Blacks from groups who directly threaten their physical and
psychological security” (1995, p. 1).
The mechanism that transmits and, quite possibly, cumulates these effects across
generations is epigenesis.
2. Epigenetic Effects165
As the regulator of which genes are expressed or suppressed, epigenetics sits at
the crossroads between inheritable traits and environmental conditions. Epigenetics is an
“emerging field… which attempts to understand how information not coded by the DNA
sequence is inherited” (Gaisler-Salomon, 2014, p. SR12). It may also be the third factor –
after contemporary and historic asymmetric exposures to threat – behind African
Americans’ disproportional predisposition toward authoritarianism.
There are two recognized pathways of epigenetic change. The first is contextdependent on pre and postnatal environmental conditions. The second is “germ linedependent… and occurs when the modified epigenome [which might have been modified
initially by changed environmental conditions] is permanently incorporated into the germ
line” and then manifests itself without recurring environmental factors (Crews et al.,
2012, p. 9143). Over 400 years, acting like a one-two punch, these epigenetic
mechanisms may have made African Americans more susceptible and reactive to threat
and, as a consequence, more dispositionally authoritarian.

165

Epigenetics was originally defined as “the study of how the environment shapes the phenotype” (Crews
et al., 2012, p. 9143). It has also been defined as “the sum of all those mechanisms necessary for the
unfolding of the genetic programme for development” (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 76). In layman’s terms
“epigenetics literally means beyond genes; it essentially represents a code put on top of an existing genetic
code. DNA… determines the genetic code…epigenetics regulates the expression of our genes” (Provencal,
2011, p. 6).
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The context-dependent environmental transmission of stress from one generation
to the next, and its consequences on behavior and biology, has been observed and studied
by numerous scholars. For example, researchers have found that the children of
Holocaust survivors have a greater response to trauma than others and “are particularly
vulnerable to psychological distress” (Baider et al., 2000, p. 904) . Eighty years after the
Armenian genocide by Turkey, survivors and their families exhibit continuing behavioral
effects (Kupelian, Kalayjian, & Kassabian, 1998). The progeny of Japanese Americans
locked away in internment camps across the Western United States during World War II
showed higher levels of behavioral stress (Nagata, 1990). “Persistent changes in the
epigenome” of children exposed prenatally to the post World War II famine in The
Netherland indicated that even “transient environmental conditions” can have long term
biological consequences (Heijmans, Tobi, Lumey, & Slagboom, 2009, p. 8). And “studies
suggest that genocides in Rwanda, Nigeria, Cambodia, Armenia and the former
Yugoslavia have brought about distinct psychopathological symptoms in the offspring of
survivors” (Gaisler-Salomon, 2014).
The evidence of germ-line epigenetic inheritance across generations is contested.
A recent study of twins166 suggests “that environmental influences… are important
factors’ in epigenetic transmission while heredity appeared to affect only one of the
genes167 (and only in males) of the three genes tested. Other published research has found
that “ancestral environmental exposures… promote epigenetic transgenerational
inheritance and influence all aspects of an individual’s life history” (Crews et al., 2012, p.
9143), including the transmission of information across generations through changes in
166

The study (Crews et al., 2012) researched changes in three genes associated with antisocial behavior,
depression, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
167
The MAOA gene implicated in antisocial behavior (Crews et al., 2012).
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germ cells (Champagne, 2008; Champagne & Meaney, 2007; Franklin, Linder, Russig,
Thony, & Mansuy, 2011; Weiss, Franklin, Vizi, & Mansuy, 2011). And one leading
study indicated that unpredictable stress experienced by female rats before they became
pregnant affected the brain and germline, “and its effects [the effect of stress] on brain
and behavior persist into the next generation” (Zaidan, Leshem, & Gaisler-Salomon,
2013, p. 684).
The role of transgenerational epigenetic change in authoritarianism in general and
African American authoritarianism in particular is speculative, but intriguing. It should
be at the top of an interdisciplinary research agenda designed to explore the different
distributions of authoritarianism globally.
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